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Chapter 82 · America’s Great Financial Panics, from the Revolution to 1907

America’s Great Financial Panics, from the Revolution to 1907

Chapter 82 of 90 · 3,370 words · Free

The Panic of 1907 naturally brought renewed attention to all the major financial crises that had come before it. Looking back at them, one pattern stands out: whenever trade, speculation, and credit expanded too far beyond the amount of available cash, a sharp reversal eventually followed.

The first episode came in the years surrounding the American Revolution. The financial trouble that followed the Boston Tea Party was tiny compared with later crises. The country had little trade, few banks, and very little credit. Compared with what came later, it was hardly a panic at all.

The first truly important panic came in 1812.

At that time, American trade had expanded too rapidly. Banks had extended too much credit, and business had grown far beyond a safe level. The outbreak of war with Britain turned an already dangerous situation into a full financial crisis.

The country’s total banking capital was only about $70 million, yet more than ninety banks failed when depositors rushed to withdraw their money.

The government also struggled to raise enough money to finance the war.

Before the war began, trade and manufacturing had been booming. Then everything changed almost overnight.

Businesses collapsed. Credit disappeared. Production nearly stopped.

The country had moved from excessive expansion to excessive contraction. Fear replaced confidence, destroying market values and wiping out credit on a massive scale.

Eventually, however, government spending on the war helped revive the economy. Once the government succeeded in selling its securities, money began circulating again. Factories and other businesses slowly reopened, giving work back to people who had been thrown out of employment.

The Panic of 1823 was much milder.

Not much was recorded about it, and its effects mainly appeared as a prolonged business depression lasting into 1825.

There was no war or other major event behind it. The basic problem was the same one that had caused earlier crises: too much trading, too much speculation, and too much credit.

Then came the much more serious Panic of 1837.

By this time, the United States had grown enormously in territory, population, and wealth. As a result, the consequences of excessive speculation were much greater than they had been in 1812.

The basic causes were familiar: excessive trade, speculation, and credit.

But the immediate trigger was the troubled condition of the United States Bank, combined with President Andrew Jackson’s hostility toward it.

Speculation had become especially wild in land and railway projects.

Railways were still a new idea in America. George Stephenson’s achievements in Britain had created enormous excitement about railway development, and American promoters rushed to raise money for new lines.

The railway boom also encouraged a huge wave of land speculation.

The Panic of 1857 was even larger.

Again, the main reason was the country’s enormous growth. America now had much more territory, a larger population, and vastly greater wealth than it had possessed during the earlier panics.

The boom in speculative business had become enormous, especially in railway construction. Much of this expansion followed the discovery of gold in California in 1849.

Then came the shock that turned the boom into a panic.

The Ohio Life and Trust Company failed.

The company had a major presence on Wall Street and had long been regarded as one of the strongest financial institutions in the country.

That confidence turned out to be completely unjustified.

When the company suddenly stopped making payments, the news hit the public like a bolt of lightning.

People lost confidence in banks and businesses almost immediately.

Banknotes were presented everywhere for redemption.

Banks across the country suspended payment in specie.

The Chemical Bank of New York was an important exception because it continued redeeming its own notes.

The consequences were devastating.

Businesses failed from Maine to California.

Nearly three-quarters of the country’s railroads and other major corporations eventually defaulted on interest and other payments and were placed in receivership.

The depression became worse month after month for more than a year.

Some highly respected railway stocks collapsed to only three or five dollars a share.

Michigan Southern and Harlem were among them.

Foreclosures, forced sales, and corporate reorganizations became the symbols of the financial destruction.

The country had barely recovered when another enormous crisis arrived.

In March 1861, Abraham Lincoln became President, and the Civil War soon began.

The country then entered another severe financial depression.

But this time the crisis developed so slowly that it was never officially known as a panic.

It can be traced back to Lincoln’s election in November 1860, when many Americans began anticipating war between the North and South.

The financial depression continued until the government began issuing wartime paper money in 1861, after the suspension of specie payments.

The Panic of 1857 also brought back a strange form of emergency money that Americans had experienced during the earlier crisis of 1837.

They called it “shinplasters.”

These were essentially private IOUs used as small change.

Suppose someone bought something with a banknote or check worth more than the amount he owed.

