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Chapter 18 · Panics: Why They Happen and How They Can Be Controlled

Panics: Why They Happen and How They Can Be Controlled

Chapter 18 of 90 · 3,139 words · Free

People often talk about financial panics as if they were sudden accidents—wild events caused by reckless speculation, foolish bankers, and frightened investors. They also assume that panics can easily be prevented or quickly cured.

That view is too simple.

It may be partly true in older European countries, where business has followed established patterns for generations and there are fewer risks from entirely new enterprises. In countries such as France and Germany, serious business disruptions are more often connected with political events.

The United States is different.

We are still, in many ways, a nation of pioneers.

Every ten years, our population grows by millions. Each new generation brings with it a huge expansion of the country. New land must be developed. Mines must be opened. Factories must be built. Railroads must be extended. Banks must be organized. New corporations must be created.

All of this requires enormous amounts of capital.

And many of these ventures are experiments. Some fail completely. Others become enormously successful. Before they can produce profits, however, they require large investments of money.

Much of that money is borrowed.

Loans are often secured by property or businesses whose true value has not yet been proved. That makes the securities much less stable than investments in mature, established companies.

As a result, the American market is constantly producing new stocks, bonds, mortgages, and commercial paper. A large portion of these obligations rests on enterprises whose future value is uncertain.

Even businesses that are no longer brand-new may still be in an unfinished or unstable stage. Their securities can rise rapidly when investors become optimistic and collapse just as quickly when confidence disappears.

That is one reason Americans have always been particularly vulnerable to speculation and financial panics.

Every commercial country experiences periods of prosperity and depression. That is part of the natural rhythm of business.

Trade moves like a wave.

First comes rising business activity.

Prices go up.

People become confident and borrow more money.

Then prices reach a level at which demand begins to weaken.

Businesses become cautious.

Lenders become more careful.

Eventually, prices begin to fall.

Investors rush to sell.

Credit tightens.

Transactions decline.

Property loses value.

Debtors find themselves under increasing pressure.

Finally, forced liquidation begins. Weak businesses fail, debts are called in, and insolvent institutions are closed.

This cycle exists everywhere.

The difference is that the United States has another problem on top of the normal business cycle: the enormous number of new and untested enterprises being created all the time.

When a crisis arrives, the securities of these ventures can lose value almost overnight.

Investors want to sell them.

Banks want their loans repaid.

Property that looked valuable yesterday suddenly becomes difficult to sell at any price.

Since the beginning of the railroad era, every major American panic has been made much worse by the sudden collapse in the value of these uncertain assets.

That is where the greatest danger lies.

So can American panics be completely prevented?

Probably not.

As long as the country continues to grow through large-scale pioneering enterprise, financial risk will remain unavoidable.

What we can hope for is that panics will become less severe as more of the country's businesses become established and financially stronger.

I believe that is already happening.

The financial resources concentrated in America's major money centers are growing rapidly.

At the same time, American businesses are becoming less dependent on European capital.

Large corporate loans are increasingly being financed at home rather than in London or other European markets.

That growing pool of domestic capital gives the American financial system greater flexibility. It provides a cushion when serious disturbances occur.

This helps explain why the United States experienced two major periods of commercial depression after the great crisis of 1873 without suffering another full-scale panic.

The closest approach was the failure of Grant & Ward in May 1884, but even that crisis was relatively limited and short-lived.

Still, although panics may not be preventable, there are conditions that can make them much worse than they need to be.

The most important factor is the behavior of the banks.

During a crisis, everything depends heavily on whether lenders remain calm.

If banks become frightened and refuse almost every loan, except those made to the strongest borrowers, panic spreads rapidly.

But if banks continue lending to sound and reasonably safe customers, those customers can often help support weaker businesses that the banks themselves cannot finance.

That can keep the crisis within manageable limits.

In other words, much depends on the judgment and courage of bankers.

