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Chapter 84 · The Financial Crisis: What Went Wrong and How America Could Recover

The Financial Crisis: What Went Wrong and How America Could Recover

Chapter 84 of 90 · 4,919 words · Free

Henry Clews began by praising Pittsburgh, the center of America’s iron and steel industry.

“Pittsburgh has achieved something extraordinary,” he said. “It has grown from the old ‘Smoky City’ into the great city of steel and coal. The men who built this industry deserve our respect. Wealthy industrialists may receive the attention today, but we should never forget the workers who carried the burden in the early years.”

He smiled.

“Pittsburgh seems to specialize in extremes. You produce glass, which is fragile, and steel, which is incredibly strong. You produce cork, which is light, and iron, which is heavy. And somehow, from smoke, coal, and steel, you have managed to create gold.”

The audience laughed.

“I have heard that Pittsburgh has another great manufacturer besides its factories—Mr. Carnegie. But after the welcome you have given me, I may have to admit that there are many people here whose job is to make others happy.”

Pittsburgh’s rise had been remarkable.

Before the Civil War, America produced relatively little steel. But after the war began in 1861, American steel production expanded rapidly. Protected by high tariffs and driven by technology and investment, the industry eventually became one of the greatest engines of American wealth.

“Today,” Clews said, “America leads the world in steel production, and Pittsburgh is at the center of it.”

But Pittsburgh had recently suffered badly.

“The financial crisis struck New York first, but Pittsburgh was not spared. Fortunately, both cities responded with courage.”

The banking system had been under enormous pressure.

“New York and Pittsburgh issued Clearing House certificates when ordinary money became scarce. Pittsburgh went even further and issued scrip. And the people accepted it. Even streetcar conductors accepted it for fares.”

Clews regarded this as a remarkable example of public spirit.

“Today the situation is much calmer. The banks are operating normally again. The certificates and scrip have been redeemed, and the Stock Exchange has reopened.”

“But industry has not recovered as quickly.”

The iron and steel industry had suffered perhaps the greatest damage.

“Yesterday there was a feast,” he said. “Today there is a famine. That is nothing new for the iron trade. It has always been capable of moving from boom to collapse with astonishing speed.”

Still, he remained hopeful.

“The iron industry is also famous for recovering quickly. We need courage and patience.”

Some Pittsburgh factories had already restarted, including much of the Duquesne works of United States Steel.

“That is encouraging,” he said. “Recovery may take time, but the signs are beginning to improve.”

Clews then turned to the events that had led to the crisis.

He had warned investors as early as 1906.

“When stock and bond prices were being pushed to levels that implied money was cheap, while six-month loans were actually costing six percent, something was obviously wrong.”

Either securities were too cheap or money was too expensive.

“I concluded that securities were overpriced.”

His advice had been simple.

“I told people to get out of stocks, get out of debt, and stay out for a long time.”

The collapse that followed was enormous.

“At the worst point, the stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange had lost roughly $3.5 billion in value.”

Yet Clews believed this crisis was fundamentally different from earlier American panics.

“America had become enormously wealthy. Our productive power had expanded faster than our banking system could support.”

That imbalance was one of the central problems.

“We had created wealth and businesses faster than we had created the financial machinery needed to support them.”

Some wealthy investors recognized the danger.

“They saw the warning signs and sold their securities in 1906, when prices were extremely high.”

At least $1 billion worth of securities was shifted from strong hands into weaker ones.

Then came another disaster.

“The San Francisco earthquake destroyed approximately $350 million of property.”

At the same time, corporations and railroads were issuing enormous amounts of new securities.

“They offered stocks, bonds, and short-term notes to investors at apparently attractive prices. Investors bought them, and enormous amounts of capital became locked into long-term investments.”

Clews compared the situation to an overfed man.

“Imagine having just finished a huge dinner at Sherry’s, and then being asked to sit down immediately for another dinner at Delmonico’s. You may want the second meal, but you simply cannot eat it.”

The American financial system had reached that point.

Too much capital had already been committed.

Then one problem after another arrived.

First came the financial consequences of the Boer War.

“Britain had already gone through a period of excessive trade and speculation. The war made its financial position even more difficult.”

Germany was suffering from similar excesses.

“Germany had also financed too many ambitious industrial projects and needed careful management to prevent a collapse.”

France had its own problem.

“It had committed enormous resources to Russian loans. When Russia became financially strained during its war with Japan, France had to provide still more money simply to protect its existing investments.”

