What Is Justice?
Yesterday I went down to the Piraeus with Glaucon, the son of Ariston. I wanted to offer my prayers to the goddess, Bendis, the Thracian Artemis, and I also wanted to see how they would celebrate her festival, since this was the first time it had been held there.
I was delighted by the procession of the local people. But the procession of the Thracians was just as beautiful, perhaps even more so.
When we had finished praying and watching the spectacle, we turned toward the city and started home.
At that moment Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, happened to see us from a distance. He immediately told his servant to run after us and ask us to wait.
The servant caught me by the back of my cloak.
“Polemarchus wants you to wait.”
I turned around.
“Where is your master?”
“There he is,” the young man said. “He’s coming after you. Just wait.”
“Of course we’ll wait,” Glaucon said.
A few minutes later Polemarchus arrived. With him were Adeimantus, Glaucon’s brother, Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession.
Polemarchus looked at me.
“Socrates, I see that you and your friend are already on your way back to the city.”
“You’re right,” I said.
“But do you see how many of us there are?”
“Of course.”
“And do you think you’re stronger than all of us? Because if you’re not, you’ll have to stay here.”
“Couldn’t there be another possibility?” I asked. “Perhaps we could persuade you to let us go.”
“But could you persuade us if we refuse to listen?”
“Certainly not,” Glaucon admitted.
“Then we’re not going to listen,” Polemarchus said. “You can be sure of that.”
Adeimantus spoke up.
“Has no one told you about the torch race on horseback tonight? It’s being held in honor of the goddess.”
“On horseback?” I said. “That’s something new. Do the riders carry torches and pass them from one to another during the race?”
“Yes,” Polemarchus said. “And that isn’t all. There will be a festival tonight that you really ought to see. Let’s have dinner and then go to the festival. There will be a gathering of young men, and we can have a good conversation. So stay with us. Don’t be difficult.”
Glaucon looked at me.
“I suppose that since they insist, we have to stay.”
“Very well,” I said.
So we went with Polemarchus to his house.
There we found his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus. Thrasymachus of Chalcedon was there too, along with Charmantides of Paeania and Cleitophon, the son of Aristonymus.
We also found Cephalus, Polemarchus’s father. I had not seen him for a long time, and he seemed much older than I remembered.
He was sitting on a cushioned chair with a wreath on his head because he had just finished making a sacrifice in the courtyard. Several other chairs had been arranged in a semicircle around him, and we sat down beside him.
Cephalus greeted me warmly.
“Socrates, you don’t come to visit me nearly as often as you should. If I were still strong enough to come into the city and visit you, I wouldn’t ask you to come here. But at my age, I can hardly make the journey. So you really ought to come down to the Piraeus more often.
“You see, as the pleasures of the body fade away, the pleasure and charm of conversation become greater and greater.
“So don’t refuse me. Make our house one of your regular places to visit, and spend time with these young men. We’re old friends, after all. You should feel completely at home here.”
“There is nothing I enjoy more, Cephalus,” I replied, “than talking with older men.
“I think of them as travelers who have already made a journey that I too may someday have to make. So I like to ask them what the road is like. Is it smooth and easy, or rough and difficult?
“And you have now reached the stage that the poets call the threshold of old age. So tell me: Is life harder toward the end, or what do you have to say about it?”
“I’ll tell you exactly how I feel, Socrates.
“Men my age tend to gather together. We’re birds of a feather, as the old saying goes.
“And whenever we meet, the conversation is almost always the same.
“‘I can’t eat anymore.’
“‘I can’t drink anymore.’
“‘The pleasures of youth and love are gone.’
“‘There was a wonderful time once, but it’s over now.’
“‘Life isn’t really life anymore.’
“Some complain about the way their relatives treat them. They sadly tell you about all the troubles that old age has supposedly brought them.
“But Socrates, I think these people are blaming the wrong thing.
“If old age were really responsible for their misery, then I would feel the same way, and so would every other old man.
“But that has not been my experience, and it hasn’t been the experience of other older men I have known.
“I remember the poet Sophocles very well. Someone once asked him, ‘Sophocles, how does love feel now that you’re old? Are you still the man you used to be?’
“Sophocles answered, ‘Be quiet! I’m delighted to have escaped from it, as though I had escaped from a mad and violent master.’
“I’ve often remembered those words, and they seem just as true to me now as they did when he first said them.
“Old age really does bring a great sense of peace and freedom. When our passions loosen their grip on us, we are freed, as Sophocles said, not from one mad master but from many.
“The truth is, Socrates, that these complaints about old age, and even the complaints about relatives, all have the same cause.
“The real problem isn’t age. It is a person’s character and temperament.
“A calm and happy person will hardly feel the burden of old age.
“But for someone who is naturally unhappy and difficult, both youth and old age will be a burden.”
I listened with admiration. I wanted him to continue, so I encouraged him.
“Yes, Cephalus, but I suspect that most people don’t believe you when you say this.
“They think old age seems easy for you not because you have such a pleasant character, but because you are wealthy.
“Everyone knows that wealth is a great comfort.”
“You’re right,” he said. “They don’t believe me.
“And there is some truth in what they say, though not nearly as much as they think.
“I could answer them with the same words Themistocles once used against a man from Seriphos.
“The man insulted Themistocles by saying that his fame came not from his own ability but simply from being an Athenian.
“Themistocles replied, ‘If you had been born in my country, or I in yours, neither of us would have become famous.’
“I would say the same thing to people who are poor and impatient with old age.
“Old age cannot be easy for a good poor man, and a bad rich man will never have peace within himself.”
“May I ask you, Cephalus, whether most of your wealth was inherited or whether you acquired it yourself?”
“I acquired it myself.
“Do you want to know how much?
“In the business of making money, I ended up somewhere between my father and my grandfather.
“My grandfather, whose name I carry, multiplied the value of his inheritance several times. What he inherited was about the same amount of property that I possess now.
“My father, Lysanias, reduced the family fortune below its present level.
“I’ll be satisfied if I leave my sons no less than I received—and perhaps a little more.”
“That is exactly why I asked you,” I said.
“I noticed that you seem rather indifferent to money. That is usually the attitude of people who inherit their wealth rather than people who make it themselves.
“People who build fortunes tend to love money twice over.
“First, they love it because money is useful and profitable, as everyone does.
“But they also love it because they created it themselves. Their attachment to their fortune is like an author’s love for his own poems or a parent’s love for his children.
“That’s why wealthy people who make their own fortunes can be such bad company. They can talk about almost nothing except how wonderful wealth is.”
“That’s true,” he said.
“Yes, very true.
“But let me ask you one more question.