They can either reduce the damage or magnify it.

The banks do not always do everything they could, but the banks of New York deserve credit for showing considerable intelligence during several financial disturbances over the previous twenty-five years.

They had learned to protect themselves while also protecting their customers.

That experience would be valuable if another panic came.

Unfortunately, the law itself created another problem.

National banks were required to maintain a certain reserve of lawful money against their deposits. If their reserves fell below the legal limit, the government could take action against them.

This created what bankers regarded as a dangerous line in the sand.

Once a bank approached that limit, it became afraid to lend.

And when banks suddenly stop lending, borrowers are forced to sell whatever they can.

That produces forced liquidation.

So a rule designed to protect the banking system could actually help destroy it during a serious crisis.

If banks were allowed to use more of their reserves during an emergency, those reserves could serve as a shock absorber.

Instead, the law often forced banks to tighten credit at precisely the moment when the economy needed credit most.

Then, after the panic had already broken out, the banks had to work together and effectively ignore the spirit of the very restrictions that had helped create the crisis.

This was a serious flaw in the banking laws.

Economic failures cannot and should not be completely eliminated.

Weak businesses need to fail.

Bad debts need to be cleared.

Unsound enterprises need to be reorganized or liquidated.

That process is necessary for a healthy economy.

But there is no reason for the law to punish sound and unsound borrowers equally when a crisis arrives.

George I. Seney

Among the most important figures in the short-lived panic of 1884 were Ferdinand Ward, James D. Fish, George I. Seney, and John C. Eno.

Many people believed Ferdinand Ward—the man popularly called the “Young Napoleon of Finance”—was responsible for nearly everything that went wrong.

That judgment was too simple.

George I. Seney was one of the financiers who became caught in the disaster.

Seney had given away enormous amounts of money, much of it to churches and religious institutions. He was one of the country's great religious philanthropists.

Unfortunately, he had also placed large sums of money in ventures that produced little or no tangible return.

When his financial troubles came, he discovered that he had very few friends willing or able to rescue him.

His collapse dragged down the Metropolitan Bank and a Brooklyn bank with which he was closely connected.

A Brooklyn insurance company was also badly damaged because it had lent much of its surplus to Seney, taking Metropolitan Bank stock as collateral.

Seney's financial history was one of the strangest of the entire panic.

He was the son of a Methodist minister and had been born in Astoria, Long Island.

He remained deeply devoted to his father's church throughout his life.

He had graduated from the University of the City of New York and, at about twenty-two, entered the Metropolitan Bank as a clerk.

He eventually became teller and then cashier.

When the bank's president, Mr. Williams, died, Seney succeeded him as president.

What was remarkable was that Seney's reputation as a financial operator developed rather late.

Until shortly before the panic, he was generally considered slow, cautious, and unemotional.

Then, during the speculative boom of 1879, everything changed.

He suddenly became one of the most aggressive operators on Wall Street.

He developed his own style of speculation and became identified with a group of railroad properties that soon became famous as the “Seney Syndicate.”

Among the principal properties were the Ohio Central, Rochester and Pittsburgh, East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia, and the famous Nickel Plate.

The speed and boldness of Seney's operations astonished experienced Wall Street operators.

Most railroad promoters began with relatively modest amounts of stock and gradually increased the capitalization.

Seney took a different approach.

He began the process of inflating the stock almost immediately.

He issued enormous quantities of securities and promoted them aggressively.

The future of the properties was described in glowing terms.

Investors became excited.

The stocks became some of the most active speculative favorites in the market.

But the real explanation for the extraordinary activity surrounding these stocks could be found in Seney's financial records.

His transactions were understood to include what Wall Street called “washed sales”—transactions in which buying and selling orders were arranged to create the appearance of genuine market activity.

These operations helped make the stocks look far more actively traded than they really were.

Seney made a great deal of money.

He went from being one of the poorer men in Brooklyn to being regarded as one of its wealthiest.