That meant France had little money left to lend abroad.

Then came the Russo-Japanese War.

“Both Russia and Japan suddenly became major borrowers in the international money market. And like Oliver Twist, they kept asking for more.”

Together, the Boer War and Russo-Japanese War had consumed more than $2 billion of capital.

Then America needed money to move its crops.

“Normally, Europe would help finance our crop-moving season. European investors might absorb roughly $300 million of New York securities.”

But in 1907 Europe effectively answered:

“We have problems of our own.”

Then came the earthquakes.

“The San Francisco disaster destroyed $350 million of property. Other earthquakes around the world added further damage.”

But these were only part of the story.

The biggest problem was excessive speculation and excessive borrowing inside America.

“Large capitalists were forced to sell stocks and bonds. Corporations and railroads were simultaneously flooding the market with new securities.”

At the same time, real estate and mining speculation had absorbed enormous quantities of capital.

“Money that should have remained liquid had been turned into fixed investments.”

That made the banking system increasingly vulnerable.

The investigation of major insurance companies and railroad companies created another shock.

“Public confidence was already weak. Then came revelations of misconduct in large corporations.”

Clews was particularly angry about the enormous fine imposed on a corporation with only $1 million of capital.

“A penalty of $29.4 million against a company with $1 million of capital looked more like confiscation than justice. It frightened investors.”

Further investigations into railroad transactions damaged confidence even more.

Then came the collapse of the Knickerbocker Trust Company and other banks.

“Bad loans had been made. Banking institutions became unstable. Officials were arrested. Public distrust intensified.”

At the same time, the copper market collapsed.

“Copper prices fell sharply, dividends were reduced, and securities connected with the industry suffered.”

Finally came the fundamental problem.

“We had abused our credit system.”

Credit had expanded too far.

Speculation had become reckless.

Businesses had expanded too aggressively.

Investors had become overconfident.

“Everything was being pushed too far.”

America had simply overdone things.

During the previous five years, companies had authorized approximately $6.8 billion of new securities.

“In the first eleven months of 1907 alone, $2 billion of new securities were authorized.”

Railroads alone authorized $1.4 billion.

“But because the money market was so tight, they could issue only about half of that amount.”

The country simply could not absorb the enormous supply.

“That was the central problem,” Clews said. “The country had created more financial obligations than its available capital could digest.”

He rejected the idea that corporate scandals alone had caused the crisis.

“That explanation is far too simple.”

America had spent the previous decade expanding at extraordinary speed.

“Railroads, factories, mines, and other businesses required enormous amounts of capital. Eventually their demands exceeded what the country could provide.”

Banks began becoming cautious.

“Bankers had to restrict lending because they knew that capital could not satisfy every demand.”

Clews believed this contraction was painful but necessary.

“In fact, it may be the very thing that saves us from a worse disaster.”

Large corporations had also made mistakes.

“When confidence was high and credit seemed unlimited, they expanded their factories, railroads, and equipment on a massive scale.”

Then confidence suddenly disappeared.

“Capital is always more timid during a crisis. Once investors become frightened, they stop lending.”

Banks had already extended too much credit.

They could not continue financing every ambitious project.

At the same time, investors stopped buying new securities.

“Everything had to be cut back.”

Clews rejected the idea that President Roosevelt should be blamed for the entire depression.

“Roosevelt did not cause the prosperity that came before the crisis, and he cannot fairly be blamed for the collapse that followed.”

Still, Clews admitted that government investigations and revelations of corporate wrongdoing had damaged confidence.

“They undoubtedly helped create the atmosphere in which the crisis became possible.”

Clews remained optimistic.

“Now is the time for patience and caution.”

America needed to finish the painful process of liquidation.

Weak businesses had to disappear.

Unsound investments had to be eliminated.

Excessive debt had to be reduced.

“When this process is finished, the financial and industrial system will be stronger than before.”

The crisis had also exposed corruption.

“Looting, illegal practices, and abuses of corporate power have been brought into the open.”

Railroad rebates were another problem.

“The end of railroad rebate abuses is a genuine improvement, and President Roosevelt deserves credit for that.”

Clews then returned to Pittsburgh.

“I expect Pittsburgh and the iron and steel industry to be among the first to recover.”

Iron, he explained, was one of the best economic indicators.

“When iron improves, other industries usually follow. When iron collapses, it often leads the way down.”