“What do you think is the greatest benefit you have received from your wealth?”
“One benefit,” he said, “is something I doubt I could easily persuade other people to understand.
“When a man begins to realize that he is approaching death, fears and worries enter his mind that he never had before.
“Stories about the world after death, and the punishments people receive there for things they did here, used to seem like jokes to him.
“But as death approaches, he begins to wonder whether those stories might actually be true.
“Perhaps it is because of old age. Perhaps it is simply because he is getting closer to that other world.
“Whatever the reason, he begins to see these things differently.
“Suspicion and fear crowd into his mind.
“He starts thinking about the wrong things he has done to other people.
“If he discovers that he has committed many injustices, he often wakes in the night like a frightened child, terrified by what may be waiting for him.
“But a man who knows that he has done no wrong has a sweet hope that stays with him in old age.
“Pindar expressed it beautifully. He said that hope is the gentle nurse of old age for the man who has lived justly and piously. Hope is his companion on the journey and the strongest comfort for his restless soul.
“What beautiful words.
“And that, Socrates, is the greatest benefit wealth can provide—not to everyone, but to a good man.
“A wealthy man has less reason to deceive or defraud anyone, whether intentionally or unintentionally.
“When he dies and goes to the next world, he does not have to fear that he owes sacrifices to the gods or debts to other people.
“Money contributes greatly to this peace of mind.
“So if I weigh all the advantages of wealth against one another, I would say that, for a sensible man, this peace of mind is the greatest.”
“That is well said, Cephalus,” I replied.
“But what exactly is justice?
“Is justice simply telling the truth and paying your debts?
“Or are there exceptions?
“Suppose a friend who is perfectly sane deposits some weapons with me. Later he becomes insane and asks me to return them.
“Should I give them back?
“No one would say that I should.
“And surely I should not always tell the truth to someone who is not in his right mind.”
“You’re absolutely right,” he said.
“Then telling the truth and paying your debts cannot be the complete definition of justice.”
“Quite right, Socrates,” Polemarchus said. “If Simonides is to be believed.”
“I’m afraid I have to leave now,” Cephalus said. “I have to take care of the sacrifices.
“I’ll leave the argument to Polemarchus and the rest of you.”
“Is Polemarchus your heir?” I asked.
“Certainly,” Cephalus replied with a laugh.
Then he went away to attend to the sacrifices.
I turned to Polemarchus.
“Then tell me, heir to the argument, what exactly did Simonides say about justice? And do you think he was right?”
“He said that justice means paying what you owe. And I think he was right.”
“I would hate to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man.
“But although the meaning is probably clear to you, I don’t understand it.
“He certainly cannot mean what we were just discussing—that I should return a weapon or anything else that someone has deposited with me when that person is no longer sane.
“Yet surely a deposit is a debt.”
“True.”
“So when the person asking for it is insane, I should not return it?”
“Certainly not.”
“Then Simonides did not mean that every debt must always be repaid.”
“Certainly not.
“He believes that a friend should always do good to a friend and never harm him.”
“So if a friend deposits gold with me, and returning it to him would harm him because he has lost his mind, Simonides would say that returning it is not really the repayment of a debt?”
“Yes.”
“And what about enemies? Should we give our enemies what we owe them?”
“Certainly.
“An enemy, I suppose, owes an enemy what is proper to him—which means evil.”
“Then Simonides seems to have spoken like a poet, hiding his meaning.
“He really meant that justice is giving each person what is proper to him, and he called that a debt.”
“That must be what he meant.”
“By heaven, Polemarchus, if we asked him what medicine gives and to whom, what do you think he would say?”
“He would say that medicine gives drugs, food, and drink to the human body.”
“And what does cooking give, and to what?”
“Seasoning to food.”
“And what does justice give, and to whom?”
“If we follow the same pattern,” he said, “justice is the art that gives good to friends and evil to enemies.”
“So that is what Simonides means?”
“I think so.”
“Who is best able to help his friends and harm his enemies when someone is sick?”
“The physician.”
“And when people are at sea and in danger?”
“The pilot.”
“And in what situation is the just man best able to help his friends and harm his enemies?”
“In war. He helps his friends by making alliances with them and harms his enemies by fighting them.”
“But when someone is healthy, there is no need for a physician?”
“No.”
“And when someone is not traveling by sea, there is no need for a pilot?”
“No.”
“Then justice is useless in times of peace?”
“Certainly not.”
“You think justice is useful in peace as well as in war?”
“Yes.”
“Like farming is useful for getting grain?”
“Yes.”
“Or shoemaking is useful for getting shoes?”
“Yes.”
“Then what is the use of justice in times of peace?”
“It is useful in contracts.”
“And by contracts you mean partnerships?”
“Exactly.”
“Now, when playing draughts, is the just man a better partner, or the skilled player?”
“The skilled player.”
“And when laying bricks or stones, is the just man a better partner than a builder?”
“No. The builder is better.”
“And when playing the harp, surely the harp-player is a better partner than the just man?”
“Certainly.”
“Then in what kind of partnership is the just man better than the harp-player?”
“In a partnership involving money.”
“Surely not in using money.
“If you want advice about buying or selling a horse, you would rather have someone who understands horses, wouldn’t you?”
“Of course.”
“And if you wanted to buy a ship, you would prefer a shipbuilder or a pilot?”
“Certainly.”
“Then what use of gold or silver makes the just man preferable?”
“When you want someone to guard your money safely.”
“So justice is useful when money is simply being stored and not being used?”
“Exactly.”
“In other words, justice is useful when money itself is useless?”
“That follows.”
“And if you want to store a pruning hook safely, justice is useful to you and to the state.
“But when you actually want to use the pruning hook, you need a vine-grower.”
“Clearly.”
“And if you want to keep a shield or a lyre safely, justice is useful.
“But when you want to use them, you need a soldier or a musician.”
“Certainly.”
“So with everything else, justice is useful when the thing is not being used, and useless when it is actually being used?”
“That seems to follow.”
“Then justice is not very useful after all.
“But let’s examine this further.
“The person who is best able to strike someone in a boxing match is also best able to defend himself against a blow, isn’t he?”
“Certainly.”
“And the person who is best at preventing or escaping from a disease is also best able to cause disease?”
“That seems true.”
“And the best guard of an army camp is the man who is best able to sneak past the enemy?”
“Certainly.”
“Then the person who is good at guarding something is also good at stealing it?”
“I suppose that follows.”
“So if the just man is good at guarding money, he must also be good at stealing it.”
“That seems to follow.”
“Then the just man has turned out to be a thief.
“And this is something you may have learned from Homer.
