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Chapter 9 · Chase, the Treasury, and the Coming War

Chase, the Treasury, and the Coming War

Chapter 9 of 90 · 1,770 words · Free

Soon after Salmon P. Chase took over the Treasury, he discovered that the government was in serious financial trouble.

The Treasury was practically empty.

For the fiscal year ending in June 1861, the government had spent about $62 million, while its revenue was only about $41 million. Even that revenue was in danger of falling because of the rebellion spreading through the South.

When President Lincoln called on Congress to authorize the enlistment of 400,000 men, government expenses quickly rose to nearly $1 million a day.

Chase calculated that the government would need about $318 million during the coming year.

He proposed raising $80 million through taxes, borrowing $240 million, and issuing $50 million in Treasury notes that could be redeemed in gold or silver on demand.

Congress authorized Chase to borrow up to $250 million on the credit of the United States.

Part of the law allowed him to issue up to $50 million in interest-free Treasury notes, payable on demand in New York, Philadelphia, or Boston.

When Chase advertised the government bonds known as the 8-1 issue, every bid at 94 or higher was accepted. Anything below 94 was rejected.

I immediately organized a syndicate to take the entire remaining balance at 94.

The group included several New York banks and a number of wealthy investors.

I went to Washington to see Secretary Chase.

When I met him, I explained why I had come.

“I am prepared to take the entire remaining balance of the loan at 94,” I told him.

Chase seemed favorable toward my proposal.

But he asked me to leave the matter open until the next morning.

“I must consider whether the people whose bids were rejected should be given another opportunity,” he said.

I agreed.

But my journey to Washington had already changed my view of the situation.

As our train approached the capital, I looked out of the sleeping-car window.

What I saw made a powerful impression on me.

An entire train was loaded with brass cannons.

There were at least a dozen flatcars, each carrying one of those enormous guns.

They appeared ready to be rolled directly against an enemy.

At that moment, the question of war was no longer an abstract political argument.

It was right in front of me.

And during my entire stay in Washington, that image remained in my mind.

When the train arrived, I went straight to Willard's Hotel, then the leading hotel in Washington.

I quickly washed, dressed, and went down to the old-fashioned dining room for breakfast.

I asked when the heads of the government departments normally arrived at work.

“Ten o'clock,” I was told.

So at ten, I went to the Treasury.

I sent my card to Secretary Chase and was admitted almost immediately.

He was a large, dignified man with an impressive presence.

From the moment I met him, I felt that I was in the presence of an unusually great man.

I explained the purpose of my visit and repeated my offer for the bonds.

But Washington itself was giving me a different message.

At that time, roughly seven-eighths of the city's population was Southern.

Many government employees were Southerners, and they expected to lose their positions because of the coming political changes.

The entire city seemed to be boiling with conspiracy, suspicion, and treason.

Everywhere I went, I kept thinking about those cannons I had seen on the train.

Rumors of war filled the air.

People were tense and excited.

The more I observed, the more certain I became that war could not be avoided.

And I did not believe it would be a short war.

I believed it would be long and bloody.

I sent a message to my partners in New York.

“Prepare for a major war,” I warned them.

“Sell all the commercial paper we have.”

I also told them to contact the members of my bond syndicate.

“Withdraw from the bond purchase,” I advised. “I believe war is about to begin, and government bonds are likely to fall sharply.”

The next morning, I returned to see Chase.

“I have changed my position,” I told him. “I now believe this will be a long and bloody war. In the interest of my clients, I cannot honestly renew yesterday's offer.”

Chase strongly disagreed with me about the likely length of the war.

He believed the trouble would be settled quickly.

“Those bonds ought to sell at par,” he said. “They should soon be worth even more.”

He expected the crisis to end in less than sixty days.

Looking back today, that confidence may seem astonishing.

But at the time, Chase was far from alone.

Many people badly underestimated the strength and determination of the South.

Despite our disagreement, Chase treated me with remarkable courtesy.

He had a dignified manner that impressed nearly everyone who met him.

His personality made an immediate impression, and unlike many first impressions, his tended to last.

He later became one of my warmest and most valuable friends.

Much of my early success in Wall Street during the war was due to his support and recognition.

My visit to Washington probably saved my business.

