Corners and Why They Can Distort Prices
The New York Stock Exchange was organized much like a private social club, rather than being created under a special charter from the state legislature. That structure gave it considerable protection from interference by Albany.
Over the years, lawmakers repeatedly tried to tax Exchange transactions or interfere with speculation and investment. Most of these efforts failed.
After the famous Hannibal & St. Joseph “corner” in 1881, however, the New York Legislature saw another opportunity to intervene.
Newspapers had made the public excited about the subject, and some legislators decided that huge speculative deals were proof of moral corruption on Wall Street.
A Senate committee was formed to investigate “corners” and futures.
Several Wall Street men were called to testify before the committee.
I was one of them.
I appeared before the committee at the Metropolitan Hotel and answered every question they asked me. I also took the opportunity to explain why I believed speculation—and even the occasional corner—played a useful role in business.
Some members of the Legislature later wrote to me and said that I had made the subject especially clear.
So, since I apparently made a favorable impression, I will repeat the main points of what I told the committee.
“Gentlemen, speculation is simply a way of dealing with disagreements about what something will be worth in the future.
“People speculate today more than they did in the past because information moves much faster. Telegraphs and cables allow merchants and investors to know what is happening almost immediately.
“In earlier times, people often did not know how large a crop would be until it actually arrived at market.
“Today, we can usually estimate the size of a crop and many other factors affecting its future price long before it is harvested.
“That information naturally creates opportunities for speculation.
“Speculation brings together the best available opinions about future prices.
“There are always two sides.
“One side expects prices to rise. The other expects them to fall.
“In the end, the side whose judgment is supported by the actual facts usually wins.
“The struggle between the two sides helps push prices toward their proper level.
“That is why speculation can be beneficial to the country as a whole.
“When people speculate on falling prices, they are usually betting that there is too much of a particular product.
“If they are right, lower prices discourage further production. Producers begin shifting their resources toward goods that are in shorter supply.
“When people speculate on rising prices, they are usually expecting a shortage.
“Higher prices encourage producers to increase production, which eventually restores the balance between supply and demand.
“In this way, speculation helps regulate both prices and production.
“A corner is something different.
“It usually happens when speculation is carried too far.
“A seller may promise to deliver far more of a commodity or security than he can possibly obtain.
“Once that happens, he becomes completely dependent on the people holding the property he needs.
“But the damage from such situations is generally suffered by the speculators themselves, not by the public.
“A corner can produce extremely high prices, but those prices are usually temporary.
“They have relatively little influence on ordinary cash transactions.
“The public should therefore judge speculation by its general effects, not by a few spectacular excesses.
“When there is a shortage, speculation can raise prices immediately and encourage more production.
“When there is an oversupply, speculation can push prices down and discourage excessive production.
“In that sense, speculation is one of the business world's most useful protections against financial panics.
“It also creates markets for securities that might otherwise have no market at all.
“Railroads, for example, can raise money by selling their bonds in an active market.
“That money allows new railroads to be built, which increases the wealth of the country and creates better opportunities for workers.
“Speculation therefore often comes before enterprise and economic development.
“And corners are not unique to Wall Street.
“They exist in almost every kind of business.
“A. T. Stewart, the great dry-goods merchant, created more corners in merchandise during the later part of his career than almost anyone else in American business.
“He often bought or contracted for the entire production of certain kinds of goods.
“Once he controlled the supply, anyone who wanted those goods had to buy them from him.
“That gave him control over the price.
“Most large merchants operate in much the same way.
“Importing companies also deal constantly in futures.
“They sell goods by sample and promise to deliver them thirty days, six months, or even a year later.
“During that period, the goods may still have to be manufactured, grown, shipped thousands of miles, and imported.
“Without future contracts, much of this business would be impossible.
“Consider the grain trade.
“During periods of economic depression, the short sellers in grain provide an important source of activity.
“Without them, large European grain speculators might be able to force American grain prices down year after year and then buy our products for less than the cost of producing them.
“When America sells goods to Europe, we must receive a profit.
“Otherwise, the trade does not make the country richer.
“There is another interesting fact about corners.
“The people who create them often suffer the greatest losses themselves.
“That happened with the Hannibal and St. Joseph corner.
