The Happiness of the Whole City
Adeimantus interrupted me.
“How would you answer, Socrates, if someone said that you are making these people miserable? They are the cause of their own unhappiness. The city belongs to them, yet they gain nothing from it. Other people acquire land, build large and beautiful houses, surround themselves with fine things, offer sacrifices to the gods at their own expense, and entertain guests generously. As you said earlier, they have gold and silver and all the other things normally enjoyed by fortunate people.
“But our citizens seem to be no better than hired soldiers stationed in the city, always standing guard.”
“Yes,” I said.
“And you could add that they are given only enough food to live on, without any additional pay as other workers receive. So they cannot even take a pleasure trip if they wish. They have no money for a mistress or any other luxury that people commonly think makes life happy. And many other accusations of the same kind could be made.”
“Let us suppose all of that is included in the charge,” Adeimantus said.
“You want to know how we would answer it?”
“Exactly.”
“If we follow the same path we have been following,” I said, “I think we shall find the answer.
“We would say that even as they are, our guardians may very well be the happiest people in the city. But that was never our purpose when we founded the State. We were not trying to make one class extraordinarily happy. Our aim was to make the whole city as happy as possible.
“We believed that in a State organized for the good of everyone, we were most likely to find justice. In a badly organized State, we were most likely to find injustice. Once we had discovered both, we could then decide which kind of State was happier.
“For now, we are constructing a happy State as a whole. We are not building it piece by piece in order to make a few citizens happy. Later we can examine the opposite kind of State.
“Imagine that we were painting a statue. Someone might come along and say, ‘Why don't you use the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful parts? The eyes should be purple, but you have painted them black.’
“We could reasonably answer, ‘My friend, surely you would not want us to make the eyes so beautiful that they cease to look like eyes. You should consider whether the whole statue becomes beautiful when every part is given its proper color and proportion.’
“In the same way, do not force us to give the guardians a kind of happiness that would destroy their ability to be guardians.
“We could dress our farmers in royal robes, put golden crowns on their heads, and tell them to work the land only whenever they felt like it. We could do the same with our potters. We could let them lie on comfortable couches beside the fire, drink wine, and make pottery only when they were in the mood.
“That would certainly make every class happy.
“But would the whole State be happy?
“Of course not. The farmer would no longer be a farmer, the potter would no longer be a potter, and no one would remain in the role for which he was naturally suited.
“That may not matter very much when the confusion is limited to something like a shoemaker pretending to be a cobbler. But when the guardians of the laws and government are only pretending to be guardians, while lacking the character and ability of true guardians, then the whole State is turned upside down.
“And the guardians alone have the power to give the State order and happiness.
“Our guardians must therefore be genuine protectors, not destroyers of the State. The person you describe as wanting everyone to be happy is really imagining peasants enjoying themselves at a festival. He is not thinking about citizens performing their duties to the State.
“So we are talking about two different things.
“If we are discussing a State, then we must ask whether the happiness of the guardians should be our highest concern, or whether happiness properly belongs to the State as a whole.
“And if the latter is true, then guardians, auxiliaries, and everyone else must be persuaded or compelled to perform their own work as well as possible.
“In that way the whole State will develop in a beautiful order, and each class will receive the share of happiness that naturally belongs to it.”
“I think you are completely right,” Adeimantus said.
“I wonder whether you will agree with another observation.”
“What is it?”
“There seem to be two things that cause the deterioration of the arts and crafts.”
“What two things?”
“Wealth and poverty.”
“How do they cause it?”
“Consider a potter who becomes rich. Do you think he will continue working with the same care?”
“Certainly not.”
“He will become increasingly lazy and careless.”
“That is true.”
“And therefore he will become a worse potter.”
“Yes, much worse.”
“But consider the other extreme. If he is poor and cannot afford proper tools or equipment, he will not be able to work well himself. Nor will he be able to teach his sons or apprentices properly.”
“Certainly not.”
“So both poverty and wealth can cause workers and their work to deteriorate.”
