How the Tweed Ring Tried to Trigger a Panic—and How the Committee of Seventy Fought Back
The Tweed Ring had spent years learning how to operate both inside and outside Wall Street. During the reign of Boss Tweed, the gang sometimes used the financial markets to help its political schemes.
I have already mentioned how they manipulated tight money in connection with Henry N. Smith, one of Wall Street's most notorious operators.
The Ring was often willing to help certain speculators with their stock deals. One famous example involved Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad stock.
The deal ended badly for Boss Tweed and his associates.
Afterward, the stock was largely forgotten for many years. Much later, John R. Duff of Boston attempted to corner the stock through his New York broker, William J. Hutchinson.
The result nearly ruined Duff.
It is only fair to say that Duff himself was not responsible for what happened. A thorough investigation by the Governing Committee of the Stock Exchange found that his losses were largely caused by his agent's dishonesty and betrayal of trust. Duff had simply placed far too much confidence in the wrong man.
But Tweed and his trusted followers sometimes used Wall Street for something much bigger than making money.
They used it to influence elections.
Whenever an election was approaching and their political opponents were in power, the Ring could deliberately tighten the money market.
They did this by ordering banks under their control to call in the city's money that had been temporarily loaned out on Wall Street.
The effect was immediate.
Money became scarce.
Speculators were forced to sell.
Prices fell.
People lost fortunes.
And then Tweed's men would point the finger at the Republican officials in charge.
They would say, in effect:
"Look what Republican rule has done to you."
It was a clever political trick.
People who had just lost money were usually desperate to find someone to blame. They did not want to hear that their own speculation had gone wrong.
They wanted an explanation.
More importantly, they wanted someone to hate.
The Tweed Ring gave them one.
When speculators saw their margins wiped out and found themselves nearly penniless, Tweed's political workers were ready with sympathy.
They told the victims that the Republican officeholders were responsible for everything.
It was an easy story to believe.
The Ring was therefore able to turn financial losses into political anger.
And when one of its political friends won office, that official was expected to repay the Boss.
Tweed did not need another public office for himself.
His real office was collecting the money that came from all the others.
At that time, Pennsylvania was considered decisive in presidential elections.
There was even a popular saying:
"As Pennsylvania goes, so goes the Union."
In the spring of 1872, General Grant was running for a second term as the Republican candidate, while Horace Greeley had been chosen as the Democratic candidate.
The Tweed people came up with a dangerous plan.
They intended to create a panic on Wall Street at the same time as the Pennsylvania state election.
If they could make the financial disaster look like the result of Republican rule, they believed they could turn Pennsylvania against Grant and help Greeley.
I received information about the plan.
I immediately went to Senator Conkling, who was staying at the Fifth Avenue Hotel.
I told him:
"The Democrats are preparing a panic on Wall Street to help defeat General Grant."
Conkling looked surprised.
"I haven't heard anything about it," he said.
Then he thought about it.
"But it sounds exactly like something Tweed and his people would do."
He clearly believed there was reason to take the warning seriously.
"Go and see Governor Morgan," he told me.
"And see George Opdyke as well."
I went looking for Governor Morgan.
He was attending a church meeting, so I left my card and asked him to come to the rooms of the Republican National Committee because I had important business to discuss with him.
I also left word for George Opdyke to come.
The Governor soon arrived.
I explained what I had learned.
But he did not seem nearly as alarmed as I expected.
He apparently doubted that the Tweed Ring was capable of organizing a scheme so complicated.
That was a serious mistake.
Governor Morgan badly underestimated Peter "Brains" Sweeney.
Sweeney had more ability, money, and political intelligence than the Governor imagined.
Morgan was naturally cautious and slow to believe anything until the evidence was unmistakable.
I told him:
"My information is positive and reliable. I know this plan is real."
I continued:
"If they succeed in creating a panic on Wall Street, the Republicans could suffer a terrible political defeat."
