The Great Crisis of 1907
By October 1907, the fears that had haunted Wall Street in September had become reality. The financial trouble was no longer confined to the stock market. Distrust spread into the banking system and then across the entire country. America was now facing a panic that would make 1907 one of the most memorable years in its financial history.
The crisis exploded after the collapse of United Copper stock in the “Curb” market. On October 17, two Stock Exchange firms that had been manipulating the stock for the Heinze interests failed.
Until then, the panic had mainly affected stock speculators and the people directly connected with them. But the Heinze failures were different.
They struck the banking system itself.
F. A. Heinze, president of United Copper, had recently gained control of several banks. Two of his brothers were involved in one of the failed firms, Otto Heinze & Co. That connection immediately frightened depositors.
They began taking their money out of the banks.
The Mercantile National Bank was hit especially hard. Heinze himself was its president.
The New York Clearing House Committee moved quickly.
“We need to examine the Mercantile National Bank,” the committee decided.
After examining the bank, the committee delivered its demand.
“All of the officers and directors must resign before we can provide assistance.”
Heinze and the other directors had little choice.
They resigned that night.
The Clearing House then helped the bank meet its daily clearing obligations for several days. But the bank's payments were so large that the assistance could not continue indefinitely.
“We can no longer provide additional support,” the committee finally said.
The situation looked desperate.
But one of the bank's older directors refused to let it collapse.
“We need new capital and new directors immediately.”
By Sunday, new money and new directors had been brought into the bank. The Mercantile National Bank was able to remain open without interruption.
But the panic was already spreading.
Depositors were now running on the banks controlled by the Heinze and Thomas interests, as well as those associated with Charles W. Morse.
The three groups had something important in common. They had become heavily involved in buying control of banks for speculative purposes.
The Clearing House Committee stepped in again.
“These men must resign,” it demanded.
One after another, the bank officers and directors connected with the speculative promoters were forced out.
The Clearing House then began supporting the banks themselves.
But suspicion soon moved beyond the ordinary banks.
Attention turned to the trust companies, several of which had connections with speculative interests.
The most dangerous target was the Knickerbocker Trust Company, the second-largest trust company in New York. It held more than sixty million dollars in deposits.
Then the run began.
On Monday, October 21, Charles T. Barney resigned as president of the Knickerbocker.
That same day, the National Bank of Commerce notified the Knickerbocker that it would no longer clear checks for the trust company after the following day.
The newspapers quickly reported the news.
Depositors panicked.
“They're going to close!”
“We must get our money out now!”
On Tuesday, October 22, thousands of people rushed to the Knickerbocker Trust Company.
The line of depositors grew rapidly.
By the end of the day, the Knickerbocker had to close its doors.
The Clearing House and J. P. Morgan were asked to help.
But after examining the situation, they reached a grim conclusion.
“We do not believe the Knickerbocker is solvent.”
No rescue was offered.
The failure of the Knickerbocker immediately triggered new runs on smaller banks and trust companies throughout New York and Brooklyn.
Several institutions failed.
About a dozen banks and trust companies closed their doors, including seven in Brooklyn.
The savings banks were also under pressure, but they had an important advantage. By law, they could delay payment of deposits for sixty or ninety days after receiving notice.
That gave them time to survive the panic.
Still, the danger was far from over.
The Trust Company of America and its Colonial Branch came under enormous pressure.
The Lincoln Trust Company was also attacked by frightened depositors.
The lines became so long that people waited outside through the night.
The situation looked increasingly dangerous.
But the banks were not abandoned.
Morgan's experts examined the troubled trust companies carefully.
After the examinations, they reached a crucial conclusion.
“These institutions are solvent.”
That changed everything.
For several days and nights, leading bankers gathered at J. P. Morgan's home.
“We must provide enough money to meet every legitimate demand.”
“We cannot allow solvent institutions to fail simply because depositors are frightened.”
After exhausting discussions, the bankers agreed to supply the Trust Company of America and the Lincoln Trust Company with whatever money they needed.
Morgan took on an enormous burden during those tense days. His determination and relentless work played a major role in preventing the banking crisis from becoming even worse.