If I had not gone there and seen the situation for myself, my firm might have suffered the same fate as many others that were heavily invested in government bonds, commercial paper, stocks, and other risky assets.

Instead, I returned to New York convinced that a serious financial storm was coming.

That warning came just in time.

My first experience with government bonds had actually occurred shortly before Lincoln took office, when Howell Cobb was Secretary of the Treasury.

Cobb had advertised an issue of United States bonds bearing five percent interest and running for twenty years.

My firm bid $200,000 for them.

We hoped to make a quick profit.

As required, we deposited five percent of the amount.

Most of the bids were accepted, including ours.

A very large amount was also awarded to Lockwood & Co., then considered one of the largest and most successful firms on the New York Stock Exchange.

George S. Robbins & Co., John Thompson, Marie & Kans, and several other firms also submitted large bids.

But when political conditions began deteriorating, almost all of those firms refused to take up the bonds they had agreed to purchase.

They lost their five-percent deposits.

The government could have enforced the contracts, but it did not.

The bonds were simply left unsettled.

This was one of the reasons the Treasury was in such poor condition when Chase took office, and Cobb deserved some of the public criticism he later received.

My firm, however, honored its commitment.

We had subscribed for $200,000 of the bonds at par.

Most of them were eventually sold at 95 or below.

But because we fulfilled our obligation when others did not, our reputation with the government became extremely strong.

That relationship proved very valuable during the war.

At the time of my Washington visit, my firm was more heavily involved in commercial paper than in any other Wall Street business.

When I first entered Wall Street, I had introduced a new way of handling merchants' paper.

Instead of merely holding merchants' acceptances and receivables until they could be sold piece by piece, we bought them outright.

The price was based on the current interest rate, plus our commission.

The system worked.

Within a short time, my firm became the largest dealer in commercial paper in New York.

For twenty-five years, two older firms had dominated that business.

Their old-fashioned methods could not compete with ours.

Under the old system, merchants would bring their receivables to the discount firms and leave them there with their endorsements.

They could only get their money as the individual pieces of paper were sold.

I offered them something much faster.

“We will buy the paper outright,” I told them.

And instead of making them wait, we gave them a check immediately.

The merchants liked the arrangement.

Soon we had become a major force in that business, much to the annoyance of our competitors.

By then, my firm had accumulated roughly $500,000 in notes, which we had pledged as collateral with banks in New York and elsewhere.

After returning from Washington with my conviction that war was coming, I immediately went to work reducing that exposure.

I moved as quickly as possible.

I managed to sell almost everything.

In the end, only about $10,000 of short-term notes from Lane, Boyce & Co. remained, along with a $500 note from Edward Lambert & Co.

I had barely finished this enormous cleanup when the news arrived.

Less than a week after my return from Washington, Confederate forces fired on Fort Sumter.

The news spread through Wall Street like wildfire.

Panic erupted everywhere.

Stocks collapsed.

Fortunes disappeared within hours.

Some millionaires were reduced to poverty almost overnight.

Money became nearly impossible to obtain.

Trust vanished from the business community.

The two firms whose paper I had been unable to sell were among the first to fail.

Before most of the other notes I had sold even came due, every drawer and endorser behind them had collapsed as well.

If I had not cleared my books when I did, the disaster would have swept me away with them.

The height reached by Gilroy's famous kite would have seemed insignificant compared with where I might have ended up.

I had escaped only because I had acted at exactly the right moment.

I have always believed that my survival was largely due to an unusual instinct—a kind of warning that occasionally comes over me before a major financial storm.

I am not a spiritualist or a believer in the supernatural.

But whatever this strange gift may be, I have experienced it repeatedly.

Sometimes I receive what people call a “tip” about the market.

I have learned to hear it without automatically acting on it.

Many other people hear the same kind of advice and rush to follow it.

That is often where disaster begins.

This strange instinct has saved me from financial ruin several times a year.

I do not practice table-tapping or attend dark séances like the elder Vanderbilt.

But whenever a financial storm is approaching, I seem to develop a strong and almost impossible-to-ignore sense of warning.

I have known other people who experienced the same kind of foreboding.

The difference was that they ignored it.

And in moments of speculation, that can be fatal.

So I will repeat my warning:

Beware of “points.”

They are a financial will-o'-the-wisp, leading more unlucky speculators toward ruin than almost anything else in Wall Street.

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