Pittsburgh also stood at the center of technological change.

The Bessemer process had transformed American steelmaking.

“But history has a habit of turning around.”

Clews believed the open-hearth process might soon overtake Bessemer.

“Improvements by American engineers have made the open-hearth process increasingly competitive.”

The lesson was simple.

“One technology replaces another, and eventually the old winner becomes the old technology.”

In 1907, America produced more than 23 million tons of steel.

About 12.3 million tons came from the Bessemer process, while nearly 11 million came from open-hearth production.

“The balance is clearly shifting.”

Clews then broadened the discussion to America’s natural wealth.

“Agriculture, mining, and manufacturing are the foundations of national wealth.”

America had enormous agricultural output.

Its mineral resources were also extraordinary.

“But we should not forget that natural resources are not unlimited.”

“We can replant forests. We cannot replant minerals.”

Still, Clews believed America’s resources gave the country enormous power to recover.

“These resources are like national banks created by nature. They provide wealth again and again.”

America’s exports had helped the country survive the crisis.

“We were able to import $100 million of gold without borrowing from anyone.”

That was powerful evidence of America’s financial independence.

“Foreign countries needed our products, and we had enough exports to pay for the gold.”

Exports remained strong even during the crisis.

In January 1908 alone, American exports reached $128 million.

Cotton accounted for more than $76 million.

Breadstuffs accounted for more than $24 million.

“At the same time, imports had fallen sharply.”

Clews believed this strengthened America’s financial position.

He then turned to the currency system.

“Our monetary system needs reform.”

But Congress was unlikely to pass a comprehensive reform bill immediately.

“So we must accept the emergency measure known as the Aldrich Bill.”

The measure would allow the government to provide up to $500 million of emergency currency to national banks.

Banks would pay six percent interest and provide acceptable securities as collateral.

“I strongly support this measure as an emergency solution.”

Clews believed it would reduce panic.

“If banks knew that additional currency could quickly become available, there would be far less reason for people to hoard cash.”

But he did not consider the bill a permanent solution.

“The country ultimately needs a much better financial system.”

He opposed the creation of a central national bank.

“A central bank would become too powerful.”

It could become a political machine.

“It would create jealousy among other banks and could repeat the abuses associated with the old United States Bank.”

Clews instead favored a more flexible currency system.

“Let the government issue the currency directly.”

Banks would provide adequate collateral.

“The government would provide the money, and the banks would pay a low interest rate for using it.”

The currency could expand when business required more money and contract when demand declined.

“This would give America an elastic currency without weakening the government's credit.”

Clews also wanted restrictions on national bank notes removed.

He proposed local redemption offices so banks would not have to send currency back and forth to Washington.

“This would save both time and money.”

He also questioned the system requiring banks to hold government bonds against their notes.

“Those bonds are extremely safe, but they are still government debt. There is no reason why the currency system must permanently depend upon them.”

Clews then reviewed the emergency measures used during the panic.

The New York Clearing House had issued $100 million of loan certificates.

The largest amount outstanding at one time was $84 million.

“This system was an American invention.”

It had also been used during earlier crises.

In 1893, the maximum had been about $41.7 million.

In 1873, it had been about $26.6 million.

But New York had become far larger by 1907.

“Bank deposits had risen from about $400 million in 1893 to more than $1 billion in 1907, even without counting the Trust Companies.”

The Clearing House system had therefore become extremely important.

Strong banks had also helped weaker banks.

“The strongest institutions held a large share of the loan certificates, allowing them to support banks under pressure.”

Clews praised the New York banking community.

“The Clearing House Committee and the banks did excellent work.”

Treasury Secretary Cortelyou also helped.

“He provided large Treasury deposits and supported the importation of gold.”

J. P. Morgan and other private bankers also played an important role.

Clews added that his own firm had helped.

“At the most critical moment, we loaned $3 million to Stock Exchange members at moderate rates.”

The crisis had forced banks to carry large amounts of difficult-to-sell collateral.

Many borrowers could not repay their loans.

“So banks had to hold those securities until markets recovered.”

Liquidation continued long after the panic itself ended.

Fortunately, bond markets began improving.

Investors who had previously chased risky investments had learned their lesson.

“They had lost money and become more cautious.”

Now they wanted high-quality bonds.

Clews believed this change in investor behavior was a healthy development.

“The recovery in the bond market made it possible for major railroads to raise new money.”

