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Chapter 8 · Foreign Powers Tried to Interfere in the Civil War

Foreign Powers Tried to Interfere in the Civil War

Chapter 8 of 90 · 2,983 words · Free

While the events described in the previous section seemed to be moving toward a result that could have been disastrous for America, the Union was saved by a remarkable stroke of good fortune.

At the time, a Russian fleet happened to be in South American waters.

A Wall Street man informed Secretary of State William H. Seward about it.

Seward immediately saw an opportunity.

The fleet was commanded by Grand Duke Alexis, brother of the Russian Emperor.

Seward sent him a friendly invitation to visit American waters.

The Grand Duke accepted at once.

But Napoleon’s spies and Scotland Yard’s agents were watching everything closely.

When they learned that the Russian fleet was coming toward the United States, they immediately reported it to their superiors.

European statesmen reached their own conclusion.

They believed Russia and the United States were secretly joining forces.

To them, it looked as if the great Russian Empire and the American Republic had come together for mutual protection—and perhaps even for offensive action.

The foreign conspirators became frightened by their own assumptions.

Their own fears defeated their plans.

What had seemed to be an approaching disaster was suddenly avoided.

The governments of France and Britain had carefully hidden their intentions behind diplomatic language, so historians have often debated whether they really planned to help the Confederacy destroy the Union.

But the Confederate records later purchased by the United States Government provide strong evidence.

They reveal a disturbing picture of what the European powers were planning.

The records show that French and British leaders were preparing on a large scale to take advantage of America if the Union collapsed.

They expected that once the United States was broken apart, they could step in and gain enormous political and economic advantages.

Letters exchanged between Confederate officials and their representatives in Europe make this clear.

Judah P. Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State, received reports from Confederate agents such as Dudley, Post, Mann, and Lamar.

Their correspondence showed that European military intervention was not merely a rumor.

It was being seriously considered.

The letters of John Slidell, the Confederate representative in Paris, are especially revealing.

Slidell had close connections with Napoleon III and was able to learn what the French Emperor was thinking.

His reports leave little doubt that Napoleon wanted to interfere in American affairs.

The United States was fortunate to have William Dayton serving as its minister in Paris.

Without Dayton’s vigilance, several privateers might have been launched from French ports to attack American commerce, much as the Alabama later did.

Britain was more cautious than France.

The British government did not appear as eager as Napoleon to openly support the South.

But that did not necessarily mean Britain had friendlier intentions toward the Union.

British diplomacy was simply more careful.

France was the more aggressive plotter, while Britain was better at hiding its intentions.

Napoleon clearly wanted to recognize the Confederacy.

At the same time, he continued pretending to have friendly feelings toward the North.

The real problem was that he did not want to act alone.

He needed Britain to join him.

But Britain refused to move first.

Slidell and James Mason arrived in Europe in January 1862.

It was one of the darkest moments of the Civil War.

They carried documents describing the weakness of the Union blockade and the enormous economic losses suffered by Britain and France because Southern cotton could no longer reach European markets.

They argued that if the Confederate ports were reopened, Britain and France would once again have access to Southern cotton.

Their message was simple.

European commercial interests would benefit enormously if the Confederacy survived.

Napoleon had ambitions far beyond simply helping the South.

He wanted to rebuild French power in North America.

He hoped to recover Louisiana, which his uncle Napoleon Bonaparte had sold to the United States.

But even that was not enough.

He dreamed of restoring the old French colonial empire in the Americas.

Napoleon knew American affairs surprisingly well.

Years earlier, when he had lived in a small room in Hoboken and eaten inexpensive meals at a twenty-five-cent restaurant, he had spent much of his time studying the history and geography of the United States and Canada.

He had borrowed money from French supporters while hoping one day to become Emperor.

He eventually repaid those debts.

He even rewarded some of his old New York and Hoboken creditors with important positions during the Second Empire.

He remembered favors.

And he never forgot an injury.