Meanwhile, the stock market was collapsing.
Heavy liquidation pushed prices to new lows.
On October 24, Union Pacific fell to 100.
Amalgamated Copper dropped to 41¾.
Other leading stocks plunged as well.
Money had become extraordinarily scarce and expensive.
Interest rates were so high that brokers could barely continue normal margin trading.
In many cases, margin business was effectively suspended.
“Cash only,” became the rule.
Even so, investors continued buying odd lots of stocks for long-term investment. Throughout the crisis, there was surprisingly heavy buying by people who believed that the lower prices represented opportunities.
The collapse of Amalgamated Copper was made worse by the fall in the price of copper itself, which dropped to twelve cents a pound.
But much of the stock-market liquidation had another cause.
Banks and trust companies were calling in their loans.
Many of those loans were secured by stocks.
When the lenders demanded repayment, borrowers had only one practical choice.
“Sell the stocks.”
Those forced sales pushed prices even lower.
At the same time, Americans were becoming afraid to leave their money in banks.
They withdrew their deposits and began hoarding cash.
Money disappeared from normal circulation.
People locked it in safe-deposit boxes, hid it in tin boxes, kept it in wallets, or stored it wherever they believed it would be safe.
This created another problem.
The banks desperately needed cash, but the public was taking cash out of the banking system and hiding it.
For several days, call loans on the New York Stock Exchange carried astonishing interest rates.
Fifty percent.
Then seventy-five percent.
In some cases, one hundred percent.
And in exceptional cases, the rate reached 125 percent a year.
The United States Treasury finally stepped in.
Secretary George B. Cortelyou personally directed unusually large deposits of government money into New York's national banks.
Additional funds were also sent to banks in other cities that were drawing heavily on their balances in New York.
But the public continued withdrawing deposits.
The money simply disappeared from circulation.
The hoarding became so severe that it was no longer merely a banking problem.
It was threatening the entire financial system.
Finally, on Saturday, October 26, the members of the New York Clearing House gathered to decide what to do.
“We need another form of money,” the bankers concluded.
They agreed to issue Clearing House certificates bearing six percent interest.
These certificates would not be ordinary currency. Instead, member banks could use them to settle their daily balances with one another through the Clearing House.
A bank needing certificates could receive them in exchange for acceptable assets deposited with the Clearing House.
The certificates could be issued for as much as 75 percent of the value of those assets.
The effect was immediate.
Banks whose cash reserves had been nearly exhausted suddenly had another source of liquidity.
But the bankers understood that this alone would not solve the crisis.
They needed gold.
Large amounts of gold had to be brought into the United States to replace the money that the public had hidden and to restore confidence.
The Clearing House certificates helped free up gold and legal-tender currency that banks could then use to arrange gold purchases overseas.
Through cable transfers, American banks began buying gold in England.
By the end of the first week of November, American banks and bankers had purchased about $50 million in gold for shipment to the United States.
Nearly half of it had already arrived in New York.
The gold was not coming only to New York.
Banks in Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco were also involved in the imports.
But America's demand for gold created a new problem.
Europe was losing its gold reserves.
The Bank of England reacted first.
On October 31, it raised its minimum discount rate from 4½ percent to 5½ percent.
That was not enough.
The rate was raised again to 6 percent the following Monday.
Then, on November 7, it was raised to 7 percent.
That was the highest rate since the great panic of 1873, when the Bank of England had eventually raised its rate to 9 percent.
Only once before, in 1866, had the rate reached an even higher level of 10 percent.
France was also feeling the pressure.
On November 7, 1907, the Bank of France raised its rate from 3½ percent to 4 percent.
Such an increase was unusual in France. For seven years, until the spring of 1907, its rate had remained at 3 percent.
Germany raised its rate to 7½ percent.
Belgium raised its rate to 6 percent.
The message was clear.
America's desperate demand for gold was putting serious pressure on Europe's financial system.
By November 16, American gold purchases had reached $70 million.
Meanwhile, clearing houses throughout the United States began following New York's example.
They issued their own clearing-house certificates to keep banks functioning without enough ordinary currency.