By February 1908, the banking system was beginning to return to normal.

Loan certificates had disappeared.

Clearing Houses had resumed normal operations.

New York also resumed publishing detailed weekly bank statements.

“This transparency is an important improvement.”

Banks were now showing both their average and actual conditions.

Clews saw another encouraging sign.

“There is plenty of money.”

Banks from Maine to California were accumulating surplus funds.

Interest rates were extremely low.

“The problem is no longer a shortage of money. The problem is a shortage of business.”

That distinction was important.

Bank reserves were rising because businesses were not borrowing.

Trade remained weak.

January 1908 bank clearings were about 25 percent below the previous year.

Railroads were suffering badly.

Their earnings had fallen.

Their freight cars were sitting empty.

Some companies had reduced dividends.

Others had paid dividends in scrip instead of cash.

“That is painful, but it is what happens during a depression.”

Clews then turned to politics.

“The presidential election of 1908 is creating another problem.”

President Roosevelt had attacked Wall Street.

William Jennings Bryan had also condemned stock speculation as gambling.

Clews strongly disagreed.

“Buying and selling stocks is no more gambling than buying and selling real estate or merchandise.”

Every business transaction involves risk.

“A merchant buys goods without knowing whether their prices will rise or fall.”

That is speculation too.

“A manufacturer who agrees today to deliver goods sixty days from now is making a commitment about the future.”

Even marriage, Clews joked, was sometimes called a lottery.

“It is impossible to eliminate speculation from business.”

The real question was whether speculation was reasonable or excessive.

“Reasonable speculation is useful.”

It helps establish prices.

Buyers and sellers constantly test what an asset is actually worth.

“No government investigation can determine the true market value of a railroad as effectively as millions of buyers and sellers negotiating with one another.”

Clews admitted that speculation could become excessive.

“There are abuses.”

But he believed public opinion and sensible rules were better solutions than political attacks.

“The problem with the current anti-speculation campaign is that politicians are exploiting public anger.”

He expected the campaign to weaken after the election.

“But in the meantime, it is doing real damage.”

Investors were becoming frightened.

Capital was hiding.

Businesses were postponing expansion.

Workers were losing jobs.

Clews also objected to political criticism of stock options.

“President Roosevelt speaks of options as though they were still commonly traded on the Stock Exchange.”

They were not.

Stock transactions were normally settled the next business day.

Futures were much more important on commodity exchanges.

“Farmers can sell future crops before harvest. Coffee importers can lock in prices before their shipments arrive.”

“That is speculation, but it is useful speculation.”

Clews believed that people unfamiliar with financial markets were judging them unfairly.

“President Roosevelt and Mr. Bryan would have spoken differently if they had spent more time understanding these markets from the inside.”

He emphasized that bad individuals should not define an entire industry.

“If one man uses stolen money to speculate, that does not make the Stock Exchange responsible for his crime.”

He compared it to a river.

“You would not blame a river because a desperate man jumped into it.”

Stockbrokers operating according to Exchange rules were engaged in legitimate business.

“Credit is what keeps business alive.”

Clews strongly defended the New York Stock Exchange.

“The Exchange has more than a thousand members, and the overwhelming majority are honorable businessmen.”

Dishonest behavior could lead to expulsion.

“Any member who violates the rules risks losing his entire position.”

He admitted that stock manipulation could occur.

But he insisted that the Exchange actively tried to prevent it.

“The practice known as ‘washing’ is prohibited.”

Some violations might escape detection, he conceded.

“But the Exchange is constantly working to uncover and punish them.”

Clews was especially frustrated by the way Wall Street was blamed after every financial crisis.

“After every panic, Wall Street becomes the scapegoat.”

But Wall Street, he argued, was simply the country’s financial marketplace.

“Chicago is the great market for wheat. Boston is important for wool. New Orleans is important for cotton.”

“Wall Street is the market for capital.”

The country needed such a market.

“Without a market for securities, millions of investors would have no efficient way to buy or sell their investments.”

The so-called bear speculator also had a useful role.

“A bear can expose weaknesses in an overpriced stock.”

That could prevent prices from rising to dangerously unrealistic levels.

Clews believed the public saw only one side of Wall Street.

“People hear about fraud and speculation, but they rarely hear about the legitimate work being done every day.”

Many critics were inconsistent.

“They condemn Wall Street when they lose money, but rush there when they want to make money.”