“That is obvious.”
“Then we have discovered two new dangers that our guardians must watch carefully, or they will enter the city without anyone noticing.”
“What dangers?”
“Wealth and poverty. Wealth produces luxury and laziness, while poverty produces low standards and viciousness. And both produce dissatisfaction.”
“That is certainly true,” he replied. “But Socrates, I still want to know how our city could possibly fight a war, especially against a rich and powerful enemy, if we deliberately deprive ourselves of the resources that make war possible.”
“It would certainly be difficult to fight one such enemy,” I said.
“But there is no difficulty if there are two of them.”
“How could that be?”
“First, remember that our soldiers will be trained warriors fighting against an army made up of wealthy men.”
“That is true.”
“Now tell me, Adeimantus, would not one boxer who was perfectly trained in his art be capable of facing two rich and physically strong men who had never learned boxing?”
“Not if both attacked him at once.”
“But suppose he could run away, then turn around and strike the first man who came after him. If he repeated this several times under the heat of a blazing sun, would he not be able to defeat more than one large and powerful man, precisely because he knew how to fight?”
“Certainly. There would be nothing surprising about that.”
“And rich men probably have even less advantage over trained soldiers than they have over a skilled boxer.”
“That is likely.”
“Then we may assume that our trained athletes could fight two or three times their own number.”
“I agree.”
“And suppose that before the battle our citizens sent an embassy to one of the two enemy cities and told them the truth:
“‘We have no gold or silver, and we are not allowed to possess any. But you have plenty. So come and help us in the war, and you can take the wealth of the other city as your reward.’
“Who would choose to fight against lean, tough dogs instead of joining those dogs and attacking fat, soft sheep?”
“That seems unlikely,” he said.
“Yet there could still be danger if the wealth of many cities were combined into one.”
“How simple of you to call them ‘cities,’” he said.
“Why?”
“You should speak of them in the plural. Not one of them is really a city. Each contains many cities.
“Every city, however small, is actually divided into two: the city of the poor and the city of the rich. These two are always fighting one another.
“And within each of those two sides there are many smaller divisions.
“So you would completely misunderstand the situation if you treated them all as one unified State.
“But if you treat them as many different groups, and give the wealth, power, or people of one group to another, you will always have many allies and relatively few enemies.
“And as long as our own State maintains the wise order we have established, it will be one of the greatest of States—not greatest in reputation or outward appearance, but greatest in reality.
“Even if it has only a thousand defenders, it will be difficult to find a single State equal to it among either Greeks or barbarians, although there will be many that appear much larger.”
“That is very true,” he said.
“Then what limit should our rulers establish when deciding how large the State should become, and how much territory it should include?”
“What limit would you suggest?”
“I would allow the State to grow only as long as its unity can be preserved. That should be the proper limit.”
“Very good.”
“Then here is another command our guardians must obey:
“Let our city be neither too large nor too small. Let it be one city, unified and self-sufficient.”
“That does not seem like a very difficult command.”
“And the other command we mentioned earlier is even simpler.
“We said that the children of guardians who prove inferior should be moved into lower classes, while children from the lower classes who naturally possess the qualities of guardians should be raised into the guardian class.
“The purpose was to ensure that every citizen performs the work for which his nature has fitted him.
“One person should do one job. Then each person does his own work, and the city itself becomes one rather than many.”
“Yes,” Adeimantus said. “That is not difficult.”
“The rules we have been establishing, my dear Adeimantus, are not really a collection of grand principles. They are small matters, provided that we take proper care of the one great thing—or perhaps I should say the one sufficient thing.”
“What is that?”
“Education and upbringing.
“If our citizens are properly educated and grow into sensible people, they will easily understand all these matters and many others that I have not mentioned.
“For example, marriage, the sharing of women, the raising of children—all these matters will naturally follow the general principle that friends should share things in common, as the proverb says.”
“That would certainly be the best way to settle them.”
“And once the State gets off to a good beginning,” I continued, “it gathers momentum like a wheel rolling forward.