Napoleon later revealed just how much he knew about America during a conversation with Judah P. Benjamin at the Villa Eugénie in Biarritz.

Benjamin recalled that Napoleon became especially interested in Mexico.

He knew the number of guns at the Morro.

He knew how much the United States had spent on Florida’s fortifications.

He knew the trade figures of Galveston and Matamoros.

He asked detailed questions about Texas, its population, the French residents, the German settlers, and public opinion along the Mexican border.

Then Napoleon made his larger ambitions clear.

“Louisiana is French at heart,” he said.

Benjamin came away convinced that Napoleon wanted to use Mexico as compensation for the French colonies lost in the West Indies.

Napoleon believed those colonies could not be recovered without creating trouble with France’s allies.

But he wanted France to establish a foothold on the Florida coast.

He said France needed such a position to protect its commerce in the Gulf of Mexico.

“We do not want another Gibraltar on this side,” he explained.

Slidell’s predecessor in Paris, Mr. Rost, had already received assurances from the Duc de Morny, one of Napoleon’s closest political advisers.

Morny told him that France would recognize the Confederacy.

It was only a matter of timing.

Slidell then consulted several leading French officials.

After speaking with the foreign minister, the interior minister, the finance minister, the commerce minister, and other senior officials, Slidell became convinced that Napoleon was ready to act.

He wrote to Jefferson Davis and the Confederate government.

“The Emperor has invited the English Government to join him in recognizing the South,” Slidell reported.

“But the English Government, because of Earl Russell, has refused to act at the same time.”

The statement was partly true.

Britain might well have joined France in a successful scheme to weaken and exploit the United States.

But neither country wanted to take responsibility for starting the intervention.

Each wanted the other to make the first move.

Napoleon tried to use Mr. Lindsay, a wealthy shipowner and member of Parliament, to find out whether Britain would support him.

But the British government refused to commit itself through an unofficial messenger.

Napoleon then spoke very openly with Lindsay.

He told him that France was prepared to help break the Union blockade if Britain would cooperate.

He had already communicated this idea through the French foreign minister.

But Britain had not given him a satisfactory answer.

Napoleon said that if Britain was ready, France was ready too.

He was prepared to send a powerful fleet to the Mississippi.

Britain, he proposed, should send an equal force.

Together they would demand that their merchant ships be allowed to enter and leave Southern ports freely and that cotton shipments be restored.

Napoleon presented the plan as an act of humanitarianism.

He claimed that he wanted to stop the bloodshed and end the terrible conflict between Americans.

It was a remarkable claim coming from a ruler whose own rise to power had been marked by political violence.

Napoleon said he had believed from the beginning that the Union could never be restored.

In his opinion, the war could end only with separation.

He authorized Lindsay to communicate this view to Lord Cowley and find out whether Britain would support his plan.

Lindsay reported back.

Lord Cowley said that the British government was not yet prepared to act.

At the same time, Seward was quietly conducting his own diplomacy with Earl Russell and Lord Palmerston.

His efforts were beginning to interfere with Napoleon’s plans.

Napoleon then told Lindsay to speak with Palmerston, Russell, Derby, and Benjamin Disraeli.

He wanted to know what the leading British politicians really intended.

He instructed Lindsay to do this without appearing to act on Napoleon’s orders.

Napoleon did not want to be trapped by normal diplomatic procedures.

He believed time was running out.

Lindsay approached Earl Russell first.

Russell refused to discuss foreign policy through an unofficial representative.

He insisted that all communications with foreign governments had to pass through official diplomatic channels.

Lindsay then met Benjamin Disraeli.

Disraeli was much more open.

He told Lindsay that he strongly supported the Confederate cause.

He also claimed to have good reason to believe that Earl Russell had a secret understanding with Seward.

Britain, Disraeli said, would continue to respect the Federal blockade and would not recognize the Confederacy for the time being.

But there was a condition.

