Georgia’s Repudiated Bonds
I had one of the most painful experiences of my business life while trying, in good faith, to help the South rebuild after the Civil War.
I put my own money at risk and offered my friendship when that part of the country desperately needed both. I wanted to help restore the spirit of brotherhood that should have existed among all Americans.
For those efforts, however, some Southern states repaid me with the worst kind of ingratitude.
I held a large amount of Southern securities that had been issued for full value. The money had gone into railroads, public improvements, schools, and other projects that strengthened the South and increased the taxable value of its property. These securities carried the official seals of the sovereign states of Georgia and Alabama.
What made the situation even more disgraceful was that these states eventually became wealthy enough to pay what they owed. They could have settled their debts and removed the stain from their reputations.
The ordinary people of those states were not entirely to blame.
The real responsibility belonged to the politicians who had taken control of their governments.
Georgia, in particular, became the state I had the greatest reason to complain about.
Because of the bad faith of Georgia’s political leaders, I suffered an enormous financial loss that nearly destroyed me.
I had trusted the state.
I had trusted its officials.
I had believed that its promises meant something.
After being deceived so completely, I had no choice but to defend myself.
I was determined to recover whatever money I could from the bonds and securities I had bought with my own funds. I intended to fight the matter to the end.
About thirteen years earlier, repudiation had spread through the South like a financial epidemic.
Several states simply refused to honor debts they had previously authorized.
New York and several other states responded by protecting their savings banks.
These institutions held hundreds of millions of dollars, much of it belonging to working people who had saved their money little by little.
New York law therefore prohibited savings banks from investing in the bonds of any state that had defaulted on its lawful debts within the previous ten years.
That law made perfect sense.
The managers of savings banks were supposed to protect the savings of ordinary people, not gamble with them.
For that reason, new bonds issued by some Southern states could not easily find buyers among Northern financial institutions.
Georgia soon saw an opportunity.
More than ten years had passed since its earlier repudiation.
Money was cheap in the North.
Georgia had debts coming due.
Its politicians therefore decided that the time was right to return to the New York market and sell new bonds.
Their first obstacle was the New York savings-bank law.
They noticed that New York had a Democratic governor, a Democratic legislature, and a Democratic attorney-general.
They apparently believed that this political situation would make it easier to remove the restriction against Georgia bonds.
Their plan was simple.
They wanted Georgia to issue several million dollars of new 4½ percent bonds and use them to replace older 7 percent obligations.
That would save Georgia taxpayers a considerable amount of interest.
Two of Georgia’s most capable lawyers were quietly sent to Albany.
Their job was to persuade Attorney-General Denis O’Brien that Georgia should no longer be considered a repudiating state for purposes of the savings-bank law.
They expected no serious opposition.
They assumed that the holders of Georgia’s old repudiated bonds would not learn about the proceeding until the arrangement had already been completed.
A small item appeared in an Atlanta newspaper announcing that Mr. Calhoun had returned from Albany after making a strong argument before the New York Attorney-General.
Someone telegraphed the news to me.
As soon as I received it, I notified the holders of the old Georgia bonds.
I also wired the Attorney-General and asked when the other side would be allowed to present its case.
When the hearing finally took place, Mr. Calhoun seemed genuinely surprised to discover that anyone was opposing him.
The whole proceeding had been handled so quietly that Georgia’s lawyers apparently believed the bondholders would never find out in time.
Mr. Calhoun was supported by N. J. Hammond, a former Attorney-General of Georgia and a member of Congress.
They argued for Georgia’s supposed sovereign right to repudiate its debts.
I responded.
I said:
“The original repudiation by Georgia has not been a single event. Every time the state refused to pay another coupon, it repeated the repudiation.
“For more than ten years, Georgia had continued to refuse payment.
“The bonds themselves did not mature until 1890. So how can anyone honestly say that the repudiation had ended merely because ten years had passed since the first refusal?
“If ten years of good behavior could erase a state’s history of repudiation, what would prevent a state from borrowing enormous sums, waiting ten years, and then repudiating the debts all over again?
“Consider a bank robber.