There was, however, an unfortunate pattern.

As Seney became richer, many of the people around him seemed to become poorer.

When his enterprises finally collapsed, many of those investors were left with little more than certificates bearing the impressive name of the Seney Syndicate.

There was an obvious contradiction in Seney's character.

He could show very little sympathy for people whose financial lives had been ruined by the schemes in which he was involved.

Yet he gave enormous sums to charity.

His philanthropic contributions were eventually estimated at more than two million dollars.

Had his financial operations not been exposed by the panic, Seney might have become famous as one of America's greatest philanthropists.

He had the money and the public position to do so.

Instead, his career ended in disgrace.

His story shows how dangerous speculative finance can become when it is connected with a major banking institution.

It also shows why bank directors cannot afford to ignore what their executives are doing.

Seney was not solely responsible for the collapse of the Metropolitan Bank.

He was its dominant figure, but the directors could hardly have been completely unaware of the bank's affairs.

The Metropolitan Bank was not a private family institution like the Marine Bank, where James D. Fish had relatives involved.

Seney himself had no family members controlling the bank.

That made the situation different.

The most important lesson, however, was the enormous collapse in stock values.

More than a billion dollars in market value disappeared.

Much of that decline had been anticipated by experienced bear operators, who believed that the institutions controlled by Seney and Fish were eventually bound to fail.

That should have been a warning to investors.

Financial history has a habit of repeating itself when people forget what happened before.

Ward, Fish, Seney, and Eno were all regarded by many people as clever financiers.

Some believed they were simply unlucky men who had gone too far and might otherwise have become celebrated millionaires.

There are certainly cases in financial history where aggressive or questionable operators managed to escape disaster.

But they are exceptions.

The broader rule is simple:

Honesty is ultimately the safest policy in finance.

A dishonest financier can become extremely rich.

But he can never enjoy his wealth in complete security.

At any moment, his past may catch up with him.

Eventually, every financial career reaches its final settlement.

That is when the real story is revealed.

John C. Eno

Of the four famous financiers connected with the panic of 1884, John C. Eno had perhaps the strangest story.

He was only about twenty-six years old.

Like many young speculators, he entered the market with enormous confidence and ambitious dreams.

He wanted wealth, status, and a grand future.

But youth often brings impatience and poor judgment.

Eno became a victim of both.

What made his case especially remarkable was his position.

Before the panic, he was president of the Second National Bank of New York.

For a man so young, this was an extraordinary position of trust.

He then used that position to take money that did not belong to him.

The bank's capital was only $100,000, but it had approximately four million dollars in deposits.

Eno eventually used essentially all of that money for speculation.

Then he fled to Canada with a Roman Catholic priest.

Fortunately, Eno had a wealthy father.

Amos R. Eno had spent a lifetime building his fortune through thrift and careful business practices.

When he learned what his son had done, he immediately came to the bank's rescue.

He paid three and a half million dollars himself, provided the other directors contributed the remaining half million.

The directors agreed.

As a result, every depositor was made whole.

No depositor lost a dollar.

The way Eno had carried out the fraud was remarkably clever.

He persuaded the directors that the bank's securities should not be kept in its own vault.

He argued that they would be safer in a downtown safe-deposit company.

The directors accepted his recommendation.

He also persuaded them that the bank's deposits were mostly from families who rarely needed loans.

Therefore, he said, there was no reason to leave large amounts of money sitting idle in the bank.

The money could instead be lent to Wall Street brokers at interest, provided the loans were secured by good collateral.

That sounded reasonable.

It sounded conservative.

The bank was located some distance from Wall Street, and Eno argued that moving securities back and forth between the bank and downtown exposed them to unnecessary danger.

So the securities were placed in a downtown vault.

Eno alone knew the combination.

The arrangement appeared to make him more careful, not less.

The directors therefore trusted him even more.

