← Fifty years in Wall Street 2026 Edition
Chapter 68 · Wall Street’s Wild Speculation, 1900–1904

Wall Street’s Wild Speculation, 1900–1904

Chapter 68 of 90 · 2,834 words · Free

After McKinley defeated Bryan in 1900, Wall Street suddenly changed from fear and depression to confidence and excitement.

Large investors began buying stocks and bonds in enormous quantities. Prices rose rapidly, and soon smaller investors joined the rush. People everywhere became convinced that stocks could only go higher. They put more and more of their money into the market, often risking nearly everything they owned.

The big Wall Street operators quickly took advantage of the situation.

Many of them had bought stocks cheaply before the boom began. Now they pushed prices higher through aggressive buying and manipulation. At the same time, businessmen across the country rushed to create industrial trusts, railroad combinations, and new corporations.

Companies were often given enormous amounts of stock and bonds—far more than their real businesses were worth.

The public eagerly bought this new paper.

Much of it later became nearly worthless.

The result was one of the greatest speculative booms America had ever seen.

What made the situation especially dangerous was that the boom continued for years. People became so accustomed to making money that they stopped thinking about risk.

High prices did not scare them.

High interest rates did not scare them.

Strikes did not scare them.

Warnings from bankers did not scare them.

They simply kept buying.

By September 1902, however, the situation had become so dangerous that conservative bankers and market observers began demanding a halt.

I was one of the first to warn the public.

I wrote:

“A man becomes an inebriate when he reaches the point where he no longer understands that effects follow causes. The stock market has produced much the same condition of mind among the public. People have been buying for so long and making profits for so long that they have become insensitive to danger.”

“They are no longer frightened by high prices, expensive money, strikes, or warnings.”

“Buying and holding stocks has become a habit.”

“I strongly recommend caution. Better still, I would advise people not to buy at all at the prices now prevailing.”

“Money is likely to remain expensive because business is active and the movement of crops will keep capital fully employed.”

“Anyone who buys stocks at these prices may soon find himself suffering from both falling values and a shortage of money.”

The warning came at the right time.

The great speculative fever gradually began to cool. Prices started falling, and the decline continued for a long time.

Hundreds of thousands of people lost money.

Many once-wealthy men were ruined.

But the country as a whole escaped something much worse.

Had the speculation continued for another six months, the entire financial system might have suffered a disaster comparable to the panics of 1857 and 1873.

The banks had finally put on the brakes.

That decision probably saved the country from a much greater catastrophe.

The year 1901 was the most extraordinary year in American financial history.

Wall Street became the stage for events that amazed the entire world.

Six major forces were working at the same time.

Railroads and industrial companies were being combined at wildly inflated values.

Speculation was sweeping through the entire country.

America was changing from a major lender to Europe into a heavy borrower.

The corn crop had partly failed.

Prices for many basic commodities were falling.

And the earnings and dividends of many newly created industrial companies were collapsing.

One of the most spectacular examples was the Amalgamated Copper Company.

Its stock was first pushed up to $130.

Then the manipulators began selling.

They sold their holdings and then sold the stock short.

The price collapsed to $60.

Later it fell all the way to $32.50.

The people who had bought near the top suffered enormous losses, while the manipulators reportedly made more than $50 million from the rise and fall.

The stock ticker told the story day after day.

It recorded fortunes being made and destroyed in minutes.

There has never been a shortage of speculation on Wall Street, and there probably never will be.

In 1901, the scale of trading was astonishing.

During the first six months alone, the New York Stock Exchange recorded 175.8 million shares of stock transactions and more than $637 million in bond transactions.

On January 7, more than 2.1 million shares changed hands in a single day.

By April 30, the daily total had reached more than 3.27 million shares.

Then came the disaster.

On May 9, 1901, the Northern Pacific panic struck.

The market had been climbing so quickly that the entire financial community seemed intoxicated.

Then suddenly everything changed.

Northern Pacific stock, which had been the center of a struggle for control, was pushed to an extraordinary level.

At one point it traded at $1,000 a share.

Stocks across the market collapsed.

Many fell between 15 and 50 percent in a single day.

The ticker recorded more than three million shares, but the actual trading was probably much greater because the market was too chaotic to record every transaction.

The mood changed almost instantly.

Only hours earlier, Wall Street had been celebrating.

Now everyone wanted to sell.

It was like a party suddenly interrupted by the sound of cannon fire.

The fight over Northern Pacific had created the disaster.

Two powerful groups were competing for control of the railroad.

J. P. Morgan & Co. represented the Hill-Burlington-Great Northern interests.

Kuhn, Loeb & Co. represented the Harriman-Union Pacific interests.

Both sides had accumulated large amounts of Northern Pacific stock.

Eventually there were almost no shares left for the shorts to buy.

The result was a classic corner.

