England, Russia, and America’s Civil War
There has been a great deal of debate about how England and Russia treated the United States during the Civil War. The debate became especially heated after Russia went to war with Japan in 1904.
Some Americans argued that the United States should support Russia because Japan was allied with England, while England had supposedly favored the South during the Civil War. Russia, they claimed, had been friendly to the North and had even offered to send its navy to help the United States if England and France intervened.
That story, however, is not supported by the evidence.
It has often been said that Russia offered the United States the use of its warships in 1863, when a Russian fleet arrived in New York. According to the popular version of the story, Russia’s offer frightened England and France away from recognizing the Southern Confederacy.
But there is no official record of such an offer in either Russia or the United States.
If Russia had actually offered military assistance, President Lincoln and Secretary of State William Seward would certainly have known about it. More importantly, such an important international agreement could not have remained completely hidden for forty years.
The Russian ships came to New York simply as part of a naval cruise, just as another Russian fleet later visited New York in 1871.
The situation with England was more complicated.
It is true that many wealthy merchants and manufacturers in England, especially in Liverpool and Manchester, sympathized with the South during the Civil War.
But their attitude was largely based on business.
The war and the Union blockade had cut off the South's cotton exports to England. British manufacturers also lost an important customer for their products.
Liverpool and Manchester suffered badly because of this disruption.
Their anger toward the North was therefore mainly economic. They wanted their trade with the South restored.
Once the war ended and Southern ports reopened, that resentment quickly disappeared.
At that time, Britain depended heavily on Southern cotton. American trade with Britain was also much smaller than it later became, and relations between Americans and Europeans were far less developed than they would be in the future.
There was, of course, one serious incident that temporarily created great tension between Britain and the United States.
In 1861, Captain Wilkes of the San Jacinto seized the Confederate diplomats Mason and Slidell from the British ship Trent.
Britain demanded their release and an apology because the United States had violated the rights of a neutral British vessel.
The United States eventually released the two men, and the crisis ended.
But this was a specific diplomatic incident. It did not mean that the British Government supported the South.
In fact, when the British Government seriously considered the possibility of recognizing the Confederacy, it did so only after Napoleon III of France proposed intervention.
Napoleon wanted to weaken the United States because he was pursuing a much larger plan.
He wanted to establish a French-backed empire in Mexico, with Maximilian as emperor. A divided and weakened United States would have been a much less dangerous neighbor.
But Britain rejected Napoleon's proposal immediately and completely.
The strongest evidence comes from William Ewart Gladstone himself.
In a letter he sent me in 1889, Gladstone stated that the British Cabinet had never considered recognizing the Southern states except when Napoleon III made his proposal.
And when that proposal came before the Cabinet, Britain rejected it without hesitation or disagreement.
Gladstone wrote that the Cabinet declined to entertain the French proposal “without qualification, hesitation, delay, or dissent.”
That statement is extremely important.
Gladstone had been a member of Lord Palmerston's Cabinet during the Civil War and was, by then, almost the only surviving member of that Cabinet.
His testimony directly contradicts the story that Britain had secretly planned to recognize the Confederacy and was stopped only by the arrival of Russian warships.
Had Britain accepted Napoleon's plan, the situation could have become extremely dangerous for the United States.
Napoleon wanted to help break up the Union, establish his Mexican empire, and eventually gain additional territory.
But Britain refused to cooperate.
Napoleon eventually suffered the consequences of his Mexican adventure. When French troops were withdrawn, Maximilian's empire collapsed, and Maximilian himself was executed.
So the claim that Russian warships saved the Union from British intervention is simply not credible.
The story probably grew out of a real event.
In September 1863, a Russian squadron under Admiral S. Lessoffsky arrived in New York aboard the Alexander Nevsky.
The Russian officers were warmly welcomed and entertained.
But they had not come to fight for the United States.
New York was simply a port of call.
Secretary Seward understood, however, that their presence could have an important political effect.
The Russian ships looked impressive.
Foreign governments might see them and assume that Russia was prepared to support the United States.
That appearance alone could discourage European powers from taking action on behalf of the South.
Seward therefore welcomed the Russian officers and made sure they received generous hospitality.
In other words, the Russian visit was useful as a political bluff.
The timing made it even more valuable.
Earlier in 1863, Napoleon III had offered to mediate between the United States and the Confederacy. Seward had firmly rejected the proposal.
Then, after the Union victory at Gettysburg, the military situation was becoming more favorable for the North.
Around the same period, another Russian squadron arrived in San Francisco under Admiral Popoff.
Seward was delighted.
When the Russian officers later went to Washington, he hosted them at a grand dinner.
The visit created the impression that Russia stood firmly behind the United States.
But an impression is not the same thing as an alliance.
