New York’s Future as America’s Financial Capital
“What New York has been as the center of American finance is a matter of history,” I wrote. “But what it will become is much less certain.”
For many years, New York stood almost alone as the nation’s great financial and commercial center. But conditions were changing, and some of those changes raised a serious question: could New York continue to handle the same share of the country’s enormous and rapidly growing financial business?
There were already signs that its position was weakening.
In the beginning, New York controlled almost all the country’s major channels of trade.
Most imported goods entered through New York and were distributed from there throughout the country. The city also handled a large share of domestic manufactured goods shipped to other regions.
Western products were largely exported through New York as well. Even when cotton and other Southern products were shipped directly from Southern ports, the financial transactions connected with those exports were usually handled through New York.
At that time, New York had virtually no rival as the nation’s financial clearing center.
But then the situation began to change.
Chicago, St. Louis, and other large Western cities started trying to become distribution centers for foreign and Eastern goods.
This was a natural consequence of the rapid growth of population in the West and Southwest.
Large wholesale businesses sprang up in these interior cities.
As a result, New York gradually lost part of its wholesale distribution business. Its merchants increasingly supplied the Middle States, the nearby West, and parts of the South rather than the entire country.
But New York still had an important advantage.
The Western wholesalers continued to obtain most of their goods from New York or through New York.
So although the city lost part of its wholesale trade, it retained most of its importing and commission business.
For a while, that seemed enough.
But a third and much more important change was now beginning.
The Western cities were no longer content to depend on New York even for imported goods.
Their wholesale houses had grown strong enough to import directly from foreign producers.
At the same time, the population and purchasing power of the West and Southwest had grown so large that manufacturers were beginning to establish factories close to those markets.
The West was becoming a serious competitor to the East in manufacturing.
It was only a matter of time before Western producers supplied a large share of the goods that had previously been furnished through New York merchants and financed through New York banks.
And the change went even further.
Chicago and other Western cities were beginning to export grain and provisions directly to Europe.
They were no longer willing to rely on New York intermediaries.
Their goods could be sold directly to European buyers and shipped under through bills of lading.
These developments were not the result of reckless competition or a foolish desire to take business away from New York.
They were simply the result of economic efficiency.
The new system saved Western merchants time and money.
For that reason, it was unlikely to disappear.
The natural growth of American production and commerce was creating independent financial centers in the interior.
And that could only reduce New York’s former dominance.
The statistics were particularly striking.
The New York Clearing House provides one of the best measures of the city’s financial importance.
Its annual clearings had risen from $5.75 billion in 1854 to $48.566 billion in 1881.
That was an increase of 744 percent in twenty-seven years.
But after 1881, the direction suddenly changed.
In 1881, New York’s Clearing House exchanges totaled $48.566 billion.
In 1882, they fell to $46.553 billion.
In 1883, they fell again to $40.293 billion.
In 1884, they dropped to $34.092 billion.
By 1885, they had fallen to only $25.251 billion.
In just four years, the decline amounted to $23.315 billion, or 48.4 percent.
The total was even lower than the $26.032 billion recorded twenty years earlier.
Of course, some of this decline could be explained.
Speculative trading had been far heavier in 1881 than in 1885.
The general decline in prices also reduced the dollar value of transactions.
But neither explanation was sufficient.
Prices had fallen by no more than about 20 percent.
The volume of Clearing House transactions had fallen by 48.4 percent.
And during the same period, the population of the United States had increased by five or six million people.
That population growth alone should have produced roughly a 10 percent increase in financial activity.
There was another warning sign.
Since 1872, the capital of the banks belonging to the New York Clearing House had fallen from $84.4 million to only $58.6 million.
That was a decline of about 30 percent.
It strongly suggested that banking in New York had become less profitable than it once was.
If New York had maintained its traditional share of the nation’s expanding financial business, such a decline would have been difficult to explain.
The contrast with Chicago was even more revealing.
Chicago’s Clearing House had begun full operations in 1866.
That year its clearings amounted to only $453.8 million.
By 1885, they had reached $2.3185 billion.
That was an increase of 410 percent.
New York showed the opposite trend.
In 1866, its clearings were $28.717 billion.
By 1885, they had fallen to $25.25 billion.
So while the nation was enjoying two decades of enormous economic growth, New York’s clearing business had actually declined by 12.5 percent.
This happened even though the population served by New York had increased by more than twenty million people.
The comparison becomes still more striking when we start in 1879, the year specie payments resumed and American commerce and financial activity began a major revival.
Chicago’s clearings were then $1.2577 billion.
By 1885, they had risen to $2.3185 billion, an increase of 84.3 percent.
New York’s clearings over the same period increased by only about one-quarter of one percent.