The Governor finally agreed to meet again the following day so we could examine the matter more carefully.
This time I brought George Opdyke and H. B. Claflin with me.
By then, Governor Morgan had also spoken with Travers, who was strongly bearish on the market.
Travers had already sensed that something was being prepared to break prices.
The Governor was now convinced.
The danger was real.
He began seriously considering how we could stop the scheme before it was too late.
I said:
"We cannot afford to wait. Someone must go to Washington and warn General Grant."
The Governor shook his head.
"I cannot go."
"I cannot go either," I said.
"Neither can Mr. Claflin."
Opdyke stepped forward.
"I'll go."
He agreed to carry the warning personally, but he wanted all of us to support him with a strong letter to President Grant explaining exactly what we knew.
We agreed.
The letter was written.
Opdyke left for Washington immediately.
It was Friday evening.
He handled the matter with remarkable speed and returned Sunday morning.
As soon as he arrived, he sent for me.
"I saw the President," he told me.
"I explained everything."
"What did he say?"
"He was extremely grateful for the warning."
Opdyke continued:
"He immediately consulted Secretary of the Treasury Boutwell."
"And what will they do?"
"They have decided to buy ten million dollars' worth of bonds on Monday and sell ten million dollars' worth of gold."
The purpose was simple.
They wanted to put money into circulation before the Tweed Ring could create an artificial shortage.
The Treasury intended to make the money market easier before the conspirators could make it tight.
But I realized that the Ring might have another trick.
Under the law, gold could be bid up by the highest bidders.
The successful bidders could either pay for the gold by placing their money in the National Depositories—the Fourth National Bank or the Bank of Commerce—or they could deposit it in the Sub-Treasury.
That second option created a serious problem.
If the money went into the Sub-Treasury, it would be locked away.
The Treasury might release gold into the market, but the money used to buy it would disappear from circulation.
That could defeat the whole purpose of the operation.
I decided to prepare for that possibility.
My firm subscribed for the entire ten million dollars' worth of gold.
We used the names of my office clerks for the subscriptions.
We were awarded eight million dollars.
We then deposited the money in the Bank of Commerce and the Fourth National Bank, ensuring that it went back into circulation.
The result was exactly what we wanted.
Ten million dollars in greenbacks and ten million dollars in gold suddenly entered circulation.
The money reached the market immediately.
The Tweed Ring's carefully prepared scheme collapsed.
Their artificial panic never came.
And only a few days later, Pennsylvania held its election.
The Republicans won by an overwhelming majority.
Had the Tweed Ring succeeded in creating its panic, the election might have turned out very differently.
Grant's reelection could have been placed in serious danger.
After seeing how close the country had come to disaster, I began thinking about something larger.
I wanted to destroy the Tweed Ring itself.
Their real power came from money.
And their money came from political office and the theft of public funds.
I became convinced that these so-called patriots, who had plunged their hands deep into New York City's treasury, were preparing to reach for the national treasury in Washington.
They wanted to repeat on a national scale what they had already done in New York City.
The only thing holding them back was the limited amount of money available to steal from the city.
I decided that this dangerous political machine had to be stopped.
That was how I came to organize the famous Committee of Seventy.
At the first meeting, I personally nominated sixty-five of its members.
The committee therefore began with the support of a large number of prominent citizens.
It immediately became a major force in New York.
For the first time in many years, ordinary citizens felt brave enough to speak openly about political corruption and tyranny.
Until then, people had been afraid to criticize the men who controlled the city.
Everyone suspected that enormous amounts of money were being stolen.
But very few people dared to say so publicly.
A wealthy citizen who criticized the Ring could pay a heavy price.
If the Boss or one of his followers heard that someone had spoken against them, the city's assessors could suddenly raise that person's property valuation.
His taxes would soar.
It was one of the Ring's most effective weapons.
The system was simple:
Stay quiet, or pay.