“John Duff of Boston was the man who conceived the operation.
“It ended in his financial ruin.
“The stock eventually rose to 350, although the short interest was only about 1,200 shares.
“The short sellers finally had to settle at 280.
“Something similar happened with the Northwest corner in 1872, which was manipulated by Jay Gould.
“The stock began around 80 and rose to 280.
“Then it collapsed back toward its original price.
“I believe Gould was acting largely on his own in that operation.
“It nearly ruined him, despite his remarkable ability to escape from difficult situations.
“Patents are also a form of corner, except that the law protects them.
“An inventor receives a monopoly over his invention for seventeen years.
“During that period, he can make and sell the patented product without competition.
“He may charge several times what the product would be worth in an open market.
“So if the Legislature intends to stop business enterprise, it is certainly taking the right approach by attacking corners.
“But I believe the result would be a disaster for the public.”
I still believe that the government should be extremely cautious about trying to regulate enterprise through special laws.
If lawmakers attempted to eliminate competition or speculation by force, business would become stagnant.
It would destroy the incentive to take risks, invest capital, and develop new enterprises.
The law of supply and demand is a far better regulator.
Congress once tried to suppress speculation in gold during the Civil War.
As soon as the law banning such speculation took effect, the premium on gold rose by 100 percent.
The lawmakers who had created the measure became so frightened by the result that they quickly repealed it.
The reason such laws so often fail is simple.
Whenever people have a strong reason to do something, they usually find a way around the law.
Usury laws provide an excellent example.
There are countless ways to evade restrictions on interest rates.
In practice, there is almost no limit to what a lender can charge if he is determined enough and willing to structure the transaction differently.
Daniel O'Connell once joked that he could drive a coach and six through any act of Parliament.
Jake Sharp held much the same opinion about Albany legislation.
He believed he could find a way to run a double-track horse-car railroad through almost any law the Legislature could write.
Sharp eventually met serious resistance, but his case demonstrated how difficult it is for legislation to control determined businessmen.
There is another reason legislators should not become too alarmed about corners.
Ordinary people rarely suffer serious losses from them.
The conspirators themselves are usually the ones who get hurt.
After a corner collapses, the people who created it often find themselves holding property at artificially high prices with no real market for it.
The property may then remain outside the speculative market for years.
Hannibal and St. Joseph provided a good warning.
After its corner, the stock was barely quoted for months.
Black Friday is another example.
The people directly involved in that operation suffered enormous losses.
It nearly destroyed Gould.
The moral damage followed him for years.
In the public mind, “Gould” and “Black Friday” became almost inseparable.
The farther one traveled from Wall Street, the more those two names became confused with each other.
I do not mean to say anything against George Gould.
He appears to be a promising young man.
His education was carefully managed, and his mother's influence, I understand, was especially good.
That kind of upbringing may help him overcome some of the disadvantages that often come with being born into great wealth.
If he has the natural intelligence required to become a successful financier, he may eventually forget that he grew up surrounded by luxury.
He may even take greater pride in the humble beginnings that made his father successful than in the family's magnificent Fifth Avenue residence, its beautiful estate at Irvington, or its yachts and private railroad cars.
I therefore have some hope that George Gould may prove to be an exception to the usual rule about the sons of wealthy men.
Corners also occur in ordinary merchandise.
Suppose a large merchant buys up nearly the entire supply of a particular product.
If nobody else has the same goods, that merchant has effectively created a corner.
There is one major difference between merchandise corners and Wall Street corners.
A Wall Street corner often turns against the people who create it.
A merchandise corner can sometimes last for years.
That was the case with A. T. Stewart.
His successors sometimes tried to maintain his system.
Judge Hilton failed badly at it, even though in some respects he was a more capable man than Stewart.
What Hilton lacked was Stewart's instinctive talent for creating and maintaining corners.
He was probably too familiar with the law and therefore too inclined to find ways around the corners instead of creating them.
One thing is certain.
Very few great merchants become extremely wealthy without gaining control over some part of their market.
These methods have played an important role in building large fortunes, and there is nothing inherently illegal about them.
The desire to control a market is deeply woven into the way business works.
It is part of the struggle for commercial survival.
I do not see how we can eliminate it without fundamentally changing the entire economic system.