The banking capital figures tell the same story.
New York’s banking capital had declined substantially from its 1872 level.
Chicago’s banking capital, meanwhile, had risen from $9.845 million in 1872 to $16.928 million in 1886.
That was an increase of 72 percent.
Chicago’s clearings were still only about one-tenth of New York’s.
But Chicago was moving rapidly forward while New York was standing still, and in some respects moving backward.
The conclusion was difficult to avoid.
New York was losing part of its financial business because settlements and banking facilities were moving toward the large interior cities, especially Chicago.
Some of this change was unavoidable.
If it resulted from the natural development of the country, New York could not and should not try to stop it.
But another part of the problem had a different cause.
It came from artificial restrictions imposed by banking laws.
That problem could be changed.
I would therefore venture to make a few suggestions, although I fully realized that men with greater banking experience might disagree with me.
For a long time, I had believed that New York’s banking system was inadequate for the role the city was capable of playing.
New York was not merely a major American city.
It had every natural advantage necessary to become the country’s great financial center and, eventually, a major center for international finance as well.
Most banking in New York was conducted by institutions chartered under either federal or state law.
The national banking system, considered as a whole, was admirably designed.
But it had serious limitations.
It did not give banks the freedom needed to perform some of the most important functions required in a great financial center.
Perhaps that was understandable.
The system had been designed largely with smaller cities and rural communities in mind.
A banking system suitable for a small interior town could not necessarily be expected to meet the needs of a financial capital handling international transactions.
Interior banks, where management might not always have the highest level of experience, could reasonably be subject to strict legal controls.
But applying the same restrictions to a highly experienced metropolitan bank could be unnecessary and even harmful.
Unfortunately, the national banking laws made little distinction between the two.
Instead of giving New York’s banks greater freedom because of their greater experience and importance, the law imposed particularly severe restrictions upon them.
The reserve requirements were a good example.
Banks outside New York were allowed to count money held with their redemption agents as part of their reserves.
For banks in other reserve cities, this often represented about 41 percent of their total reserves.
For other banks, it amounted to roughly 60 percent.
New York banks had no such freedom.
They were required to keep their entire reserve—25 percent of their deposits—in actual lawful money.
But even that was not the worst part.
The banks were not truly free to use those reserves when they were most needed.
The moment a bank’s reserve fell below the required 25 percent, the Comptroller of the Currency could be required to close the bank and place it in liquidation if the deficiency was not immediately corrected.
Imagine what happened during a financial panic.
Depositors wanted their money.
The banks needed to use their reserves.
Yet the law threatened them with closure if those reserves fell below the required level.
There was no effective legal mechanism for relaxing the rule during an emergency.
The banks were therefore forced into suspension or compelled to find other ways of pooling their available cash in order to protect themselves and their customers.
This created a constant source of fear whenever the money market became tight.
Everyone watched the reserve requirement like a dangerous line that could not be crossed.
As the banks approached that line, they began reducing loans.
Depositors became nervous and withdrew funds.
And the very reserves that were supposed to protect the banking system became one of the forces driving it toward panic.
A financial center whose banks were repeatedly exposed to this danger was operating under a serious handicap.
Great financial institutions need freedom to respond to emergencies.
They need flexibility.
They need the ability to use their resources when conditions demand it.
The law was taking away precisely that flexibility.
The problem was even more unreasonable when one considered how much money had to remain idle.
The amount required to be held as reserve was often greater than the entire capital of the banks.
A bank was therefore forced to keep a huge portion of its resources sitting idle and earning nothing.
That would already be a serious burden.
But when the idle money created no corresponding benefit and actually increased the danger of financial panic, the restriction became particularly damaging.
No wonder New York’s national banks were showing signs of decline rather than progress.
What New York needed was a new class of banks with broader powers and greater freedom than the national banking charters allowed.
I did not believe that the national banking system could simply be modified to accomplish this.
Whenever New York banks tried to change the national system, they encountered political prejudice and ignorant demagoguery in Congress.
They had become so accustomed to opposition that they were often willing to tolerate serious disadvantages rather than ask Congress for reform.
Their practical alternative was to reorganize under state law.
Some had already done so.
New institutions generally preferred the state system.
But even that was not enough.
New York probably needed special authorization from the state legislature for banking institutions with powers not clearly provided under either federal or existing state law.
What would these new banks actually do?
Much of their purpose was obvious.
America was becoming one of the world’s largest commercial nations.
Yet American merchants were still heavily dependent on foreign bankers to finance their international trade.
That situation was becoming difficult to justify.
There was no longer any shortage of American capital.
There was no shortage of banking experience.
There was no shortage of business.
Imports and exports together represented an annual business of about $1.2 billion.