Because of this quiet form of blackmail, even some of the city's richest and most powerful citizens were afraid to oppose Tweed.
The Ring's ability to hide its crimes and deceive the public is difficult to imagine today.
But people who lived through those years understood it very well.
Richard Connolly, the city comptroller, provides a perfect example.
Before the Committee of Seventy was organized, serious accusations had already been made against him.
Connolly responded boldly.
He demanded an investigation of his department by a committee of respected citizens.
And he chose the investigators himself.
They were Moses Taylor, Marshall Roberts, and John Jacob Astor.
No one could easily object to those names.
All three were wealthy, independent, and highly respected.
At the time, it would have been difficult to find three citizens who inspired greater confidence.
The investigation ended with Connolly being cleared.
His reputation was restored.
His political career was extended.
And criticizing him became even more dangerous.
But when the Tweed Ring was finally exposed, the truth became clear.
Connolly had used the investigation to strengthen himself while taking even more money from the city treasury.
By then, the Ring controlled practically everything.
New York City was living under a political reign of terror.
That continued until the summer of 1872.
Then the Committee of Seventy went into action.
One by one, the corrupt officials who had ruled the city for so long were driven from power.
Soon they were scattered across the world.
Removing the Ring was not easy.
Its resources were enormous.
Its members had money, political influence, loyal followers, and control over important offices.
Once they realized that their power was slipping away, they tried every possible method to preserve what remained.
They used flattery.
They used promises.
They used bribes.
I personally experienced one of their attempts.
At the beginning of my work with the Committee of Seventy, one of the Ring's members came to see me.
He made me an offer.
"Would you consider becoming City Chamberlain?"
I answered carefully:
"That isn't something I can decide immediately. There is no vacancy at present."
I paused.
"If a vacancy occurs and the position is actually offered to me, I can consider it then."
I deliberately gave him the impression that I might accept.
My purpose was to encourage him to reveal how the Ring handled these matters internally.
I believed that obtaining this information was justified if it could help the Committee of Seventy expose the corruption.
The next day, one of Tweed's closest friends returned.
He smiled as he delivered the news.
"The City Chamberlain has resigned."
"There is now a vacancy."
"And you can have the position."
I thanked him.
"Please express my deepest gratitude to the gentlemen who have made this generous offer."
Then I gave him my answer.
"But I must respectfully decline."
"I have thought carefully about it since yesterday."
"I am a member of the Committee of Seventy, which was created to reform the city."
"I cannot honestly accept an office from the very people we are trying to remove."
The position had to be filled immediately.
The Ring then offered it to F. A. Palmer, president of the Broadway Bank, one of the banks that had served as a depository for city funds controlled by the Ring.
Not long afterward, most of the city's corrupt officials resigned and disappeared.
Some went to Europe.
Some went to Cuba.
Others fled to the New Dominion, which had become something of a paradise for political defaulters.
They were scattered all over the world.
The Committee of Seventy was now effectively in control of the city.
Tweed himself remained.
But he was no longer quite as confident as before.
He had once loved to ask:
"What are you going to do about it?"
Now he seemed to understand that the Committee of Seventy really intended to do something.
Mayor Oakey Hall also remained in office.
He jokingly insisted that, as far as he was concerned, everything was "O. K."
At about this time, Samuel J. Tilden began to attract attention.
Through the influence of William F. Havemeyer, Tilden was chosen as one of the three legal advisers to the Committee of Seventy.
The other two were Abraham B. Lawrence and William H. Peckham.
Tilden immediately recognized the opportunity.
He used the Committee's campaign against the Ring to bring himself into the public spotlight.
He soon began presenting himself as a great reformer.
But I have always believed that without the Committee of Seventy, it is doubtful that Tilden would ever have become known as a reformer at all.
And it is even more doubtful that he would later have found himself in the extraordinary position of being declared the loser of a presidential election—or of trying, through his mysterious calculations and political maneuvers, to determine who else should be counted out of the presidency.
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