“Homer says of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, whom Homer clearly admired, that he was the greatest of all men at stealing and breaking oaths.
“So you, Homer, and Simonides all agree that justice is an art of theft—though the theft is supposed to be practiced for the benefit of friends and the harm of enemies.”
“No, certainly not that,” Polemarchus said. “Though I’m no longer sure what I was saying.
“But I still stand by the last part.”
“Then let us ask another question.
“When we say ‘friends’ and ‘enemies,’ do we mean people who really are our friends and enemies, or people who merely appear to be?”
“Surely,” he said, “a man naturally loves those he thinks are good and hates those he thinks are bad.”
“But people often make mistakes about who is good and who is bad.
“Many people who are actually bad appear good, and some who are good appear bad.”
“That’s true.”
“Then a person may think a bad man is his friend and a good man his enemy.”
“That can happen.”
“And in that case, he would do good to the bad man and harm to the good man?”
“Clearly.”
“But good men are just, and a just man would not do injustice.”
“True.”
“Then according to your argument, it would be just to harm people who have done nothing wrong.”
“No, Socrates. That would be an immoral doctrine.”
“Then perhaps we should say that we should do good to the just and harm the unjust?”
“I prefer that.”
“But consider what follows.
“A man who does not understand human nature may have bad people as his friends and good people as his enemies.
“In that case, he would have to harm his friends and help his enemies.
“Yet that is the exact opposite of what we said Simonides meant.”
“That is true.
“I think we made a mistake when we used the words ‘friend’ and ‘enemy.’”
“What mistake?”
“We assumed that someone is a friend simply because he appears good or is believed to be good.”
“And how should we correct that?”
“We should say that a true friend is someone who is both good and appears to be good.
“A person who merely appears good but is not good is only apparently a friend.
“And the same distinction applies to an enemy.”
“So the good are our friends and the bad are our enemies?”
“Yes.”
“And instead of simply saying that justice means doing good to friends and harm to enemies, we should say that justice means doing good to our good friends and harm to our evil enemies?”
“Yes. That seems right.”
“But should a just man ever harm anyone?”
“Certainly. He should harm wicked people who are also his enemies.”
“When horses are harmed, do they become better or worse?”
“Worse.”
“Worse in the qualities that make a good horse, not in the qualities that make a good dog?”
“Yes, in the qualities of a horse.”
“And dogs become worse in the qualities that make good dogs, not in the qualities that make good horses?”
“Of course.”
“And when human beings are harmed, do they become worse in the qualities that make a good human being?”
“Certainly.”
“And the quality that makes a good human being is justice?”
“Certainly.”
“Then when people are harmed, they necessarily become more unjust?”
“That follows.”
“Can a musician, simply by using his musical skill, make someone less musical?”
“No.”
“Can a horseman, by using his skill, make someone a worse horseman?”
“Impossible.”
“Then can a just man, through justice, make another person unjust?
“Or can a good person, through goodness, make someone bad?”
“Certainly not.”
“Just as heat cannot create cold?”
“No.”
“And dryness cannot create moisture?”
“Clearly not.”
“Then goodness cannot make someone worse.”
“Impossible.”
“And the just man is good?”
“Certainly.”
“Then harming a friend—or anyone else—is not the work of a just man.
“It is the work of the opposite kind of person, the unjust man.”
“I think you’re absolutely right, Socrates.”
“Then if someone says that justice means paying what you owe, and that a just man owes good to his friends and evil to his enemies, he is not speaking wisely.
“Because we have clearly shown that harming another person can never be just.”
“I agree,” Polemarchus said.
“Then you and I would be ready to fight anyone who tried to attribute such a teaching to Simonides, Bias, Pittacus, or any other wise man or prophet.”
“I would gladly fight beside you.”
“Shall I tell you whose teaching I think it really is?”
“Whose?”
“I think it came from some powerful and wealthy man—perhaps Periander, Perdiccas, Xerxes, Ismenias of Thebes, or someone like them.
“Someone who had enormous power and an equally enormous opinion of himself.
“Such a man may well have been the first to say that justice means doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies.”
“That sounds very likely.”
“Yes.
“But if that definition of justice also collapses, what other definition can we offer?”
For some time during our discussion, Thrasymachus had repeatedly tried to take control of the argument. The others had stopped him because they wanted to hear the end of our discussion.
But now Polemarchus and I had finished speaking, and there was a brief silence.
Thrasymachus could contain himself no longer.
He suddenly gathered himself and came toward us like a wild animal ready to attack.
We were all terrified by the sight of him.
He shouted at the whole group.
“What nonsense has taken hold of all of you, Socrates?
“Why are you all acting like fools and giving way to one another?
“If you really want to know what justice is, don’t just ask questions. Answer them!
“And don’t try to win admiration for yourself by tearing apart someone else’s answer.
“Anyone can ask questions. The real difficulty is answering them.
“And now I don’t want to hear you say that justice is duty, advantage, profit, gain, or interest.
“That kind of vague nonsense won’t do.
“I want a clear and precise answer.”
I was frightened by his words. I could hardly look at him without trembling.
I believe that if I had not forced myself to meet his eyes, I would have become completely speechless.
But when I saw how angry he was becoming, I looked directly at him first, and that gave me enough courage to answer.
“Thrasymachus, please don’t be so hard on us.
“Polemarchus and I may have made some mistakes in our argument, but I assure you that we did not make them deliberately.
“If we were looking for a piece of gold, you would never imagine that we were weakly giving way to one another and wasting our chance to find it.
“So why, when we are searching for justice—a thing worth far more than many pieces of gold—do you accuse us of giving in to each other instead of doing everything we can to discover the truth?
“The truth is that we very much want to discover it.
“We simply cannot.
“And if that is the case, you who claim to know everything should feel sorry for us rather than become angry with us.”
“How typical of Socrates!” Thrasymachus replied with a bitter laugh. “That’s your famous irony.
“Didn’t I already know what you would do?
“Didn’t I warn everyone that whenever you were asked a question, you would refuse to answer?
“You would use irony or some other trick to avoid giving an answer.”
“You’re a philosopher yourself, Thrasymachus, so you understand this perfectly.
“Suppose you asked someone, ‘What numbers add up to twelve?’
“But then you forbade him to answer six plus six, three plus four—”
“Three times four,” Thrasymachus corrected.
“Yes, three times four, six times two, or four times three.
“And suppose you said, ‘I don’t want any of that nonsense.’
“Obviously, no one could answer you.
“Now suppose the person replied, ‘Thrasymachus, what exactly do you mean?
“If one of the answers you have forbidden is actually correct, am I supposed to give a false answer simply because you have forbidden the true one?