The price exploded upward because desperate short sellers could not find stock to cover their positions.

But the panic had already spread throughout the market.

Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb realized that continuing the fight could destroy the entire financial system.

They met quickly and reached an agreement concerning the Northern Pacific shares.

The announcement brought an immediate recovery.

But by then the damage had been done.

Several Stock Exchange firms failed, and many investors had suffered devastating losses.

The market recovered, collapsed again, and then recovered once more.

That violent pattern was typical of a financial crisis in which confidence had been badly damaged.

The final result of the Northern Pacific struggle was the creation of the Northern Securities Company.

The Hill and Harriman interests placed their Northern Pacific and Great Northern holdings into the new holding company.

In return, they received shares of Northern Securities.

The arrangement temporarily settled the conflict.

But the story did not end there.

In 1904, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Northern Securities violated the antitrust law.

The company therefore had to be broken up.

A new dispute immediately followed.

The directors wanted to distribute the railroad shares proportionally among the owners.

E. H. Harriman, representing Union Pacific, wanted his company's Northern Pacific shares returned directly.

Union Pacific had contributed about $78 million of Northern Pacific stock.

If Harriman got all of it back, Union Pacific would gain control of Northern Pacific.

James J. Hill naturally opposed that outcome.

Another major legal battle followed.

The speculation of 1901 was not limited to Northern Pacific.

April was the busiest month of the year.

More than 41.6 million shares were traded during the month.

On April 24 alone, 652,900 shares of Union Pacific changed hands.

Those numbers give some idea of the fever that had taken hold of Wall Street.

The rush to create new corporations was equally extraordinary.

The United States Steel Corporation was the largest and probably the most heavily capitalized of the new combinations.

It was launched with more than $508 million of common stock, more than $510 million of preferred stock, and $304 million of bonds.

Across the country, promoters competed to create larger and larger corporations.

They often valued businesses at many times their real worth.

The obvious goal was to sell the new stock to the public.

And the public eagerly bought it.

Unfortunately, much of that stock later became almost worthless.

New Jersey became a center of this corporate boom.

In 1901 alone, 2,346 companies were incorporated there, with a total capitalization of nearly $4.8 billion.

The previous year had seen 2,181 companies with only about $1.35 billion of capitalization.

New York, Ohio, Texas, and other states experienced similar waves of incorporation.

This was a dramatic change from the America of the mid-nineteenth century.

Commercial corporations had been relatively uncommon before 1850.

Railroads and industrial development changed that.

By the early twentieth century, corporations could be formed with enormous amounts of capital and for extraordinarily long periods.

The growth of trust companies was another important part of this transformation.

Trust companies became powerful competitors to traditional banks.

Their deposits grew rapidly.

In 1882, all American trust companies together held about $145 million in deposits.

By 1892, that figure had risen to about $412 million.

By June 1902, it had reached more than $1.5 billion.

In New York City, trust company deposits were already larger than the deposits of individual national banks.

This competition forced banks to become more aggressive and contributed to the wave of bank consolidations that followed.

By 1902, however, the speculative boom was beginning to reach its limits.

Several powerful forces were now working against it.

The country had enjoyed excellent crops.

But banks were being stretched by the enormous financing requirements of new trusts and corporate flotations.

Imports were rising sharply while exports were falling.

Raw materials and labor were becoming more expensive.

Large investors were fighting to maintain control over major railroad and industrial enterprises.

And wealthy Western speculators were entering Wall Street with enormous amounts of borrowed money.

These groups became known as the “Chicago Crowd” and the “Pittsburg Crowd.”

They borrowed heavily from banks and used the money to speculate aggressively.

But eventually the public stopped following them.

That was the critical turning point.

The banks understood what was happening.

They began reducing loans to the biggest speculators.

Fresh credit became harder to obtain.

Without cheap credit, the great operators could no longer keep buying stocks and pushing prices higher.

Their power suddenly disappeared.

They had become rich men with wings clipped by the banks.

One of the boldest operations of 1902 was John W. Gates's attempt to gain control of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad.

Gates and his associates quietly bought a majority of the company's stock.

They had acquired control before the railroad interests realized what was happening.

Once J. P. Morgan & Co. discovered the situation, they decided that Gates had to be removed from the picture.

A meeting was arranged at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel at three o'clock in the morning.

Mr. Perkins went to see Gates.

Gates was already in bed.

Gates told him:

“You want this stock badly enough to protect the Southern Railway interests. I'll give it to you, but you'll have to pay me ten million dollars more than I paid for it.”

The offer was accepted.

Gates received a $10 million profit.

The purpose was not simply to buy stock.

It was to prevent Gates from using control of Louisville & Nashville to disrupt the Southern Railway system.

He was regarded as a dangerous speculator who might cause enormous trouble simply because he enjoyed taking risks.