A great opportunity was waiting for American banks willing to serve that business.
Our export trade was being held back in many areas simply because American exporters could not obtain the generous credit necessary to ship goods to distant markets.
Take cotton goods as an example.
Manchester was defeating American manufacturers not necessarily because its prices were lower or its products were better.
The real advantage was credit.
English merchants could obtain whatever amount and length of credit they needed.
American merchants often had to sell on much tighter terms and work through Manchester agents who were simultaneously selling English goods in competition with American products.
The English exporter could obtain credit from the bank where he kept his account.
The American exporter often had to turn to a foreign banker who had little reason to accommodate him and every reason to charge for the additional risk.
The logical place for an exporter to maintain his banking relationship was the institution that provided his credit.
That fact alone showed how much business specialized American banks could develop.
Consider the cotton crop.
Every year, American merchants had to pledge a large portion of the crop in advance to obtain the money needed to collect and market it.
Why should that money come from England?
The arrangement placed part of the American cotton crop under foreign financial control.
It weakened America’s ability to protect its own producers.
This was another important area in which domestic banks could play a major role.
The same problem existed with imports.
Why should an American importer obtain credit from an agent of a London bank instead of getting that credit from an American bank through which he conducted all his other business?
The American bank knew its customer.
It understood his business.
It had every reason to serve him efficiently.
A London banker, dealing with a merchant thousands of miles away, had less information and therefore had to charge for the additional risk.
The importer was disadvantaged.
The foreign banker was disadvantaged.
The logical solution was simple.
Credit should be provided directly from the financial center where the importer conducted his business.
Specialized American banks could make that possible.
Such institutions could perform many other valuable functions as well.
They could arrange corporate loans.
They could provide temporary financing to corporations.
They could manage corporate accounts.
They could help companies reorganize their finances.
Large corporations represented an enormous field of banking business, yet existing banks were often unable to take full advantage of it because of their legal restrictions.
These new institutions should, of course, also seek strong deposits and discount high-quality commercial paper.
Since national banking laws would prevent them from earning profits through the issue of banknotes, they might reasonably be allowed to issue their own acceptances to highly reputable customers within carefully controlled limits.
London’s leading banks had already demonstrated the profitability and safety of such a practice.
I also saw no good reason why these banks should not follow the London practice of paying somewhat less interest on deposits than the current market rate when circumstances justified it.
That would attract more accounts and greatly increase the banks’ resources and earning power.
Because such institutions would not be burdened by rigid reserve requirements and other unnecessary restrictions, they would also be better able to withstand fluctuations in the money market.
They could therefore offer Wall Street firms better terms on loans secured by securities.
The scale of that business was enormous.
During the previous six years, the New York Stock Exchange had averaged about 102 million shares traded each year.
At an estimated average value of $60 per share, that represented annual stock transactions of roughly $6.12 billion.
And that did not include the enormous business in bonds.
Banks with broader powers would naturally attract many Stock Exchange firms.
Experience had shown that these firms could be exceptionally safe and profitable customers.
The simple fact that such banks would not be forced to structure every loan around an arbitrary 25 percent reserve requirement would give Wall Street firms a powerful reason to move their business to them.
To some degree, New York’s loan and trust companies were already filling this gap.
They were providing valuable services as institutions for loans and deposits.
The weaknesses of the national banks had pushed a large and profitable part of the banking business toward these companies.
In New York and Brooklyn, such companies already had nearly $14 million in capital and about $15 million in surplus and profits.
Their total resources were approximately $175 million.
Their deposits amounted to about $137 million.
Their growth was remarkable.
Since 1883, their resources had increased by $32 million, or about 27 percent, even though those years had been a period of serious business depression.
Their success proved that New York badly needed broader banking facilities.
But the trust companies still could not do everything a great financial center required.
Their powers were too limited.
New York needed institutions capable of performing the functions that the great joint-stock banks and private discount houses performed in London.
The goal was not to copy London blindly.
The goal was to give New York the financial machinery required by its own growing importance.
I offer these suggestions for whatever value the men of Wall Street may find in them.
The essential point is clear.
There is plenty of room—and an urgent need—for a new kind of banking institution capable of handling the larger operations of American finance and commerce.
The country was already suffering because such facilities were lacking.
There was no shortage of capital.
There was no shortage of capable managers.
And American interest rates had fallen to levels comparable with those in Europe.
So there was no longer any reason to fear that foreign bankers possessed some unavoidable financial advantage.
If New York intended to remain financially independent, and if it intended to become, in the fullest sense, the financial center of the enormous trade of this continent and its business with the rest of the world, action was needed.
New York merchants were ready for such a development.
The real question was whether the bankers and capitalists were ready to provide the institutions that the new era demanded.
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