“Is that what you want?’
“What would you say to him?”
“That is completely different!” he said.
“Why?” I asked. “Even if the situations are not exactly the same, if the person being questioned believes one of the forbidden answers is correct, shouldn’t he say what he believes whether we allow it or not?”
“So I suppose you’re going to give one of the answers I forbade?”
“I may, if after thinking it over I believe one of them is correct.”
“But what if I give you an answer about justice that is better than all those answers?
“What do you deserve if I do?”
“What do I deserve?
“As an ignorant man, I deserve to learn from someone wiser than myself.”
“And no payment?”
“That’s a pleasant idea.”
“I’ll pay you when I have money.”
“But you do have money, Socrates,” Glaucon said.
“And Thrasymachus, don’t worry about being paid. We’ll all contribute and pay for Socrates.”
“Yes,” Thrasymachus said. “And then Socrates will do what he always does.
“He will refuse to answer the question himself and then tear apart someone else’s answer.”
“My good friend,” I said, “how can I answer when I know that I know nothing?
“And even if I have some vague idea of my own, a man who claims to be an authority tells me not to say it.
“The natural person to answer is someone like you—someone who claims to know and is able to explain what he knows.
“So please answer us.
“Do it for the benefit of everyone here and for me.”
Glaucon and the others joined me in asking him.
Thrasymachus was obviously eager to speak. He believed he had an excellent answer and thought he would make himself look impressive.
At first, however, he pretended to insist that I should answer.
Eventually he agreed to begin.
“Look at the wisdom of Socrates,” he said.
“He refuses to teach himself anything. Instead, he goes around learning from other people—and he never even thanks them.”
“It’s true that I learn from other people,” I replied.
“But I completely reject the accusation that I’m ungrateful.
“I have no money, so I pay with praise.
“That is all I have.
“And if someone speaks well, I am always ready to praise him.
“You’ll soon see how generous I am when you give your answer, because I expect you to answer very well.”
“Then listen carefully,” he said.
“I declare that justice is nothing more than the interest of the stronger.
“Now why don’t you praise me?”
“But of course you won’t.”
“First let me make sure I understand you,” I said.
“You say that justice is the interest of the stronger.
“What exactly do you mean?
“You surely cannot mean that because Polydamas, the famous pancratiast, is stronger than us and finds eating beef good for his physical strength, therefore eating beef is equally good and just for us, who are weaker than he is?”
“That is a ridiculous way to interpret me, Socrates. You deliberately choose the interpretation that makes my argument look stupid.”
“Not at all.
“I’m trying to understand what you mean.
“But I wish you would make yourself a little clearer.”
“Well,” he said, “have you never heard that governments come in different forms?
“There are tyrannies, democracies, and aristocracies.”
“Yes, I know.”
“And in every state, the government is the ruling power?”
“Certainly.”
“And each kind of government makes laws according to its own interests.
“A democracy makes democratic laws.
“An aristocracy makes aristocratic laws.
“A tyranny makes tyrannical laws.
“These governments create laws for their own benefit, and those laws become the justice they impose on their subjects.
“Anyone who breaks those laws is punished as a criminal and an unjust person.
“That is what I mean when I say that justice is the same everywhere: it is the interest of the ruling government.
“And because the government has power, the only reasonable conclusion is that justice everywhere means the interest of the stronger.”
“Now I understand you,” I said.
“Whether you are right or not, I will try to discover.
“But I notice that in defining justice, you yourself have used the word ‘interest,’ even though you forbade me to use it.
“You have simply added the words ‘of the stronger.’”
“That is a small addition.”
“Small or large, we can ignore that for the moment.
“First we must determine whether what you are saying is true.
“We agree that justice is the interest of someone.
“But you add that it is the interest of the stronger.
“I am not yet convinced of that part.”
“Go on.”
“First tell me this.
“Do you agree that subjects are supposed to obey their rulers?”
“I do.”
“Are rulers completely infallible, or can they sometimes make mistakes?”
“Of course they can make mistakes.”
“Then when rulers make laws, they may sometimes make correct laws and sometimes incorrect ones?”
“True.”
“When they make correct laws, the laws serve their own interests.
“When they make mistakes, the laws go against their interests.
“You agree?”
“Yes.”
“And the subjects must obey the laws the rulers make.
“That is what you call justice?”
“Certainly.”
“Then according to your own argument, justice means not only obeying the interest of the stronger but sometimes doing the opposite of what is in the stronger person’s interest.”
“What are you talking about?”
“I’m simply following your argument.
“We have agreed that rulers can make mistakes about their own interests.
“We have also agreed that subjects must obey their rulers, and that obedience is justice.
“Have we not?”
“Yes.”
“Then you must also admit that sometimes justice requires subjects to do something that harms the stronger.
“If a ruler mistakenly orders something that goes against his own interest, and the subjects obey because obedience is justice, then the weaker are being ordered to do what harms the stronger.
“That follows from your own argument.”
“Nothing could be clearer,” Polemarchus said.
“Yes,” Cleitophon added, “if you allow Polemarchus to speak for you.”
“There’s no need for anyone to speak for me,” Polemarchus replied.
“Thrasymachus himself admitted that rulers sometimes give orders that go against their own interests, and that obeying those orders is just.”
“Yes, Polemarchus,” Thrasymachus said. “I said that subjects should obey what their rulers command.”
“Exactly,” Cleitophon said.
“But you also said that justice is the interest of the stronger.
“And you admitted that the stronger may sometimes command the weaker to do something that is not in the stronger person’s interest.
“So according to your own argument, justice can be the injury of the stronger just as much as his interest.”
“No,” Cleitophon said. “He meant that the interest of the stronger means whatever the stronger believes to be his interest.
“That is what the weaker are required to do, and that is what he called justice.”
“That is not what he said,” Polemarchus replied.
“It doesn’t matter,” I said.
“If Thrasymachus now says that is what he meant, let us accept it.
“Thrasymachus, is that what you meant?
“Is justice whatever the stronger believes to be in his interest, whether it really is or not?”
“Certainly not.
“Do you seriously think I would call someone ‘stronger’ at the moment when he is making a mistake?”
“Yes,” I said. “That was how I understood you when you admitted that rulers can make mistakes.”
“You argue like an informer, Socrates.
“Are you saying that a doctor who makes a mistake about a patient is still a doctor because he is making that mistake?
“Or that an arithmetician who makes a mistake in calculation is an arithmetician in respect of the mistake?
“Or that a grammarian who makes a grammatical error is a grammarian while he is making the error?
“Yes, we say that the doctor, arithmetician, or grammarian has made a mistake.
