Railroad Investments
Few people truly understand how enormous the American railroad system had already become.
By 1884, the United States had about 125,380 miles of railroad—more than all of Europe combined.
Yet the country had only about 54 million people.
By comparison, Great Britain, France, and Germany together had a population of roughly 120 million but only about 60,000 miles of railroad.
Russia had around 85 million people and just 19,000 miles of track.
The reason was simple: America was enormous, and its population was spread across a vast territory.
But building so many railroads came at a cost.
The more money we poured into transportation, the less capital remained for factories, farms, mines, and other productive businesses.
And the more expensive transportation became, the harder it was for American industries to compete with foreign producers.
This was a major reason why the United States struggled to claim a share of international trade equal to its enormous population and resources.
In 1884, American railroads reported about $3.67 billion in bonds and $3.76 billion in stock.
But these figures greatly overstated what the railroads had actually cost to build and equip.
Even so, the companies tried to earn returns on this inflated capital.
That burden ultimately fell on the public.
Railroads were often expected to pay interest and dividends on hundreds of millions of dollars of capital that had never truly been invested.
The result was higher transportation costs, slower economic growth, and the creation of a powerful class of railroad millionaires.
But a major change was already taking place.
The cost of borrowing money was falling.
Several forces were responsible.
The federal government had established a strong credit reputation and could borrow at around 3 percent.
Business had become more stable and less risky.
American industries were becoming larger and more organized.
And national income was growing faster than the number of new businesses requiring capital.
Money had become so plentiful that America no longer needed to depend heavily on European investors to finance railroad construction.
In fact, American capital was beginning to flow into railroad projects in Canada and Mexico.
That changed the outlook for railroad bonds.
Most older railroad bonds still paid 6 or 7 percent interest, with some paying 5 percent and others as much as 8 percent.
But sound railroads could already borrow new money at 4 percent.
It was reasonable to expect 4 percent to become the normal rate for high-quality railroad debt.
That would create a serious problem for the older railroads.
Imagine a railroad carrying $40 million of debt.
At 6 percent, it would have to pay $2.4 million a year in interest.
At 4 percent, it would pay only $1.6 million.
That was a difference of $800,000 every year.
A railroad carrying expensive old debt would therefore be at a major disadvantage against a competitor financed at the new lower rate.
Eventually, many railroads would have little choice.
They would either face financial trouble or find a way to reduce their interest burden.
This process was about to accelerate because many bonds issued twenty-five or thirty years earlier were reaching maturity.
Old 6, 7, and 8 percent bonds would increasingly be replaced by bonds paying only 4 percent.
The change would have major consequences for investors.
Old railroad bonds had risen substantially in market value because their high interest payments were attractive.
Many of them had reached prices that produced only about a 4 to 4½ percent return to the buyer.
But once investors realized that the railroads could no longer afford those high interest payments, the market value of those bonds would begin to fall.
Bondholders would understand that some form of restructuring was inevitable.
And when financial pressure became severe, the railroads would not necessarily treat their creditors gently.
Foreclosure and reorganization could force bondholders to accept new securities carrying much lower interest rates.
In the end, a large portion of the old high-interest debt would probably be converted into long-term 4 percent bonds.
This would be one of the most important financial changes of the coming years.
At first, however, it would probably make investors feel poorer.
Someone who had depended on a high-interest railroad bond could suddenly see both the market value of the investment and the income it produced decline sharply.
But there was another side to the story.
Lower interest payments would leave more money inside the railroad companies.
That money could potentially go to shareholders instead.
If a railroad had roughly equal amounts of bonds and stock, then every reduction in interest expense could increase the amount available for stock dividends.
Investors would quickly notice this.
Demand for railroad shares could rise dramatically.
Stock prices could climb.
And that could create a powerful new wave of speculation.
The conversion from expensive debt to cheap debt might therefore trigger a period of unusually active speculation in railroad stocks.
Stock prices could become greatly inflated as investors anticipated larger future profits.
But the story would not end there.
Higher railroad profits would attract new competition.
New railroad companies would build competing lines wherever the opportunity existed.
Those new lines would take business away from the established railroads.
The savings created by lower interest payments would gradually be absorbed by lower freight rates and increased competition.
In the end, much of the benefit would go not to the railroad owners, but to the public.
That was the great economic significance of the change.
Once railroads reduced their interest costs by 30 or 40 percent, they would have the ability to lower their transportation charges.
Cheaper transportation would benefit almost every industry.
It would be especially valuable to businesses dealing with heavy or bulky goods, because transportation represented a large part of their total costs.
Workers would benefit as well.
They made up the great majority of consumers, and lower transportation costs would eventually mean cheaper goods.
The problem went deeper than railroad finance.
Railroads had been heavily overcapitalized.
Investors had earned fortunes from railroad systems whose supposed value was far greater than their actual construction cost.
That inflated capital had effectively placed an unfair burden on the rest of society.
But economic forces were beginning to correct the imbalance.
The railroad owners who had become enormously wealthy from inflated railroad valuations would now have to accept lower returns.
Part of the income they had once collected would disappear.
And that lost income would gradually be transferred to the public through cheaper transportation.
History repeatedly shows the same pattern.
When a privileged group manages to take an artificially large share of a nation's wealth, it may appear powerful for a time.
But eventually the earning power of that wealth begins to decline.
The process is especially likely in countries where wealthy or privileged classes have accumulated an excessive share of national resources.
In the end, economic forces tend to push wealth back toward the wider community.
Railroad investments were about to become one of the clearest examples of that principle.
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