Instead of receiving coins for the difference, he might receive a small piece of paper promising payment later.

In New York, notes from sound New York banks were generally accepted.

Notes from banks elsewhere were not.

And because banks had stopped paying out specie, there was no hard money available for making change.

So merchants and ordinary people began issuing their own little pieces of paper.

Storekeepers issued them.

Hotels issued them.

Restaurants issued them.

Bars issued them.

Barbers issued them.

Almost everyone seemed to have his own private currency.

The city became flooded with these small promises to pay.

They passed from hand to hand until many became filthy, worn, and barely readable.

They ranged from one cent to several dollars.

The same kind of emergency money appeared in many places from Maine to Texas.

Of course, many of these pieces of paper were never redeemed.

Then came the Black Friday Gold Panic of 1869.

This was different from the great nationwide panics.

It was mainly a Wall Street crisis.

On Friday, September 24, 1869, a group led by Jay Gould attempted to corner the gold market.

Their plan was simple: drive the price of gold higher and force people who had bet against gold, as well as importers who needed gold, to buy it at extremely high prices.

The Tenth National Bank on Nassau Street became deeply involved because Gould and his associates controlled it.

The bank had over-certified checks totaling about $7.5 million.

The government bank examiner eventually shut it down.

The gold conspiracy produced several scandals.

One involved the resignation of the Assistant Treasurer of the United States in New York.

Two brokerage firms employed by the gold speculators were also drawn into the scandal.

The conspirators pushed the price of gold from 119½ to 162¼.

Then the government announced that it would sell $5 million worth of gold.

The price collapsed by thirty percent.

The Gold Clearing House Bank was forced to suspend operations, and the Stock Exchange was closed to prevent the panic from spreading into the stock market.

Black Friday was not a nationwide commercial panic, but it caused enormous losses on Wall Street.

Then came the devastating Panic of 1873.

It began on Wall Street on September 13 with the collapse of several prominent banking and brokerage firms.

Howes & Macy failed.

Kenyon Cox & Co., in which Daniel Drew was a special partner, failed.

Fisk & Hatch failed.

Then Jay Cooke & Co. collapsed.

The failures quickly spread across the country.

Crowds gathered on Wall Street every day to watch the unfolding disaster.

The Stock Exchange was closed for ten days to prevent people from dumping stocks at ruinous prices.

The scale of the crisis was extraordinary.

On September 19 alone, twenty-two Stock Exchange firms suspended payment.

Rumors spread that banks and trust companies were also in trouble.

Depositors rushed to withdraw their money.

The Union Trust Company was temporarily forced to close while it tried to raise enough cash from its assets to survive the run.

Several banks were close to collapse.

Then, on the evening of September 20, the New York Clearing House took emergency action.

It authorized $10 million in Clearing House loan certificates.

These certificates allowed banks to settle their obligations with one another without handing over scarce cash.

The Stock Exchange was also closed that same day.

On September 24, another $10 million of certificates was authorized.

By September 27, the panic had become so severe that restrictions on issuing the certificates were removed.

Banks stopped paying most checks in cash.

Instead, they certified checks payable through the Clearing House.

The normal weekly bank statement was also suspended.

The Clearing House certificates eventually reached a maximum of $22.4 million on October 20.

The Stock Exchange finally reopened on September 30 after ten days of closure.

During the shutdown, a curb market operated on Broad Street.

But anyone who wanted to sell securities for cash there had to accept panic prices.

The Panic of 1873 was far more severe than the crisis of 1907, and the recovery was painfully slow.

The Panic of 1884 also spread beyond Wall Street, although Wall Street suffered the most.

Then came another stock market panic in 1890.

This one was triggered by the failure of Baring Brothers in London and the large quantities of American gold sent to Europe to help stabilize the British financial system.

The crisis remained largely confined to Wall Street and ended relatively quickly.

The Panic of 1893 was much more serious.

About 15,000 business failures were attributed to it across the country.

As usual, excessive speculation and overexpansion in trade, stocks, and new businesses had created the underlying weakness.

But the immediate danger came from the political battle over silver.

The campaign for unlimited silver coinage at a ratio of sixteen to one undermined confidence in the American monetary system.

People rushed to exchange paper money for gold.