“But that is only a way of speaking.
“In reality, the skilled person does not make mistakes precisely insofar as he possesses the skill.
“When his skill fails, he is no longer acting as a true expert.
“No true artist, wise man, or ruler makes mistakes while he is genuinely acting as such.
“People commonly say that they make mistakes, but that is merely ordinary speech.
“Since you insist on being so precise, let us speak precisely.
“A ruler, insofar as he is truly a ruler, does not make mistakes.
“Therefore he always commands what is in his own interest.
“And his subjects are required to obey.
“So justice is, as I said from the beginning, the interest of the stronger.”
“Really, Thrasymachus?
“Do I seem to you to argue like an informer?”
“Certainly.”
“Do you think I ask these questions because I want to harm you in the argument?”
“No.
“‘Think’ isn’t the right word.
“I know it.
“But you’ll be exposed, and you’ll never defeat me simply by using arguments.”
“I have no intention of trying to cheat you.
“But to make sure we don’t misunderstand one another later, tell me exactly what you mean by ‘ruler’ or ‘stronger.’
“Do you mean ruler in the ordinary sense, or ruler in the strict and exact sense?”
“In the strictest possible sense.
“And now, if you can, try your tricks and your accusations.
“I won’t give you any special treatment.
“But you won’t succeed.”
“Do you really think I’m crazy enough to try to cheat you, Thrasymachus?
“I might as well try to shave a lion.”
“You already tried a moment ago, and you failed.”
“Enough of these polite insults.
“Let me ask you a question.
“The physician, in the strict sense you insist upon—what is he?
“Is he a healer of the sick, or a person who makes money?
“Remember, I mean the true physician.”
“A healer of the sick.”
“And a pilot, in the true sense—is he the captain of sailors or merely a sailor?”
“The captain of sailors.”
“The fact that he happens to sail in a ship is irrelevant.
“He is not called a pilot because he sails.
“He is called a pilot because of his knowledge and authority over the sailors.”
“Very true.”
“Now, every skill or art has some particular purpose or interest, doesn’t it?”
“Certainly.”
“And every art must concern itself with that interest?”
“Yes. That is the purpose of the art.”
“And the proper interest of an art is to perfect the thing that the art deals with?”
“What do you mean?”
“I’ll explain.
“Consider the human body.
“If you asked me whether the body is completely self-sufficient, I would say no.
“The body can become sick and need treatment.
“That is why medicine exists.
“Medicine exists to serve the needs of the body.
“Do you agree?”
“Completely.”
“But is medicine itself sick in the same way that an eye can lack sight or an ear can lack hearing?
“Does an art itself have some defect that requires another art to take care of it?
“And does that second art require another art, and that one another, forever?
“Or do the arts simply concern themselves with their subjects?
“Perhaps an art, when it is a true and complete art, has no defect of its own.
“It does not need another art to repair it.
“It simply serves the thing it was created to serve.
“Every art remains pure and complete as long as it remains a true art.
“Tell me whether I am right, using the precise meaning of the words you insist upon.”
“Yes. You’re right.”
“Then medicine does not serve the interests of medicine.
“It serves the interests of the body.”
“True.”
“And horsemanship does not serve the interests of horsemanship.
“It serves the interests of the horse.
“And every other art serves the thing it governs rather than itself.”
“True.”
“But surely, Thrasymachus, an art is superior to and rules over the thing it deals with?”
He agreed reluctantly.
“Then no art or science considers the interest of the stronger or superior.
“It considers only the interest of the thing under its care, which is weaker and dependent upon it.”
Thrasymachus tried to resist this conclusion, but finally gave in.
“Then,” I continued, “a physician, insofar as he is a physician, does not consider his own benefit when prescribing treatment.
“He considers the benefit of his patient.
“The true physician is also a ruler, with the human body under his care.
“He is not merely someone trying to make money.
“We have already agreed on that.”
“Yes.”
“And a true pilot is a ruler over sailors, not merely another sailor?”
“That has been admitted.”
“And such a pilot, as ruler, will provide what is best for the sailors under his command, not what is best for himself?”
Thrasymachus reluctantly said:
“Yes.”
“Then there is no ruler, insofar as he is genuinely a ruler, who considers his own interest.
“He considers the interests of those under his authority.
“That is what he looks after in everything he says and does.”
At this point everyone could see that Thrasymachus’s definition of justice had been completely overturned.
Instead of answering, however, he suddenly asked me:
“Socrates, do you have a nurse?”
“Why are you asking me that?
“You should be answering the argument.”
“Because your nurse has clearly abandoned you.
“She lets you cry and never wipes your nose.
“She hasn’t even taught you to tell the difference between a shepherd and his sheep.”
“What makes you say that?”
“You imagine that shepherds and cattle herders care for sheep and cattle because they love the animals and want what is best for them.
“You think they don’t care about their own profit or their master’s profit.
“And you make the same mistake about rulers.
“You imagine that true rulers never think about their own interests.
“You imagine they spend every hour of every day thinking only about the welfare of their subjects.
“Of course that is nonsense.
“You are completely confused about justice and injustice.
“You don’t even understand that justice is actually someone else’s good.
“It is the interest of the ruler and the stronger, while the subject and servant suffer the loss.
“Injustice is the opposite.
“The unjust man rules over the simple and just.
“He is the stronger, and his subjects do what benefits him and makes him happy, even though it makes them miserable.
“Think about this, foolish Socrates.
“The just man always comes out worse than the unjust man.
“Look at private contracts.
“When a just man and an unjust man become partners and later dissolve their partnership, the unjust man always ends up with more, while the just man ends up with less.
“Look at their dealings with the state.
“Suppose there is an income tax.
“The just man pays more than the unjust man on the same income.
“But when the state gives money back, the just man receives little or nothing, while the unjust man gets a great deal.
“Look at public office.
“The just man neglects his private affairs and may suffer losses because he is honest.
“He gets nothing from the public because he refuses to use his office for personal advantage.
“His friends and relatives may even hate him because he refuses to help them in illegal ways.
“The unjust man has the opposite experience.
“And I am talking about injustice on a large scale, where the advantages of injustice are easiest to see.
“The clearest example is tyranny.
“The tyrant uses fraud and force to take away other people’s property—not little by little, but all at once.
“He takes sacred property and private property, public property and everything else.
“If an ordinary person committed even one of these crimes, he would be punished and disgraced.
“People would call him a temple robber, a slave trader, a burglar, a swindler, or a thief.
“But when a man takes away the money of an entire population and enslaves its people, he is not called a criminal.
“He is called fortunate and blessed—not only by his own citizens but by everyone who hears about his success.