Cash became so scarce that certified checks sometimes traded at premiums of 2½ to 5 percent.
In other words, people were willing to pay more than the face value of a check simply because they wanted something they could trust as money.
Pittsburgh's Stock Exchange closed after the failure of three Westinghouse companies.
Other businesses and financial institutions were also failing at an alarming rate.
Local clearing houses in Pittsburgh, Chicago, New Orleans, and other cities began issuing small-denomination clearing-house checks.
Some were issued for as little as twenty-five cents or one dollar.
Banks used them when ordinary currency was unavailable.
Western Boards of Trade were also forced to close in several places.
Grain prices had collapsed as desperate traders sold whatever they could in order to raise cash.
Banks across the country began improvising.
Some issued their own cashier's checks, both large and small, instead of currency or clearing-house certificates.
The entire banking system was operating under extraordinary pressure.
From Maine to California, banks were functioning in what was essentially a partial suspension of normal operations.
The statistics showed just how serious the situation had become.
For the week ending November 2, the associated New York banks were collectively $38,838,825 below the legally required 25 percent reserve against their deposits.
And that calculation did not even include the very large government deposits that had already been placed in the banks.
The detailed condition of individual banks was not published at that time.
The information was deliberately withheld until the crisis had passed.
The huge reserve deficit frightened the market and contributed to another sharp decline in stock prices.
Yet the leading bankers were not giving up.
Day after day, and night after night, bank officers met with Secretary Cortelyou and J. P. Morgan.
“We have to find a way through this.”
“How can we restore confidence?”
“How can we stop the banks from draining one another's reserves?”
These conferences produced important results.
One of the most useful steps was bringing the trust companies together so that they could act collectively rather than individually.
A committee was formed for this purpose.
Edward King, president of the Union Trust Company, was appointed chairman.
The committee operated from the offices of J. P. Morgan & Co., which had effectively become the headquarters for banking relief outside the Clearing House.
But America's rescue efforts were creating problems overseas.
The huge amounts of gold being pulled from Europe seriously unsettled the financial markets of London, Paris, and Berlin.
Stock and bond prices continued falling as gold flowed across the Atlantic.
America was being rescued by European gold, but Europe was paying a heavy price.
And even with those enormous gold imports, American banks remained under severe pressure.
The New York Clearing House figures for the week ending November 9 showed just how difficult the situation had become.
The reserve deficit of the associated New York banks had increased by another $13,085,800.
Their total deficit had now reached $51,921,625.
The numbers looked frightening.
But there was an important qualification.
The Clearing House figures were based on weekly averages rather than the exact condition of the banks at the end of the week.
Gold was not credited to a bank's reserves until the date it actually arrived.
As a result, the statistics did not fully reflect the relief provided by the gold shipments.
Still, the crisis remained extremely dangerous.
One of the most important rescue operations involved the Trust Company of America.
During the Morgan conferences, the bankers worked out a remarkable deal involving the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company.
A majority of Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad stock was sold to United States Steel at $100 a share.
Much of that stock had been pledged as collateral to the Trust Company of America.
Under the agreement, payment was made with United States Steel's 5 percent sinking-fund bonds, valued at 84.
J. P. Morgan & Co. handled the transaction beginning November 7.
The deal immediately strengthened the position of the Trust Company of America and, at the same time, brought another major industrial property into the United States Steel empire.
The transaction became one of the defining events of the panic of 1907.
America had come frighteningly close to financial disaster.
Banks had been attacked.
Trust companies had nearly collapsed.
The stock market had plunged.
Money had become extraordinarily expensive.
Gold had been drained from Europe.
Ordinary people had hidden their cash because they no longer trusted the banking system.
Yet the crisis had also forced the country's financial leaders to cooperate in ways they had never done before.
The worst was finally passing.
The wreckage left by the panic would take years to clear away.
But the country itself remained strong.
With nearly eighty-four million people, enormous natural resources, powerful industries, and an extraordinary capacity for growth, America still had the foundations for a much greater future.
The panic had been brutal.
But it had also exposed the weaknesses of the financial system.
And when the country emerged from the ordeal, it would be more cautious, more disciplined, and, ultimately, stronger.
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