“If France takes the initiative,” Disraeli explained, “Britain will probably support whatever she does to end the present situation.”

The reason was political.

A large majority in Parliament would support intervention if France moved first.

Russell would therefore have little choice but to follow France rather than risk bringing down the government.

Disraeli understood the game perfectly.

Britain was making friendly promises to Seward while quietly waiting for Napoleon to take the dangerous first step.

If France acted first, Britain could follow without taking the blame.

Napoleon was furious when he learned that Russell had apparently revealed his plans to Seward.

Russell had carefully placed himself in a position where he could move in either direction.

He wanted Britain to be prepared for whatever happened.

By the middle of April, Napoleon was considering a new strategy.

If Britain would not join him, he might appeal directly to the United States to open the Southern ports.

But he planned to support that so-called friendly appeal with a naval demonstration.

If the United States refused, France could then claim that it had a reason to oppose the blockade openly.

Napoleon decided to wait a few more days to see what Britain would do.

Then something happened that completely changed his calculations.

A few days later, Admiral David Farragut and Commodore David Porter led their forces past Forts Jackson and St. Philip at the mouth of the Mississippi.

Their commanders, including Bailey and Bell, helped carry out the dangerous operation.

The Union fleet silenced the Chalmette batteries and reached New Orleans.

After two days of negotiations, New Orleans surrendered.

The city authorities offered little resistance.

Farragut took control of the city.

General Butler followed soon afterward.

No major battle was necessary.

The victory stunned Napoleon.

He suddenly realized that his planned demonstration against the Southern coast would be much harder to carry out.

New Orleans and the Mississippi forts were already in Union hands.

But Napoleon did not completely abandon his plans.

A leading member of his cabinet, M. Billault, told Slidell that most of the French cabinet still favored the South.

“If New Orleans had not fallen,” Billault said, “France would probably have recognized the Confederacy by now.”

But there was still hope, he added.

If the Confederates could win major victories in Virginia and Tennessee and hold the Union army back for another month or two, France might again have an opportunity to intervene.

Napoleon’s real intentions were revealed even more clearly in a letter he later wrote to General Forey.

He argued that Europe had a vital interest in America.

The United States was important because it bought European manufactured goods and supported European commerce.

Napoleon said he wanted America to remain powerful and prosperous.

But he did not want the United States to control the entire Gulf of Mexico, dominate the Caribbean and South America, and monopolize the trade of the New World.

His solution was to establish a strong government in Mexico.

France, he believed, could then restore the power and prestige of the Latin race in the Americas.

Napoleon had revealed too much.

His letter made his ambitions obvious.

He was not merely trying to stop a civil war.

He wanted to reshape the political balance of the Western Hemisphere.

His ambitions even alarmed the Confederacy.

In August, a French consul in Texas named M. Theron began considering the possibility of turning Texas into a French republic.

He shared the idea with Governor Francis Lubbock.

Lubbock immediately informed Jefferson Davis.

The Confederate government had heard enough.

Both Theron and the French consul in Richmond were ordered to leave Confederate territory.

But Napoleon still refused to give up.

He wanted other European powers to become involved.

He again discussed with Slidell the possibility of joint mediation by Britain, France, and Russia.

Napoleon proposed a six-month armistice.

During the armistice, Southern ports would be opened to world commerce.

He presented the plan as a humanitarian effort to stop the killing.

“If the North refuses,” Napoleon argued, “that will give us good reason to recognize the South and perhaps intervene more actively.”

Slidell then asked whether France could quietly allow ships and military supplies to be sent to the Confederacy.

Napoleon had an idea.

“Why not build the ships as if they were intended for the Italian government?” he suggested.

He said he would discuss the idea with his ministers.

Napoleon also proposed that Britain and Russia join him in demanding the six-month armistice.

Both countries refused.

He then offered mediation directly to the United States.

Again, he presented himself as a peacemaker acting for humanity.

The United States government rejected the offer.