The Treasury’s freely available gold reserve fell below $20 million.

In New York, the Treasury’s sub-treasury held only about $8.7 million.

The situation became so dangerous that President Grover Cleveland arranged a major gold transaction with the Morgan-Belmont syndicate.

The government purchased 3.5 million ounces of gold for $62,312,500 in four-percent bonds.

The syndicate also worked to stop further gold exports.

Together, these measures restored confidence.

The run on gold ended.

Later, higher customs duties brought even more gold into the Treasury, eventually giving the government a much larger reserve than it had ever held before.

Then we reach the Panic of 1907.

Its causes had been building for years.

As in every previous crisis, the fundamental problem was too much credit compared with the amount of cash available to repay it.

Trade and speculation had expanded rapidly.

Too many businesses had borrowed too much money.

Too much capital had been committed to investments that could not quickly be converted back into cash.

I had warned repeatedly that this situation could not continue forever.

Unless Americans slowed down their speculation and corrected the weaknesses in the financial system, a serious reaction was inevitable.

My experience with earlier panics, especially the Panic of 1857, made the danger clear to me.

The volume of credit was becoming far too large compared with the amount of actual cash available.

That imbalance always becomes more dangerous during periods of intense economic activity.

But in America, particularly among Wall Street speculators, millionaires, and promoters, the problem had become extreme.

Much of the country’s liquid capital had been locked into fixed investments.

When people suddenly needed cash, much of that wealth could not be converted quickly enough.

Still, most Americans did not realize how serious the danger was.

That changed on October 21.

The Bank of Commerce notified the New York Clearing House that it would no longer clear for the Knickerbocker Trust Company after the following day.

At the same time, the Clearing House investigated the Mercantile National Bank.

It ordered the bank’s officers and directors to resign immediately so that the institution could be stabilized.

That was enough to frighten the public.

The next morning, depositors rushed to the Knickerbocker Trust Company.

It opened its doors, but within about two hours the run became so severe that it was forced to close.

Fear spread immediately.

Depositors began running on the Trust Company of America, its Colonial Branch, and the Lincoln Trust Company.

The next day, six banks and a trust company in Brooklyn failed, along with the Hamilton Bank in Harlem.

The panic then spread through the entire banking system.

People withdrew money from banks and trust companies everywhere.

But they did not deposit the money somewhere else.

They simply hid it.

That created an enormous shortage of circulating cash.

The shortage became so severe that call loans on the Stock Exchange eventually carried interest rates of forty to fifty percent a year.

For the rest of 1907, rates remained around fifteen to twenty-five percent.

The New York Clearing House quickly realized that the banks needed protection from the enormous drain on their deposits.

On October 26, it authorized the issue of Clearing House certificates against acceptable assets deposited by member banks.

The banks could use these certificates instead of cash when settling their daily obligations through the Clearing House.

The measure immediately relieved pressure on the banks.

Other clearing houses in major American cities followed the same strategy.

Many country banks went even further and issued their own small checks, starting at one dollar, to customers who wanted to withdraw money.

The most important point about the Panic of 1907 is that fear played an enormous role.

The panic was largely psychological.

Fear created by distrust was the immediate trigger.

But fear alone cannot create such a crisis.

There must first be serious weaknesses underneath it.

In 1907, those weaknesses had been created by years of excessive credit, speculation, and financial expansion.

Once people lost confidence, they rushed to withdraw their deposits.

Then they hoarded the money instead of putting it back into circulation.

People who might otherwise have deposited their money also held onto it because they were afraid.

This created a huge vacuum in the money supply.

To fill that vacuum, America went further than ever before.

We imported roughly $100 million in gold.

In addition, the various Clearing Houses issued a total of about $81 million in loan certificates.

The combination of hoarding and the shortage of cash also produced a premium on currency.

At one point, currency itself was trading at a premium of four to five percent.

Banks were effectively forced into a partial suspension of normal payments.

They required many checks to be settled through the Clearing House rather than paying cash directly, except when customers were allowed to withdraw small amounts.

Fortunately, the currency premium steadily declined.

By December 31, it had fallen to only one-quarter to three-eighths of one percent.

At the beginning of 1908, it disappeared completely.

The crisis also created serious problems for American workers.