“People condemn injustice because they are afraid of suffering from it, not because they hate committing it themselves.
“So, Socrates, I have shown that large-scale injustice is stronger, freer, and more powerful than justice.
“Justice is the interest of the stronger.
“Injustice is the profit and interest of the person who commits it.”
Thrasymachus had poured all these words over us like a bath attendant dumping water over someone.
Then he seemed ready to leave.
But the others refused to let him go.
They insisted that he stay and defend what he had said.
I joined them.
“Thrasymachus, my excellent friend, your argument is certainly provocative.
“But are you really going to run away before we have properly established whether what you have said is true?
“We are trying to discover how a human being ought to live.
“Is there anything more important than discovering how each of us can live the best possible life?”
“Do you disagree with me about the importance of the question?”
“Not at all.
“But you seem to care very little about what happens to us, Thrasymachus.
“Whether we live better or worse because we do not understand what you claim to know seems completely unimportant to you.
“Please don’t keep your knowledge to yourself.
“There are many of us here.
“Whatever benefit you give us will be repaid many times over.
“As for me, I openly admit that I am not convinced.
“I do not believe injustice is more profitable than justice, even when an unjust person has complete freedom to act.
“Suppose there is an unjust man who can commit injustice through fraud or force.
“That still does not prove to me that injustice is more advantageous.
“Perhaps there are others here who feel the same way.
“Perhaps we are wrong.
“If we are, then you, with all your wisdom, should show us our mistake.”
“And how am I supposed to convince you?” he asked.
“You weren’t convinced by what I have already said.
“What more can I do?
“Do you want me to force the proof directly into your souls?”
“Absolutely not,” I said.
“I only ask you to be consistent.
“If you change your position, then say openly that you have changed it.
“Don’t pretend that you haven’t.
“Remember what happened earlier.
“You insisted on defining a true physician with complete precision.
“But when you spoke about a shepherd, you suddenly abandoned that precision.
“You claimed that a shepherd, simply as a shepherd, takes care of sheep not for their benefit but for the pleasure of eating them or for selling them in the marketplace.
“But surely the art of shepherding is concerned with the welfare of the sheep.
“The shepherd’s task is to provide what is best for the animals.
“The art itself is complete once everything required of it has been fulfilled.
“That is exactly what I said earlier about ruling.
“I believed that the art of ruling, whether in a state or in private life, must concern itself with the good of those being ruled.
“But you seem to think that rulers actually enjoy being rulers.”
“Enjoy it?
“I am absolutely certain they do.”
“Then why,” I asked, “do people never willingly accept lesser offices without receiving some kind of payment?
“Why do they need money, honor, or some other reward?
“Isn’t it because they are ruling for someone else’s benefit rather than their own?
“Let me ask you this.
“Are the various arts different because each has its own special function?”
“Yes.”
“And each art provides some particular benefit?
“Medicine provides health.
“Navigation provides safety at sea.
“And so on.”
“Yes.”
“And there is also an art of receiving payment.
“That art provides wages.
“But we do not confuse it with the other arts.
“We don’t say that navigation is medicine just because a sailor might become healthier during a voyage.
“Using your own precise definition of words, you wouldn’t call navigation medicine, would you?”
“Certainly not.”
“And you wouldn’t say that the art of payment is medicine simply because a man in good health happens to receive payment?”
“No.”
“And you wouldn’t say that medicine is the art of receiving payment merely because a doctor receives a fee?”
“Certainly not.”
“We have already agreed that the proper benefit of each art belongs to the thing that art governs.”
“Yes.”
“Then if all artists receive some common benefit, it must come from something that all of them have in common.
“Correct?”
“Correct.”
“And when an artist receives payment, that benefit comes from another art—the art of payment—not from the art he practices?”
Thrasymachus reluctantly agreed.
“Then payment does not come from medicine, building, navigation, or any other art itself.
“Medicine gives health.
“Building builds houses.
“And another art provides payment.
“An artist can perform his own work and benefit the thing he governs.
“But if he is not paid, he receives no financial benefit from his art.”
“I suppose that’s true.”
“But does that mean he provides no benefit when he works for free?”
“Certainly not. He still provides a benefit.”
“Then, Thrasymachus, we have finally settled the matter.
“Neither arts nor governments exist for their own interests.
“They serve the interests of those under their care, who are weaker in relation to them.
“That is what they are concerned with.
“And that is why, as I said earlier, no one is eager to rule.
“No one wants to take responsibility for correcting problems that are not his own unless he receives some kind of reward.
“A true ruler, like a true craftsman, does not consider his own interest while performing his work.
“He considers the interests of those under his authority.
“So if rulers are to be willing to rule, they must be rewarded in one of three ways.
“They must receive money, honor, or the punishment of being ruled by someone worse if they refuse.”
“What do you mean, Socrates?” Glaucon asked.
“I understand money and honor.
“But I don’t understand the third one.
“How can being punished be a reward for ruling?”
“You don’t understand because you don’t understand what motivates the best people to rule.
“You know that ambition and greed are generally considered disgraceful.”
“Of course.”
“That is why money and honor do not attract truly good people.
“A good person does not want to demand payment openly for ruling and then be called a hired servant.
“And he does not want to secretly take public money and be called a thief.
“Nor is he ambitious, so ordinary honors do not attract him.
“Therefore, good people have to be compelled to rule.
“They must be motivated by the fear of punishment.
“That is why people have traditionally regarded it as shameful to seek office voluntarily instead of waiting to be forced into it.
“The worst punishment of all is that if a good man refuses to rule, he may end up being ruled by someone worse than himself.
“I think this fear is what motivates good people to accept office.
“They do not do it because they expect pleasure or personal advantage.
“They do it because they cannot trust anyone else who is better than themselves—or even as good as themselves—to take responsibility.
“Imagine a city made entirely of good people.
“In such a city, people would fight just as hard to avoid office as they now fight to obtain it.
“Then we would have clear proof that a true ruler does not naturally seek his own interest.
“He seeks the interest of his subjects.
“And anyone who understood this would prefer to receive a benefit from someone else rather than endure the trouble of providing a benefit to others.
“So I completely disagree with Thrasymachus when he says that justice is the interest of the stronger.
“But we do not need to settle that question any further right now.
“What concerns me more is Thrasymachus’s new claim that the life of the unjust is better than the life of the just.
“That seems much more serious.
“Glaucon, which life do you prefer?”
“I believe the life of the just man is better,” Glaucon replied.
“You heard all the advantages Thrasymachus claimed for injustice?”
“Yes.
“But he hasn’t convinced me.”
“Then shall we try to find a way to show him that he is mistaken?”