The Confederates nevertheless managed to obtain permission to build warships in French ports.

They were allowed to arm and equip them and eventually send them to sea without interference from French authorities.

This violated France’s obligations under international law.

Napoleon apparently believed his power placed him above such restrictions.

The Alabama was already operating successfully under the Confederate flag.

Napoleon then met with Mr. Arman, a major French shipbuilder.

He assured Arman that there would be no serious difficulty if the Confederate ships were officially described as vessels being built for Italy.

A contract was soon signed for five warships to be built at Bordeaux and Nantes.

Later, another contract was arranged for three ironclad rams.

By 1863, Napoleon still had not abandoned his dream.

He remained convinced that European powers should recognize the Confederacy.

But he was becoming increasingly concerned about his Mexican expedition.

Openly breaking with the United States could put his entire Mexican project in danger.

Finally, Napoleon decided to approach Britain directly.

“I will make a direct proposal to England for joint recognition,” he said.

That would prevent Palmerston from misrepresenting his position on the American question.

Napoleon then met with two members of Parliament, Roebuck and Lindsay, at Fontainebleau.

The meeting appeared to go very well.

He authorized them to tell the House of Commons that France was willing—and eager—to recognize the Confederacy if Britain would cooperate.

A major debate followed in Parliament.

But then Earl Russell stood up and declared that the French ambassador, Baron Gros, had received no instructions from his government concerning American affairs.

Roebuck was stunned.

He had acted on Napoleon’s authority.

Yet now it appeared that the French government was denying everything.

There was a mystery behind this.

Napoleon’s secretary, M. Mocquard, had written to Slidell that immediately after the meeting with Roebuck and Lindsay, the French foreign minister had telegraphed Baron Gros.

The instruction was to inform Palmerston unofficially that if Britain was willing to recognize the Confederacy, Napoleon was willing to follow.

So why had Baron Gros claimed that he had received no such communication?

There were only a few possible explanations.

Perhaps the Palmerston-Russell government had intercepted or delayed the message.

Or perhaps Baron Gros saw that the debate in Parliament was turning against intervention and deliberately suppressed the message.

Either way, Britain was beginning to understand that supporting the Confederacy could be a serious mistake.

The British government was becoming increasingly afraid of the growing strength of the Union.

Even William Gladstone’s earlier declaration that Jefferson Davis had “created a nation” was losing its political force.

Britain was no longer acting out of sympathy for the South.

Fear was beginning to guide its policy.

The capture of New Orleans had demonstrated the strength of the Union.

The destruction of Confederate naval forces showed that the United States could build and operate a powerful navy.

The London Times reflected this growing concern.

Then came even worse news for the Confederacy.

Lee’s army was defeated at Gettysburg.

Vicksburg surrendered.

Union victories began appearing everywhere.

The balance of the war had changed.

Napoleon finally began backing away.

He bitterly complained that “perfidious Albion” had abandoned him.

He became afraid to allow the Confederate warships built in France to leave French ports.

Even when he allowed the English privateer Rappahannock to depart, he insisted that the American minister must not know about it.

A whole series of events was now forcing Napoleon to change course.

Palmerston called it a “concatenation of circumstances.”

The Mexican expedition was becoming deeply unpopular.

Political troubles were developing in several parts of Europe.

Meanwhile, Otto von Bismarck and Helmuth von Moltke were quietly building the political and military trap that would eventually destroy Napoleon’s empire.

Seven years later, that trap would close at Sedan.

Napoleon’s dream of creating a French-American empire west of the Mississippi had already disappeared.

His final humiliation came when he surrendered the sword of France to Bismarck.

Before his death, Napoleon became a broken man, living once again in political exile.

He had dreamed of weakening the American Republic and building a French empire in the New World.

Instead, he lived long enough to watch the United States recover from the Civil War.

The republic he had hoped to divide and weaken rose stronger than before.

In time, it would become one of the greatest nations in history.

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