But the safeguards were actually part of his scheme.

Instead of lending the bank's money to independent brokers, Eno placed it as margin with his own brokers for speculative stock transactions.

In this way, he used the bank's entire four million dollars for his own speculation.

The directors never suspected what was happening.

Each evening, Eno would tell the cashier that certain amounts had been lent against specific securities.

The cashier accepted his word.

The checks were issued.

The books were updated.

Eventually, the bank's records showed approximately four million dollars in legitimate-looking call loans backed by excellent collateral.

In reality, the money had gone into Eno's private speculative accounts.

He continued gambling in stocks that kept falling.

Eventually, the losses became impossible to hide.

Eno finally had to tell his father the truth.

Amos Eno once again stepped in and saved the bank from suspension.

The elder Eno was still worth about twenty-five million dollars, so the financial loss would not destroy him.

But the disgrace caused by his son's actions was another matter.

Money could repair the bank.

It could not repair the damage done to the family name.

How the Clearing House Helped Stop the Panic

The banks belonging to the Clearing House displayed one of the most remarkable acts of collective self-sacrifice in the history of American banking.

The panic of 1884 was different from earlier financial crises.

The banks reacted quickly.

They acted generously.

And, most importantly, they acted together.

The leaders of the banks had learned important lessons from earlier panics.

Their response helped keep the crisis short and prevented it from spreading much further.

The decisive action of the banks, combined with the courage of Amos R. Eno and the other directors of the Second National Bank, prevented what could have become a much larger disaster.

The lesson was clear.

A panic can sometimes be stopped if decisive action is taken early enough.

Speed matters.

Cooperation matters.

Confidence matters.

If bank presidents could always be relied upon to act quickly and together with the business community, financial panics would have far less power to frighten the public.

Unfortunately, that had not always been the case.

During earlier panics, bank managers often acted without a clear plan.

They hesitated.

They changed course repeatedly.

Their behavior was sometimes so weak and confused that it resembled the actions of inexperienced children rather than responsible businessmen.

The panic of 1873 was a painful example.

Had the banks responded with the same determination in 1873 that they showed in 1884, much of the damage might have been prevented.

The country suffered for years after the collapse of 1873.

For five or six years, business activity remained deeply depressed.

From the standpoint of economic progress, those years were almost a blank.

The experience of 1884 showed that a different response was possible.

One controversial decision involved the Clearing House accepting Seney's paintings as collateral.

The arrangement was unprecedented, and many bears on Wall Street attacked it.

But the results eventually justified the decision.

A valuable collection of paintings could be sold for substantial amounts, especially in a country where wealthy collectors were becoming increasingly interested in art.

When Seney's paintings were eventually auctioned, they attracted strong competition and brought good prices.

In fact, they were easier to sell than many railroad securities would have been during the months that followed.

Seney himself appears to have had a genuine love of art.

But unlike some wealthy collectors, he did not allow his enthusiasm to destroy his judgment.

He understood that a painting still had to possess market value.

Ironically, he seemed to understand the value of paintings better than the value of the banking business he controlled.

The banks' willingness to act also helped prevent another dangerous development: depositors becoming panic-makers.

Several million dollars were withdrawn from the Metropolitan and Second National banks.

But instead of disappearing from circulation, that money immediately returned to the community.

This helped calm the public rather than frighten it.

The depositors therefore became part of the solution instead of becoming another source of panic.

That was very different from what had happened during the failure of Jay Cooke.

When holders of Northern Pacific bonds discovered that their supposedly safe securities were worth far less than they had believed, they became terrified.

They began spreading their fear to everyone around them.

One frightened investor influenced another.

Then another.

Soon distrust spread through the entire country like an infection.

That is one of the most dangerous forces in any financial crisis.

A panic is not created only by falling prices.

It is created by fear spreading from one person to another.

And once fear becomes widespread, even a problem that might have been contained can turn into a national disaster.

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