“Suppose he robbed a savings bank of several million dollars, fled to Canada, lived comfortably for ten years, and committed no further robbery during that period.
“Would anyone seriously say that after ten years he should be treated as an honest man because his record had been clean since the robbery?
“Georgia is asking us to accept essentially the same principle.
“It wants to come back into the financial market without settling the old debts.
“That is an extraordinary display of audacity.
“Those who manage savings banks have a special responsibility. They must maintain the confidence of their depositors, especially during financial panics.
“Suppose a savings bank invested $500,000 in Georgia bonds.
“Then imagine that a rumor spread during a panic that Georgia was about to repudiate those bonds too.
“The depositors would rush to withdraw their money.
“The bank could collapse.
“Thousands of poor people could lose their savings.
“Is it wise to allow a savings bank to place itself in such danger?
“A state that is able to pay its debts but deliberately refuses to do so deserves neither confidence nor credit.
“It is disgraceful that a state can issue obligations, take the money, and then hide behind its sovereign immunity when creditors demand payment.
“The creditors cannot even bring the state into court.
“That leaves innocent investors without a remedy.
“If the United States hopes to maintain the high credit that its enormous resources deserve, this problem of state repudiation must eventually be dealt with.
“When a state repudiates its debts and suffers no consequences, the damage does not stop with that state.
“It damages the reputation of the entire country.
“This is not a military battle against the South.
“It is a financial battle.
“And the time has come to settle it.
“We creditors have already suffered the loss of our investments.
“Many of us have been ruined.
“And then, to make matters worse, we have been accused of conspiring to rob Georgia simply because we own the bonds Georgia refused to honor.
“That is like a pickpocket stealing your wallet and then shouting, ‘Stop thief!’ to distract attention from himself.
“All we ask is that the dispute be heard by a proper court.
“Georgia has refused us even that basic right.
“The state says the bonds were fraudulent and therefore will not pay them.
“But here is something remarkable.
“Not one of the many officials supposedly responsible for issuing these fraudulent bonds was convicted during the thirteen years that followed.
“Yet the innocent bondholders have been punished.
“They paid their money believing in the good faith of the people of Georgia.
“They are the ones who have suffered.”
I then asked permission to introduce a letter I had previously sent to the Attorney-General.
The letter explained the entire matter in greater detail.
The Robbery Behind Georgia’s “Sovereign” Power
My letter began with a simple principle:
“A state that is too sovereign to be sued should also be too honorable to cheat its creditors.”
I warned insurance companies and savings banks that their managers could eventually be held responsible if they invested depositors’ money in bonds issued by states with a history of repudiation.
I explained that Georgia had always justified its repudiation by claiming that Governor Rufus B. Bullock had issued the bonds without proper authority and had misappropriated much of the money.
But Bullock had later returned to Georgia and demanded a trial on the criminal charges against him.
He was acquitted.
He eventually became one of the prominent citizens of Atlanta.
Another argument was that Bullock had been born in the North and was therefore a “carpetbag” governor.
That argument was weak as well.
Bullock had remained in the South throughout the Civil War and had supported the Confederacy.
Several of the best lawyers in New York had also examined the bonds and concluded that they had been legally issued.
Among them were Evarts, Southmayd & Choate and several other prominent attorneys.
Some of the bonds had even been approved for trading on the New York Stock Exchange.
Then Georgia repudiated them.
Their market value collapsed almost overnight.
Bonds that had been worth nearly their full face value suddenly became worth little more than the paper they were printed on.
Savings banks and trust companies were among the victims.
The Metropolitan Savings Bank held $100,000.
The Brooklyn Trust Company held another $100,000.
The Union Trust Company held another $100,000.
The Commercial Warehouse Company held between $300,000 and $400,000, and the loss helped destroy the institution.
The New York State Loan and Trust Company also held $100,000, and the loss contributed heavily to its collapse.
The Broadway National Bank held $200,000 as collateral for a $160,000 loan.
Many other respected bankers and financial firms were also caught in the disaster.
My own firm held more than $2.5 million in Georgia securities in 1873.
The repudiation played a major role in the failure of my firm.
The solution, in my judgment, was straightforward.