“Certainly.”
“If Thrasymachus gives a speech listing all the advantages of injustice, and we give another speech listing the advantages of justice, then we will simply argue back and forth.
“We would have to count and measure the advantages on both sides and eventually find judges to decide between us.
“But if we proceed as we did earlier, by questioning each other and admitting what seems true, then we can be both the judges and the advocates.”
“Very good,” Glaucon said.
“Which method do you prefer?”
“The one you just described.”
“Then, Thrasymachus, let us begin again.
“You say that complete injustice is more profitable than complete justice?”
“Yes. That is exactly what I say, and I have already given my reasons.”
“And what do you think justice and injustice are?
“Would you call one a virtue and the other a vice?”
“Certainly.”
“Justice is virtue, and injustice is vice?”
“What a charming idea.
“Of course I say that injustice is profitable and justice is not.”
“Then what would you call justice?”
“The opposite.”
“So you would call justice a vice?”
“No.
“I would call it noble simplicity.”
“And injustice is wickedness?”
“No.
“I would call it cleverness.”
“And you think unjust people are wise and good?”
“Yes.
“At least those who are capable of committing complete injustice and powerful enough to conquer states and nations.
“Perhaps you think I’m talking about ordinary thieves.
“Even a thief can benefit from being undetected, though those benefits are nothing compared with the advantages I described.”
“I understand you perfectly, Thrasymachus.
“But I am still amazed that you place injustice among wisdom and virtue, and justice among their opposites.”
“Of course I do.”
“Then you are making a much more difficult argument than before.
“If you had admitted that profitable injustice was still a vice and something shameful, I could have answered you using the usual moral principles.
“But now you are calling injustice honorable and powerful.
“You are giving the unjust all the qualities we normally associate with the just.
“You are even placing injustice alongside wisdom and virtue.”
“You understand me perfectly,” he replied.
“Then I certainly should not avoid following the argument wherever it leads, as long as I have reason to believe you are honestly expressing your view.
“I believe you are serious now and not merely playing with us.”
“Whether I am serious or not is irrelevant.
“Your job is to refute the argument.”
“True.
“That is what I must do.
“But answer one more question.
“Does a just man try to gain an advantage over another just man?”
“Of course not.
“If he did, he wouldn’t be the simple, harmless person we say he is.”
“Would he try to gain more than another just man?”
“No.”
“How would he regard trying to gain an advantage over an unjust man?
“Would he consider that just or unjust?”
“He would consider it just, and he would try to gain the advantage.
“Whether he succeeded is another question.”
“Whether he succeeded is not important.
“I am only asking whether the just man, while refusing to take more than another just man, would want to take more than an unjust man.”
“Yes.”
“And what about the unjust man?
“Does he want more than the just man and more than what is just?”
“Of course.
“He wants more than everyone.”
“And he will also try to gain more than another unjust man, so that he can have more than everyone?”
“That’s true.”
“Then we can put it this way.
“The just man does not want more than his equal, but he may want more than someone who is unlike him.
“The unjust man wants more than both his equal and his unequal.”
“Nothing could describe it better.”
“And you said that the unjust man is good and wise, while the just man is neither?”
“Exactly.”
“And the unjust man is like the wise and good person, while the just man is unlike them?”
“Of course.
“A person resembles those who share his nature, and someone with a different nature does not.”
“So each person resembles people like himself?”
“Certainly.”
“Good.
“Now let’s consider the various arts.
“You agree that one man may be a musician and another not a musician?”
“Yes.”
“Which one is wise and which one foolish?”
“The musician is wise.
“The non-musician is foolish.”
“And the musician is good insofar as he is wise, while the non-musician is bad insofar as he is foolish?”
“Yes.”
“And you would say the same thing about a physician?”
“Yes.”
“Suppose a musician is tuning a lyre.
“Would he want to tune it better than another musician, going beyond what another musician considers correct?”
“No.”
“But would he want to be better than someone who is not a musician?”
“Of course.”
“And what about a physician?
“When prescribing food or drink, would he want to go beyond another physician or beyond the standards of medicine?”
“No.”
“But would he want to go beyond a person who is not a physician?”
“Yes.”
“And what about knowledge and ignorance generally?
“Would a knowledgeable person ever want to say or do more than another knowledgeable person in the same situation?
“Wouldn’t he naturally say and do what another knowledgeable person would say and do?”
“That seems undeniable.”
“And what about the ignorant person?
“Wouldn’t he want more than both the knowledgeable person and another ignorant person?”
“I suppose so.”
“And the knowledgeable person is wise?”
“Yes.”
“And the wise person is good?”
“True.”
“Then the wise and good person does not want more than his equal.
“He wants more than someone who is unlike him.”
“I suppose so.”
“Whereas the bad and ignorant person wants more than both his equal and his opposite?”
“Yes.”
“But didn’t you say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust man wants more than both his equal and his opposite?”
“Yes.”
“And didn’t you say that the just man wants more than his opposite but not his equal?”
“Yes.”
“Then the just man is like the wise and good person.
“And the unjust man is like the bad and ignorant person.”
“That follows.”
“And each person is like those who resemble him.”
“That was admitted.”
“Then the just man has turned out to be wise and good, while the unjust man is evil and ignorant.”
Thrasymachus admitted all of this reluctantly.
It was a very hot summer day, and sweat was pouring down his face.
Then, for the first time in my life, I saw Thrasymachus blush.
Now that we had agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice was vice and ignorance, I moved to another question.
“Very well, Thrasymachus.
“We have settled that.
“But didn’t we also say that injustice has strength and power?
“Do you remember?”
“Yes, I remember.
“But don’t imagine that I accept your argument.
“I have an answer.
“If I gave it, you would accuse me of making another speech.
“So either let me speak freely, or if you prefer to question me, ask your questions and I’ll simply answer ‘Very good,’ like an old woman listening to a story.
“I’ll nod yes and no, if that is what you want.”
“Certainly not.
“Not if that would go against what you really believe.”
“Yes, I’ll answer you properly, since you refuse to let me speak.
“What else can I do?”
“Nothing.
“If you are willing, I’ll ask questions and you can answer them.”
“Go ahead.”
“Then I’ll repeat the question I asked earlier, so that we can continue examining justice and injustice in an orderly way.
“We said that injustice was stronger and more powerful than justice.
“But now we have identified justice with wisdom and virtue.
“If injustice is ignorance, then justice must be stronger than injustice.
“No one could reasonably deny that.
“But I want to look at the matter from another angle.
“You would agree that a state can be unjust?
“It could unjustly try to enslave other states.
“It could conquer them and hold them under its control.”
“Certainly.