When they became rich, they congratulated themselves.

“When they lost, they blamed Wall Street.”

Clews considered this unfair.

“Most investors lose because they make bad decisions, not because Wall Street forces them to make those decisions.”

He acknowledged that Wall Street contained dishonest people.

“Of course it does. Human nature is the same everywhere.”

But he believed the majority were intelligent, disciplined, and honest.

“Wall Street attracts some of the strongest business minds in the country because enormous organizations and complicated financial operations require exceptional ability.”

He also acknowledged serious abuses.

“Some questionable schemes have been promoted. Some people have misused money placed in their care.”

Those abuses needed to be eliminated.

“But the standards of the financial community are already much higher than they were.”

Clews then spoke personally.

“I have never forgotten the day I first walked onto the floor of the New York Stock Exchange as a newly elected member.”

He remembered the pride he felt.

“That pride has only grown.”

He praised the trust that existed among Exchange members.

“Millions of dollars can be traded with nothing more than spoken words.”

Written contracts were often unnecessary.

“Disputes are rare.”

If a disagreement did occur and neither side could prove what had happened, the parties might simply divide the loss.

“That tells you something about the importance of reputation.”

Clews also described the atmosphere inside the Exchange.

“People sometimes worry about the pressure placed on brokers during busy markets.”

He laughed.

“They should not. Busy days are often the happiest days on the Street.”

At ten o’clock each morning, the Exchange suddenly came alive.

“The members begin shouting and waving their arms. To an outsider, it looks like complete madness.”

“But watch carefully.”

“There is order inside the apparent chaos.”

Signals, telephones, messengers, and clerks all work together.

“The entire machine operates with extraordinary precision.”

And almost everything in America affects that market.

“Wheat, corn, cotton, mining, railroads, factories, workers—everything has an influence.”

Wall Street was therefore a kind of economic barometer.

“Every person who has money invested or deposited in a bank is connected to what happens there.”

Clews insisted that Wall Street also served the public during disasters.

“During times of great need, members of the Exchange have repeatedly contributed money to relief efforts.”

There was much about Wall Street that outsiders never saw.

“So listen to both sides before passing judgment.”

Clews believed the foundation of the financial system was trust.

“Honesty and truthfulness are the foundation. Confidence is the keystone.”

The existence of an occasional weak point did not mean the entire structure was weak.

He also believed that young people could learn valuable lessons on Wall Street.

“They would learn discipline, hard work, responsibility, and the importance of treating others fairly.”

The Golden Rule, he said, was still one of the best principles for business.

“Wall Street will survive these attacks.”

In fact, he believed the attacks might eventually strengthen it.

“This is a trial by fire. Those who have nothing to fear will come through it.”

Clews then turned to another problem: the railroads.

“While Wall Street is under political attack, the railroads are being attacked by state governments.”

Low-rate regulations and other restrictions were making it difficult for railroads to expand.

“I believe interstate railroads should be placed entirely under federal control.”

The labor situation was another serious problem.

“Railroads and manufacturers were facing lower revenues, but wages remained at boom-time levels.”

Clews believed wages would have to fall.

“Labor unions should recognize the new economic reality.”

Lower wages, he argued, could allow companies to reopen factories and employ more workers.

“Some workers might earn less per person, but more people could have jobs.”

That, he believed, would help both workers and employers.

“The country needs common sense in adjusting wages to the new level of prices.”

Commodity prices had already fallen.

Rents had fallen in many places.

“Wages should eventually adjust as well.”

Clews viewed this as a matter of economic balance.

“Labor and capital have mutual interests.”

Neither could prosper permanently at the expense of the other.

Falling commodity prices were actually beneficial in some ways.

“Consumers could buy necessities more cheaply.”

Manufacturers could obtain cheaper raw materials.

“Lower production costs would eventually stimulate consumption and trade.”

The crisis had also forced investors and businessmen to become more conservative.

“That painful liquidation has made the financial system safer.”

Many speculative businessmen had taken enormous risks.

“They invited the crisis through reckless borrowing and excessive commitments.”

Some had even gained control of major banks and used bank resources to support their own speculative ventures.

“These men were among the most dangerous figures in the entire crisis.”

Their removal from the banking system was therefore beneficial.

“One good thing has come from this terrible experience: unsound banking practices have been exposed and eliminated.”

Clews also believed the panic had taught Americans a lesson in personal economy.

“We had become too extravagant.”