Georgia and other states that had repudiated their debts needed to understand that repudiation would damage their credit and make it harder and more expensive for them to borrow.
If they were shut out of the financial markets, they would eventually have an incentive to settle with their creditors.
Georgia had received the money.
The railroads and other improvements were still there.
The state had benefited.
Its taxable property had increased enormously.
The debt it refused to pay was small compared with its ability to pay.
Georgia could become one of the most prosperous states in the country.
But investors and immigrants would naturally hesitate to put their money or their future in a state that refused to honor its obligations.
The bondholders had repeatedly offered to submit the entire dispute to the courts or to arbitration.
Georgia refused every proposal.
Its answer was essentially:
“The bonds are repudiated. We will not pay them. What are you going to do about it?”
Since a state could not be sued by its creditors, there was very little those creditors could do.
I also pointed out that many respected financial institutions and individuals had suffered losses.
My own firm was among the largest victims.
And I emphasized that the Georgia bonds had not been mysterious or unofficial pieces of paper.
They carried the state’s seal.
They bore the signatures of its officials.
They had been accepted and traded by major financial institutions.
The state had taken the money.
The state had benefited from the improvements.
And then the state simply refused to pay.
Georgia’s Own Lawyers Condemned the Repudiation
A former attorney and agent for Georgia had personally examined the books and records of my firm.
His investigation was especially significant because he had begun the examination with an unfavorable opinion of me.
After reviewing the records, however, he concluded that Henry Clews & Co. had acted fairly and honestly in all its dealings with Georgia.
He found nothing that damaged my reputation for integrity.
Even former Governor Joseph E. Brown had warned Georgia that its repudiation could not stand.
He said the state would eventually have to allow its creditors to test the validity of the bonds in court.
Otherwise, he warned, Georgia would lose its honor and its credit.
Former Governor Alexander H. Stephens went even further.
He described the repudiation as nothing less than public swindling.
Former Governor Charles J. Jenkins also opposed the blanket repudiation.
He argued that the Legislature and the constitutional convention were not the proper bodies to decide the legal validity of the bonds.
That was a matter for the courts.
He asked a question that remains difficult to answer:
“If Georgia has received the benefits of these railroads and improvements, how can she honestly keep the benefits while refusing to honor the debts that made them possible?”
Governor Bullock Defends the Bonds
I also spoke with former Governor Rufus B. Bullock.
He made it clear that he had not organized the recent proceedings before the New York Attorney-General.
He happened to be in New York on private business and attended the hearing out of curiosity.
Bullock defended the bonds issued during his administration.
He said:
“During my administration, from 1868 through 1871, the state issued bonds for legitimate state purposes.
“It also guaranteed certain railroad bonds under authority of law.
“After the Republican government was overthrown in Georgia, almost everything connected with that administration was repudiated.
“That included its financial obligations.
“But the facts have never been allowed to go before a proper court.
“The holders of these bonds maintain that every bond was issued according to law.
“I agree with them.
“And the state continues to enjoy the benefits created with the money.
“The Legislature later decided that the state was not bound by the actions of its predecessors.
“But that is a legal question.
“It should have been decided by the courts, not by a political body.
“I believe that, now that political passions have cooled, both sides would accept a decision from the Supreme Court of Georgia.
“The bondholders have shown extraordinary patience.
“I believe they would accept a long-term settlement at a lower rate of interest if that were the result of a fair judicial decision.
“That would allow Georgia to restore its credit and regain the respect of investors at home and abroad.”
Bullock also rejected the claim that he had avoided an earlier investigation.
He explained that he had not left the country, that his whereabouts were known, and that he had already provided the necessary financial records.
Then he made the central point:
“Can a debtor decide for himself whether his own debt is valid?
“A legislative committee is not a court.
“If the Legislature can decide a legal question and permanently prevent the courts from reviewing it, then what protection does a citizen have?
“What happens to property rights if the government can simply declare a debt invalid and make the courts powerless to intervene?
“Georgia used other people’s money to build railroads.
“Those railroads increased the value of the state.
“Yet the people who provided the money have been denied a hearing.