“And I would add that the most unjust and completely unjust state would be the most likely to do this.”
“I know that is your position.
“But what I want to know is whether such power can exist and be exercised without justice—or only with justice.”
“If your view is correct, and justice is wisdom, then it requires justice.
“If my view is correct, then it does not.”
“I’m delighted, Thrasymachus, to see that you are not merely nodding yes or no.
“You are actually giving excellent answers.”
“I’m only being polite.”
“How kind of you.
“Now tell me this.
“Could a state, an army, a gang of robbers, thieves, or any other group of criminals accomplish anything if they were constantly harming one another?”
“Certainly not.”
“But if they avoided harming one another, would they be able to work together more effectively?”
“Yes.”
“And isn’t that because injustice creates division, hatred, and conflict, while justice creates unity and friendship?”
“I agree.
“I don’t want to argue with you.”
“How generous.
“But let me ask one more question.
“If injustice has the power to create hatred wherever it exists, whether among slaves or free people, wouldn’t it make them hate one another and turn against each other?
“Wouldn’t it make them incapable of acting together?”
“Certainly.”
“And if injustice existed between only two people, wouldn’t they quarrel, fight, and become enemies of each other and of the just?”
“They would.”
“And if injustice existed inside a single person, would it lose its natural power, or would it keep it?”
“Let us assume it keeps its power.”
“But doesn’t injustice have this effect wherever it appears—in a city, an army, a family, or any other group?
“Doesn’t it destroy unity?
“Doesn’t it make the group divided against itself and hostile to everyone who opposes it, including the just?”
“Yes, certainly.”
“And doesn’t injustice have the same effect within one individual?
“First, it makes him unable to act effectively because he is divided against himself.
“And second, it makes him an enemy to himself and to the just.
“Isn’t that true?”
“Yes.”
“And surely the gods are just?”
“Granted.”
“Then the unjust man must be an enemy of the gods, while the just man is their friend.”
“Go ahead and celebrate your victory,” Thrasymachus said.
“Eat your fill of the argument.
“I won’t argue with you because I don’t want to upset the others.”
“Very well.
“Then continue answering me and let me finish the meal you have provided.
“We have already shown that the just are wiser, better, and more capable than the unjust.
“We have also shown that the unjust cannot truly act together.
“Indeed, it is not quite accurate to say that completely evil men can always cooperate effectively.
“If they were completely unjust, they would attack one another.
“If they were able to work together, there must have been some trace of justice among them that allowed them to cooperate.
“Without that, they would have harmed each other as well as their victims.
“They were only partly wicked in their enterprises.
“If they had been completely wicked and completely unjust, they would have been completely incapable of acting together.
“That, I think, is the truth—not what you claimed at the beginning.
“But there is still another question.
“Do the just have a better and happier life than the unjust?
“That is what we originally set out to discover.
“I believe they do, for the reasons I have given.
“But we should examine the question more carefully.
“This is no small matter.
“We are deciding nothing less than how human beings ought to live.”
“Go ahead,” Thrasymachus said.
“I’ll begin with a question.
“Would you agree that a horse has some particular purpose?”
“Yes.”
“And the purpose of a horse—or anything else—is to perform some function that cannot be performed, or cannot be performed as well, by something else?”
“I don’t understand.”
“Let me explain.
“Can you see except with your eyes?”
“Certainly not.”
“Can you hear except with your ears?”
“No.”
“Then seeing is the purpose of the eyes, and hearing is the purpose of the ears?”
“Yes.”
“But you could cut a vine branch with a dagger or a chisel, or with many other tools?”
“Of course.”
“Yet none of them would do it as well as a pruning hook designed specifically for the job?”
“True.”
“Then we can say that cutting vines is the purpose of the pruning hook?”
“Yes.”
“Then I think you will now understand what I meant.
“When we ask about the purpose of something, we mean the function that cannot be performed, or cannot be performed as well, by another thing.”
“I understand, and I agree.”
“And anything that has a particular purpose must also have some quality that allows it to perform that purpose well.
“Do I need to ask again whether the eye has a purpose?”
“No.”
“And does the eye have a special quality that allows it to perform that purpose?”
“Yes.”
“And the ear has a purpose and a special quality as well?”
“Certainly.”
“And the same is true of everything else.
“Each thing has a purpose and a particular quality that allows it to fulfill that purpose.”
“That is true.”
“Now, can the eyes perform their purpose if they lack their proper quality?”
“How could they, if they were blind?”
“Exactly.
“They would have lost their proper excellence, which is sight.
“But I haven’t reached that point yet.
“I want to ask the general question.
“Do things perform their purposes through their proper excellence and fail through their defects?”
“Certainly.”
“The same is true of the ears.
“If they lose their proper excellence, they cannot perform their purpose.”
“True.”
“And the same applies to everything else?”
“I agree.”
“Now, does the soul have a purpose that nothing else can perform?
“For example, supervising, ruling, deliberating, and making decisions.
“Are these functions proper to the soul?”
“No other thing can perform them.”
“And is life itself one of the soul’s purposes?”
“Certainly.”
“And does the soul also have a proper excellence?”
“Yes.”
“And can the soul perform its purposes if it lacks that excellence?”
“No.”
“Then a bad soul must necessarily be a bad ruler and supervisor, while a good soul must be a good ruler.”
“Yes, necessarily.”
“And we have already agreed that justice is the excellence of the soul, while injustice is its defect?”
“We agreed to that.”
“Then the just soul and the just person will live well, while the unjust person will live badly.”
“That is what the argument shows.”
“And the person who lives well is blessed and happy, while the person who lives badly is the opposite?”
“Certainly.”
“Then the just person is happy, and the unjust person miserable?”
“So it appears.”
“And happiness is beneficial, while misery is harmful?”
“Of course.”
“Then, my dear Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than justice.”
“Let that be your entertainment at the festival of Bendis.”
“For which I am grateful,” I replied, “especially now that you have become gentler with me and stopped scolding me.
“Still, I can’t say I have been entertained very well.
“But that is my fault, not yours.
“I am like a man who sits down to a great feast and keeps tasting every dish that arrives without ever giving himself time to enjoy any one of them.
“I have done the same thing in this discussion.
“I have moved from one question to another without first solving the one we originally set out to answer.
“We began by asking what justice is.
“Then I abandoned that question and started asking whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and ignorance.
“Then another question arose about whether justice or injustice is more advantageous.
“And I couldn’t stop myself from moving on to that.
“So after all this discussion, I find that I know nothing.
“I still do not know what justice is.
“And if I do not know what justice is, I certainly cannot know whether justice is a virtue or not.
“Nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.”
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