The crisis forced people to reduce unnecessary spending.

“Adversity sometimes teaches lessons that prosperity never can.”

Clews connected excessive personal spending with broader corruption.

“People who demand extravagant lifestyles create pressure for dishonest ways of making money.”

Corporate looting, bribery, and abuse of power could grow from such attitudes.

He again gave Roosevelt credit for fighting corporate corruption.

“His campaign against illegal corporate practices has helped raise standards.”

The scandals in insurance and railroad companies had shown how badly reform was needed.

“Material wealth is not enough. A nation also needs morality.”

Clews then pointed to another encouraging sign.

New York City had recently offered $50 million of municipal bonds.

Investors submitted bids totaling approximately $300 million.

“The bonds sold at around 104¾.”

That was six times more demand than the amount offered.

“This proves that enormous amounts of capital are still available.”

Investors simply wanted safe investments.

The cheapness of money also encouraged demand for high-quality bonds.

Banks and bankers needed somewhere to put their surplus funds.

Clews believed the recovery would therefore eventually come.

“Business is weak, but the foundations are sound.”

He compared the economy to a ship.

“There is a time to move forward, a time to reduce sail, and a time to stop altogether.”

“Good navigation means knowing which moment has arrived.”

For now, the country needed caution.

Banks also needed larger reserves.

Clews argued that the legal reserve requirement of 25 percent in central reserve cities was too low.

“I believe it should be at least 30 percent.”

If New York banks had maintained 30 percent reserves in October 1907, he believed the Knickerbocker Trust failure might not have produced such a severe crisis.

“There might have been no need for Clearing House certificates.”

There might have been far less hoarding of cash.

“The banks would have sacrificed some profit, but they would have gained much greater safety.”

The crisis had demonstrated the value of prevention.

“An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”

Clews also discussed several bank failures that occurred after the worst of the panic.

Four Clearing House banks had failed in one week near the end of January.

But public reaction was surprisingly calm.

“The panic had changed the public.”

People had already experienced the worst.

The stock market was recovering.

Investors had become less frightened.

Clews also criticized the legal process for winding up failed banks.

“Receivership can take too long, and legal expenses can consume too much of the remaining assets.”

He wanted fixed compensation for receivers and their lawyers rather than excessive fees.

“Creditors should not lose their money simply because liquidation is badly managed.”

Even so, the banking system was much stronger than during earlier crises.

The panic of 1893 had produced 158 bank suspensions.

The crisis of 1907 had produced far fewer.

American banks had grown larger and stronger during the previous fourteen years.

“They were better equipped to withstand a financial storm.”

No one knew exactly how quickly the economy would recover.

Some predicted a long depression.

Others believed the worst was already over.

Clews preferred a middle position.

“The safest people are the conservatives. They do not assume either extreme is certain.”

He quoted Longfellow’s advice:

“Learn to labor and to wait.”

America still had enormous opportunities.

“The needs of more than eighty million Americans cannot simply disappear.”

The country was still growing.

“It remains one of the most progressive nations in the world.”

Then Clews asked the question he wanted his audience to remember:

“Who’s afraid?”

He believed the period of excessive pessimism should end.

“The worst of the financial depression has probably passed.”

Businesspeople should remain cautious, but they should also regain confidence.

“I believe recovery will come faster than after any of the great panics since 1857.”

Now was the time for courage.

“The timid must become brave.”

“The strong must help the weak.”

“The inexperienced must be willing to learn from those who know more.”

Everyone had a role in rebuilding the economy.

“If workers give their best efforts, employers treat them fairly, banks remain conservative, and businessmen avoid reckless expansion, the country can recover.”

The panic of 1907 should not be remembered merely as a disaster.

“It should be remembered as a lesson.”

America had learned what happened when credit expanded too far, speculation became excessive, banks took unreasonable risks, and businesses expanded beyond what available capital could support.

“The lesson is not to stop enterprise.”

“It is to combine enterprise with prudence.”

Panics would come again someday.

But not necessarily soon.

“For now, the country has been given an opportunity to rebuild on stronger foundations.”

Clews ended with a message of cooperation.

“Let the worker serve his employer faithfully.”

“Let the employer treat the worker fairly.”

“Let the strong help the weak.”

“And let everyone remember the lesson of this crisis: prosperity is strongest when ambition is balanced by common sense.”

“The storm has passed.”

“Now we must rebuild.”

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