His operation was even bolder than Hill's acquisition of Burlington or the Moore brothers' control of Rock Island.

Those men wanted to build and control railroad systems.

Gates wanted only to make a speculative profit.

He was fortunate that the people he had frightened were willing to pay him so much to leave.

By 1903, the great speculative machine was slowing down.

Stock Exchange trading fell sharply.

The total number of shares traded was about 161.1 million, compared with 188.5 million in 1902 and nearly 265.9 million in 1901.

The difference showed that the fever of speculation was finally weakening.

At the beginning of 1903, however, business still looked extremely strong.

Farmers had enjoyed good harvests.

Railroads were earning large profits.

Railway companies were spending heavily on new equipment.

Factories were busy.

The iron and steel industry was booming.

Demand was so strong that American producers could not supply enough metal, and the country was importing large quantities of iron and steel.

Then, in June, the situation changed with astonishing speed.

The iron market suddenly weakened.

Demand dropped rapidly.

By November, prices for some products were 50 percent below their January levels.

The great iron boom that had begun in 1899 was over.

The collapse of the industrial boom was accompanied by a major liquidation of stocks.

Investors who had borrowed heavily were forced to sell.

Banks called in loans.

Speculators who could no longer obtain credit had no choice but to unload their holdings.

Many wealthy men lost most or all of their fortunes.

Others sold their best assets simply to protect what remained.

By 1904, Wall Street was filled with what might be called “poor rich men.”

They still owned houses, land, businesses, and stocks.

But many of their assets could not be sold without taking enormous losses.

So they held on and waited for better times.

Meanwhile, the cotton market produced another extraordinary speculative episode.

Daniel J. Sully led a huge bull campaign in New York, while William P. Brown and a group of Southern speculators operated in New Orleans.

Cotton rose from about eight cents a pound to seventeen cents.

The trading volume was enormous.

Sully believed it could reach twenty cents.

But his resources were not large enough to survive a decline.

When cotton prices turned downward, he could no longer finance his enormous position.

His fortune collapsed almost as quickly as it had been built.

He had made several million dollars during the rise.

Then he lost it in the fall.

His failure ended one of the most aggressive cotton speculations the country had ever seen.

The consequences reached beyond Wall Street.

Spinners suffered enormous losses.

Many textile mills were forced to close.

The lesson was familiar: a speculative campaign can rise far beyond what its supporters can ultimately finance.

By the end of 1903, the great liquidation had largely run its course.

The market became quieter.

In 1904, trading was dull and the public largely stayed away.

Business was still suffering from the effects of the earlier boom.

Railroads and industrial companies were earning less.

Trade had slowed.

But conditions were gradually improving.

The United States Steel Corporation, after suspending dividends on its common stock in 1903, was able to maintain a 7 percent dividend on its preferred stock.

That offered little comfort to the hundreds of thousands of investors who had bought the stock at inflated prices.

The larger lesson was becoming clear.

The boom had been built on too much credit, too much speculation, and too much inflated capitalization.

Many corporations had been created with financial structures that could not survive a serious downturn.

Some had been supported by little more than optimistic prospectuses and accounting tricks.

Others depended on investors continuing to believe that prices would always rise.

The banks finally recognized the danger.

They decided that the creation of new trusts, the issue of new stock, and the continual rise of market prices had gone beyond the limits of safety.

The public had already bought more speculative stocks than it could afford to carry through a decline.

The great speculators had also become dependent on enormous bank loans.

Once the banks stopped supplying them with credit, their ability to manipulate prices disappeared.

The liquidation that followed was painful, but it prevented something even worse.

By 1904, Wall Street had lost much of its faith in the great market leaders who had once been treated almost like financial gods.

The public no longer blindly followed their schemes.

The old idols had lost their power.

Investors had also become suspicious of new corporations, new railroad combinations, and new industrial securities.

Court cases and financial investigations had exposed fraud, manipulation, excessive capitalization, and misleading claims.

The public had finally learned that a brilliant prospectus did not necessarily represent a sound investment.

This loss of confidence had an important positive effect.

Blind optimism gave way to caution.

Wild inflation gave way to discrimination.

Investors became more suspicious, and financial institutions became more conservative.

The change was painful, but it helped create a healthier financial environment.

There was still danger, however.

Large corporations could no longer easily sell new bonds to the public.

Instead, many borrowed heavily from banking syndicates at interest rates of five or six percent, using loans lasting one to three years.

That arrangement carried its own risks.

But America continued to grow.

The country's population, industries, railroads, commerce, and resources were expanding from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Wall Street would continue to reflect that growth.

It would also continue to reflect periods of fear, recession, speculation, and recovery.

The stock market is always a barometer of the times.

And as long as America continued to grow, there would always be another boom, another crisis, and another cycle of speculation waiting ahead.

Comments 0

Share your thoughts about this chapter with other readers.

No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!