I later had the opportunity to speak with Seward personally, and he made it clear that the Russian squadron had not come to offer military assistance.
The Grand Duke Alexis gave me essentially the same understanding when he visited New York in 1871 with another Russian squadron.
The behavior of the Russian officers also tells us something.
After their visit, they repeatedly thanked Americans for their hospitality.
When they returned to Russia, they even visited the American Minister, Cassius M. Clay, to express their gratitude formally.
That would have been a strange thing to do if Russia had come to rescue the United States at a moment of national crisis.
In that case, America would have owed Russia a tremendous debt.
Instead, the Russians behaved like honored foreign visitors who had been treated generously.
There is another important point.
If Russia had actually offered its navy for military cooperation, the event would have been known immediately.
It would have been recorded officially in both countries.
The American Government had no reason to hide such an alliance.
On the contrary, announcing Russian military support would have been a powerful way to discourage European intervention and convince the South that its cause was hopeless.
Russia was certainly friendly toward the United States.
But friendship is not the same as a promise to fight.
Russia's navy was also too weak at the time to challenge Britain or France effectively. After the Crimean War, Russian naval power was limited.
Military intervention would therefore have been extremely risky and of doubtful value.
The story that Russia offered its warships to America is therefore little more than a legend.
There was no such offer.
Russian Foreign Minister Prince Gortchakoff repeatedly made Russia's position clear. Russia wanted peace and hoped the American Civil War would end quickly, but it did not intend to take sides between the North and South.
The same principle applies to Britain.
Gladstone's testimony shows that the British Government did not support recognition of the Confederacy.
When Napoleon III tried to persuade Britain to intervene, the British Cabinet rejected the proposal immediately.
If Britain had truly been hostile to the United States, this would have been the perfect opportunity to join France.
It did not.
The facts therefore give us a very different picture from the popular stories.
There is also no reason for Americans to become anti-Russian simply because these old stories are false.
Russia and the United States had enjoyed friendly relations for many years.
But friendship does not require Americans to ignore present-day behavior.
The real reason many Americans sympathized with Japan in its war with Russia was Russia's conduct in Manchuria.
Russia had promised to withdraw from Manchuria, but instead tightened its control.
It restricted American trade and damaged the commercial opportunities that Americans had developed there.
Russian officials could offer all the explanations they wanted, but Americans could see the practical result.
Russia was behaving like a power seeking exclusive control, while Japan presented itself as defending wider commercial access.
That is why American sympathy naturally leaned toward Japan.
Russia's claim to a special position in Manchuria was becoming increasingly difficult to defend.
It was reasonable to hope that Russia would eventually withdraw and allow the region's trade to remain open to the world.
American factories that had been built there and then left idle could once again become profitable.
Past friendship with Russia did not justify present injustice.
Russia's continued occupation of Manchuria, together with its ambitions in Korea, suggested that it wanted permanent territorial expansion.
Those ambitions raised concerns about China and Japan as well.
Under these circumstances, Americans could reasonably sympathize with Japan.
We owed Russia nothing simply because Russian ships had visited New York in 1863.
If anything, our country had a more concrete reason to be grateful to Britain, because Britain had firmly rejected France's proposal to recognize the Confederacy.
Britain was also America's natural partner in many respects.
The two countries shared language, ancestry, religion, and traditions of free government.
As for the so-called “Yellow Peril,” which Russian representatives often described as a threat to Western civilization, I regard it as little more than fantasy.
There is no serious reason to believe that a victorious China or Japan would invade and conquer the Western world.
Such a fear is about as realistic as expecting the man in the moon to come down and invade Earth with an army.
August 11, 1905
Dear Editor,
I have been informed about your editorial of August 10 concerning the Gladstone letter that I received personally.
The wording of your editorial appears to cast doubt on the authenticity of the letter and on the truth of the statements it contains.
The letter was sent to me voluntarily by Mr. Gladstone in response to an article I had written.
It makes the position of the British Cabinet during the Civil War quite clear.
It is true that some individual members of the Cabinet expressed sympathy for the South at various times during the war.
But when Emperor Napoleon's proposal for intervention was brought before the British Cabinet, the Cabinet rejected it exactly as Gladstone described in his letter to me.
Gladstone's position is also supported by the speech he delivered in the House of Commons shortly afterward.
Indeed, his speech played an important role in defeating Mr. Roebuck's motion supporting Napoleon's proposal.
There is also an important constitutional point.
British Cabinet discussions were traditionally kept confidential unless the Crown gave permission for their disclosure.
Gladstone was well known for respecting such conventions.
He specifically told me that I was free to publish his letter.
That could not have happened without the necessary royal permission.
Very truly yours,
Henry Clews
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