Large employers had great difficulty obtaining enough cash to pay wages.

In Pittsburgh and other industrial centers, workers were often paid in bank or company scrip.

The practice became so widespread in Pittsburgh that even the streetcar companies accepted this emergency money for fares.

Under such conditions, it was no surprise that consumers stopped buying.

Industrial companies became disorganized.

Factories reduced production or shut down altogether.

Hundreds of thousands of workers lost their jobs.

But once the storm passed and the money market became easier, the outlook improved.

There was every reason to expect American trade and manufacturing to return gradually to normal prosperity.

On January 11, 1908, the Clearing House finally reported that the banks had eliminated their reserve deficit.

Instead of a deficit of $11.5 million on January 3, the banks now had a surplus of $6,084,050.

At one point, the deficit had been as large as $81 million.

Some people might think that importing $100 million in European gold placed America under an obligation to Europe.

It did not.

We paid for every ounce of that gold with our own resources.

We exported cotton, grain, petroleum, copper, and other American products in exchange for it.

In fact, Europe needed these American products even more urgently than America needed the European gold.

The transactions were simply business.

We sold our products.

Europe sold us gold.

Neither side was doing the other a favor.

Indeed, Britain and France did everything they could to discourage America from taking their gold.

The Bank of England raised its discount rate to an extraordinary seven percent and kept it there until America stopped buying gold.

That policy was understandable from Britain’s point of view.

The Bank of England was trying to protect its own reserves.

But it also made America’s task more difficult.

Britain openly intended to prevent us from taking too much gold from Europe.

Yet America continued to buy the gold it needed and paid for it.

Only after we stopped buying did the Bank of England reduce its rate to six percent.

There was an important lesson in this.

America was not dependent on Europe for rescue.

We had the resources to rescue ourselves.

We neither asked for favors nor received them.

The episode demonstrated the enormous strength of American financial and commercial resources.

It also demonstrated the depth of the country’s underlying business strength.

America had endured an extraordinary financial strain and still emerged in relatively good order.

That was powerful evidence that the United States had become a great economic power.

Our enormous foreign trade benefited the rest of the world as well.

So did the vast sums American tourists spent in Europe.

In 1907 alone, American tourists spent about $150 million there.

Had that money remained in the United States, it might have reduced or even eliminated the need to import so much European gold during the crisis.

Europe had every reason to appreciate what America supplied.

Without the United States, what would European trade and commerce look like in this age of rapid economic development?

The courage and determination shown by the American people during the Panic of 1907 gave strong reason to expect a quick recovery.

The country was far better equipped to recover than it had been during the panics of 1812, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1884, and 1893.

America had become so much wealthier and more populous, with such vastly greater resources, that direct comparisons were hardly meaningful.

The growth of the American banking system tells the story clearly.

During the severe Panic of 1873, the New York Clearing House issued only $16 million in loan certificates.

During the Panic of 1884, it issued $21 million.

During the Panic of 1893, it issued $41 million.

But during the Panic of 1907, the figure reached an extraordinary $81 million.

The crisis had been severe.

But it had also served a useful purpose.

It exposed and eliminated much of the reckless, unhealthy, and sometimes dishonest speculation that had infected the management of banks, railroads, and industrial corporations.

In its place, America could build a higher standard of business conduct.

Perhaps, then, the old saying was appropriate:

All’s well that ends well.

Or, as the Bible says, good can come out of evil.

We had taken the flower of safety from the very nettle of danger.

The same basic conclusion was shared by bankers in Europe.

They did not blame President Theodore Roosevelt for the crisis.

One prominent London banker, H. H. Raphael, a member of Parliament and one of Britain’s most influential financial figures, expressed this view in December.

He said that Europeans regarded Roosevelt as one of the most courageous and capable presidents America had ever produced.

They admired his independence and determination.

They believed that he was giving America a much-needed “housecleaning.”

They also understood that although America was passing through a severe financial storm, the country possessed extraordinary power to recover.

Their expectation was that America would soon move forward again—cleaner, stronger, and more prosperous than before.

That judgment deserves attention because it was clearly sincere.

There was no obvious political motive behind it.

And if any American president deserved a national cheer for his public service during this difficult period, it was Theodore Roosevelt.

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