The Constitution of the United States certainly contains no obvious prohibition against making legitimate business corners.
As Gladstone once said, it is one of the most remarkable achievements ever produced by the human mind.
I believe the Constitution protects the freedom to conduct such business, while the harmful consequences of speculation can be dealt with through ordinary business practices and ordinary laws.
To abolish corners completely would require a revolution in the economic system.
Trying to eliminate them one at a time through special legislation is another matter.
That approach often amounts to unfair discrimination.
Sometimes it looks suspiciously like legalized blackmail.
The truth is that it is almost impossible to legislate against corners without also attacking speculation itself.
And speculation is an important part of how prices are regulated, how businesses remain stable, and how financial panics are prevented.
Anyone with long experience in Wall Street, banking, or commerce can see that a market with somewhat inflated prices is generally preferable to a market suffering from severe depression.
Over time, the greater activity usually benefits the larger number of people.
I doubt even Jeremy Bentham's ghost could consistently argue against that conclusion.
The same principle applies to grain and other basic necessities.
I believe speculation in food commodities ultimately benefits consumers.
Consumers are generally better protected against shortages and famine when an active speculative market exists than they would be if speculation were completely eliminated.
Before leaving this subject, I should mention my own experience with corners.
In all my years in business, the only corner that ever caused me a truly serious financial loss was created by the State of Georgia.
Georgia had issued approximately eight million dollars in bonds.
They carried the state's great seal, were properly signed, and appeared to have been legally issued for full value.
I invested more than two million dollars of my own money in some of those bonds.
Soon afterward, the State of Georgia learned from a distorted report prepared by a committee sent to New York that all of those bonds were held outside the state.
The Georgia Legislature responded by passing a law repudiating the bonds.
Their value immediately collapsed from par to almost nothing.
When I discovered that my two million dollars in what I believed were perfectly sound securities could no longer be exchanged for greenbacks, I had the unpleasant feeling that I had been cornered myself.
Only this time, my opponent was not a Wall Street speculator.
It was the sovereign government of Georgia.
In the Harlem corner, which I discuss elsewhere, contracts to deliver the stock at 110 were eventually settled at 179.
About three million dollars were taken from the short sellers.
Several major brokerage houses collapsed under the pressure.
But the bulls ended up owning the entire capital stock of the company.
One broker had sold calls at 150.
When the stock rose to 250, the buyers demanded that he honor his contracts.
He refused.
“I don't see anything here about delivering,” he said.
“You can call all you like, but I don't have anything to deliver.”
It was a perfect example of a man making promises that became impossible to keep.
There were actually two Harlem corners.
In one, the Common Council was cornered.
In the other, the Legislature itself was cornered.
In the Rock Island corner, the bulls bought 20,000 more shares than actually existed.
The price rose from 110 to 150.
London financiers developed a strong dislike of corners.
For that reason, the London Stock Exchange was extremely cautious about listing American railroads, particularly companies with relatively few shares outstanding.
Corners are rarely profitable.
Unless the people creating one are prepared to buy and hold the entire property, they usually end up badly hurt.
Even when they succeed, the stock often disappears from the speculative market for a long time.
The Hudson corner was one of the more successful examples.
It produced a profit of about 12 percent.
The Rock Island corner produced about 4½ percent.
The earliest recorded Wall Street corner involved Morris Canal, a forgotten speculative favorite whose main claim to fame today is that it was the subject of the first recorded corner.
The stock had been pushed far above its real value, as speculative favorites often were.
Several operators began selling it short.
After the short selling continued for some time, a group of operators formed a pool to protect the stock.
They bought up the available shares and literally locked them away in a trunk.
The tactic was completely new to Wall Street.
The bears were stunned.
When they were later asked to settle their short positions, they became furious.
They accused the people behind the corner of conspiracy.
The bulls had a simple response.
“Why did you sell shares you didn't own and couldn't obtain?”
The dispute was eventually sent to the Board of Brokers for arbitration.
The Board was still relatively inexperienced in the more complicated tactics of speculation.
It decided that the short sellers had been treated unfairly and ruled in their favor.
The bears were therefore released from their obligations on the ground that the bulls had created an improper conspiracy.
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