The Real Causes of the Panic of 1907
The financial experts on Wall Street had taken some brutal lessons during the panic of 1907. They had become overconfident, convinced that they understood everything. But that is exactly when a person becomes most vulnerable. My advice has always been simple: never blindly follow a leader who thinks he knows everything. Be patient, stand aside, and wait until the right opportunity comes.
Back in September 1906, stock and bond prices had been pushed to extremely high levels, with returns of only about 3½ to 4 percent. At the same time, six-month loans were costing around 6 percent. Clearly, something was out of balance. With the demand for money steadily increasing, it was obvious to me that money was not too expensive. Securities were simply too expensive.
At that time, I repeatedly advised people to sell their stocks, pay down their debts, and stay out of the market for a long while. The only exception was to make quick, short-term trades when a good opportunity appeared.
Since then, security prices have fallen dramatically. The losses on stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange alone would probably amount to no less than $3.5 billion.
Those who followed my advice and sold near the top can now afford to buy back their stocks at much lower prices, provided the companies do not cut their dividends. No one can predict what will happen to dividends. But many sound securities are now selling cheaply, below what they are actually worth based on their current earnings.
Our financial situation is also very different from what followed earlier panics. I have lived through many of them, going all the way back to the panic of 1857, which began with the failure of the Ohio Life & Trust Company.
This time, the circumstances are different.
The United States has become enormously wealthy. In terms of real wealth and productive power per person, it has become the richest nation in the world.
But our economic growth has been so rapid that our banking system has failed to keep pace with it. That imbalance had a great deal to do with the recent crisis.
Some experienced and cautious capitalists saw trouble coming. They understood what was happening in Wall Street and elsewhere, and they sold their securities during the previous year while prices were still extremely high.
In fact, these investors unloaded at least $800 million worth of stocks onto people who were financially less prepared to carry them.
Then came the San Francisco earthquake.
The disaster wiped about $350 million from property values and delivered another powerful blow to an already fragile financial system.
After the big investors had sold out, the major railroad companies began flooding the market with bonds, stocks, and notes to raise money for improvements.
These securities were offered to existing shareholders at prices that looked attractive, and investors bought them.
But the market was soon overwhelmed by the enormous amount of new securities.
The new issues absorbed the capital of many wealthy Americans and locked their money into long-term investments.
Many of these men had previously been extremely rich in liquid cash and securities. Now they were like a man who had just finished a huge dinner and was immediately asked to sit down for another enormous meal. They simply had no room left.
The panic was not caused by one single event.
It was the result of several bad developments arriving one after another.
First came the selling of securities by experienced investors while prices were still high.
Second came the enormous amount of new securities issued by the railroads to finance expansion and improvements.
Third came the scandals exposed by the investigation of the life insurance companies led by Governor Hughes.
Then the Interstate Commerce Commission investigated Edward Harriman, and his testimony under oath revealed further disturbing information.
After that came Judge Landis's $29.4 million fine against the Standard Oil Company of Indiana.
Finally, Governor Hughes fought through overwhelming opposition to pass the Public Utilities law. Under that law, an investigation began into the Metropolitan Street Railway.
That investigation uncovered the real reasons behind the collapse of the company's stock.
The shares had once traded at $127.
They had fallen to around $20.
That investigation was the final blow.
Confidence collapsed completely.
And confidence is the foundation of credit.
Once confidence began to disappear, the Knickerbocker Trust Company was forced to close its doors.
Then everything descended into chaos.
Wall Street was in turmoil, and almost everyone stood stunned, wondering what would happen next.
I have presented my side of the story as honestly as I can.
So now I ask you to act as though you were sitting on a jury.
Why should President Roosevelt receive all the blame for the panic?
The real causes can be summarized quite clearly.
First, financial operators had pushed stock prices to levels producing only 3½ to 4 percent returns, even though six- and twelve-month loans were costing 6 percent or more, even against the best collateral.
Second, enormous amounts of capital throughout the country had been invested in real estate and other fixed assets. That money was no longer liquid and could not easily be used when cash was suddenly needed.
Third, the Knickerbocker Trust Company had made a number of unsound loans, eventually forcing it to suspend operations.
Fourth, major operators had dumped about $800 million worth of securities onto the market, followed by huge new issues from the railroads.
Fifth, the San Francisco earthquake caused losses of roughly $350 million.
Sixth, the investigation into the life insurance companies shook public confidence.
Seventh, the investigation into the Metropolitan Street Railway exposed serious financial wrongdoing.
Eighth, Judge Landis imposed the extraordinary $29.4 million fine on a corporation whose capital was only $1 million.
Ninth, the Interstate Commerce Commission investigated the Chicago & Alton railroad deal, producing further damaging revelations.
These were the major forces that led to the financial disaster.
Now ask yourself one question.
Did President Roosevelt personally cause any of these things?
Not one.
Governor Hughes was the man who led the investigation into the life insurance companies. He was also responsible for exposing the Metropolitan Railroad scandal because he had written the Public Utilities law.
Yet Roosevelt was widely condemned while Hughes was praised across the country.
So is it fair to place the entire responsibility for the financial crisis on President Roosevelt while ignoring Governor Hughes, when both were actively involved in the same reform movement?
I do not believe either man should be blamed.
Both were simply doing their duty by enforcing the law and exposing wrongdoing.
As for the future of the stock market, I believe it will eventually recover when the major Wall Street investors begin buying back the securities they previously sold.
They can already buy many of those securities for 30 to 50 percent less than the prices at which they sold them.
With $70 million in gold already imported or on its way from Europe, together with an increase in the supply of bank notes, there should soon be no shortage of money in the United States.
What we need now is not simply more money.
We need confidence.
Once confidence returns, credit will expand again.
But we should not continue importing large amounts of gold, because doing so could create serious problems for London and other European financial centers.
Cheap money by itself will not make stock prices rise.
The real drivers will be business conditions and corporate earnings.
And in the end, that is what the major investors will watch most closely.
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