“Does that look like confidence in the justice of Georgia’s position?
“Look at Minnesota.
“She also used borrowed money to build railroads and later repudiated her obligations.
“After twenty years, her courts finally settled the matter and the debts were paid.
“I believe Georgia will eventually do the same.”
Georgia Tries Again
The controversy soon moved back to New York.
Georgia wanted to issue new bonds and sell them to investors.
But because of its history of repudiation, New York savings banks were prohibited from buying them.
The state therefore tried to remove that restriction.
I argued that this would expose the savings of widows, orphans, workers, and other ordinary depositors to unnecessary danger.
These people had placed their money in savings banks because they wanted safety.
They had not given their money to the banks so that managers could speculate on the credit of a state with a history of repudiation.
The Attorney-General eventually rejected Georgia’s attempt.
His conclusion was that Georgia had defaulted on obligations connected with the Brunswick and Albany Railroad.
Therefore, New York savings banks could not legally invest their deposits in Georgia bonds.
That decision protected the savings of thousands of people.
The Fight Reaches the Stock Exchange
Georgia did not give up.
The state soon tried another route.
A new issue of roughly $3.3 million in Georgia 4½ percent bonds was brought forward for listing on the New York Stock Exchange.
This time, a man named Fred Wolf applied to have the bonds listed.
I immediately protested.
I argued that the state should not be allowed to use the Stock Exchange to give its new bonds the appearance of unquestionable legitimacy while leaving its old creditors unpaid.
Georgia had already repudiated millions of dollars of bonds that had been issued under its official seal.
What reason did investors have to believe the new bonds would receive different treatment?
If Georgia could erase old debts whenever a new political majority wished to do so, what protection would a buyer of the new bonds have?
I warned the Exchange:
“If Georgia has not removed the stain of repudiation, she should not be given the benefit of the Exchange’s reputation.
“Once Georgia restores the rights of her old creditors, pays what she owes, and clears her record, then she can come back to the market.
“Until then, investors should not be encouraged to trust her new promises.”
I made another appeal to the Exchange.
I presented evidence showing that many innocent investors still held the old Georgia bonds.
Banks held them.
Trust companies held them.
Prominent financiers held them.
My own firm held a substantial amount.
These bonds had been bought for real money.
The state had received the proceeds.
Some of the bonds had previously traded at prices close to par.
Other Georgia bonds that had not been repudiated were still trading at strong prices.
The difference was simple.
Some bonds had been honored.
Others had been wiped out by legislative action.
I asked the Exchange to consider what message it would send if it listed Georgia’s new bonds while ignoring what had happened to the old ones.
If a state could destroy its obligations and then immediately return to the market as though nothing had happened, investors everywhere would be placed at risk.
A Final Appeal
I also wrote to Senator William M. Evarts.
I argued that Congress should be cautious about spending federal money on states that continued to repudiate their debts.
New York taxpayers were contributing a large share of the federal government's revenue.
Many New Yorkers had already lost fortunes because Southern states refused to honor their obligations.
Why should those same taxpayers then be required to finance new public improvements for states that had robbed them?
If the federal government wanted to help the South, I argued, one of the greatest improvements it could make would be to restore the credit and honor of the states themselves.
A state that paid its debts would attract capital.
It would attract immigrants.
It would encourage new businesses.
It would build confidence.
Repudiation did the opposite.
Finally, a large group of bankers, financial firms, and other holders of Georgia’s repudiated bonds joined together.
They sent a petition to the Governing Committee of the New York Stock Exchange.
Their message was straightforward:
As long as Georgia continued to repudiate its obligations, the Exchange should refuse to lend its reputation to the state’s new securities.
The petition was signed by many of the most important financial names in New York.
The Exchange listened.
The Governing Committee refused to list the new Georgia bonds.
That decision was a victory not merely for the old bondholders, but for a larger principle.
A government cannot expect the financial world to forget yesterday’s broken promises simply because it wants to borrow money again today.
Georgia wanted new credit without settling the old debt.
New York refused to give it that easy path.
The lesson was clear:
If a state wants the confidence of investors, it must first prove that its promises are worth keeping.
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