“Good upbringing and education produce good institutions. Those institutions, once firmly established, improve education still further. The improvement then continues, affecting even the character of future generations, just as careful breeding affects animals.”
“That seems very possible,” he said.
“So, to sum everything up, this is what our rulers must watch above all else.
“They must preserve music and physical training in their proper form. They must resist unnecessary innovations and do everything possible to keep them unchanged.
“When people say, ‘People always love the newest song,’ our guardians must be careful. They should not assume that ‘newest’ means merely a new song. It may mean an entirely new style of music.
“And that kind of innovation must not be treated as harmless.
“As Damon has told me—and I believe him—when musical styles change, the fundamental laws and customs of a State eventually change with them.”
“Adeimantus replied, “You can count on my support as well as Damon’s.”
“Then the guardians must build the first walls of their fortress in music.”
“Yes,” he said. “The lawlessness you are talking about can enter very easily.”
“And it enters first through entertainment.”
“At first,” he said, “that seems harmless.”
“Yes. But little by little, this spirit of freedom from rules finds a home in people's habits and customs.
“Then it enters their dealings with one another. From there it enters agreements and contracts, and eventually it reaches the laws and constitution themselves.
“Once that happens, it shows no respect for anything, and finally it overturns both public and private rights.”
“Do you really believe that?” I asked.
“I do.”
“Then, as I said, our young people must be trained from the beginning under a strict system.
“If their games become lawless and the young themselves become lawless, they will never grow into disciplined and virtuous citizens.”
“That is certainly true.”
“But if they learn good order from the beginning, even in their games, and music teaches them to love harmony and discipline, then that habit will accompany them throughout life.
“And unlike the disorderly games of other children, their sense of order will influence everything they do.
“If some part of the State has fallen into disorder, they will be able to restore it.”
“Very true.”
“Once they are educated in this way, they will naturally establish many small rules that their predecessors have completely ignored.”
“What sort of rules?”
“For example, when young people should remain silent before their elders, how they should show respect by standing or offering them a seat, what respect is owed to parents, what clothes and shoes should be worn, how the hair should be arranged, and how people should behave generally.”
“You agree with me?”
“Yes.”
“But I think there is little wisdom in making laws about such things. I doubt whether anyone could create precise laws that would last.”
“Probably not.”
“It seems, Adeimantus, that the direction in which education begins determines the whole future life of a person.
“Like tends to attract like.”
“Certainly.”
“And eventually it produces some great result, whether good or bad.”
“That cannot be denied.”
“For that reason, I will not try to make detailed laws about these matters.”
“That seems reasonable,” he said.
“What about the ordinary business of the marketplace?” I asked.
“What about people's dealings with one another? Agreements with craftsmen? Insults and injuries? Lawsuits? The selection of juries? Market taxes and harbor fees? Regulations concerning markets, police, harbors, and similar matters?
“Must we really make detailed laws about all these things?”
“I think,” he said, “that good men do not need laws for such matters. They will quickly discover for themselves whatever rules are necessary.”
“Yes, my friend, provided that God preserves the laws we have already established.”
“And without divine help,” Adeimantus said, “they will spend their whole lives making and revising laws and trying to improve their society.”
“You could compare them,” I said, “to sick people who refuse to control themselves and give up their unhealthy habits.”
“Exactly.”
“What a wonderful life they lead!
“They are constantly consulting doctors, increasing and complicating their illnesses, and trying every new treatment someone recommends, always imagining that the next remedy will cure them.”
“That is very common among such people.”
“And the funniest thing is that they regard as their worst enemy the person who tells them the truth.
“That person simply says, ‘Unless you stop overeating, drinking, sexual excess, and idleness, no medicine, surgery, spell, charm, or amulet will help you.’”
“Funny?” he said. “I don't see anything funny about becoming angry with someone who tells you the truth.”
“These people are certainly not among your favorites.”
“Certainly not.”
“And I suppose you would not admire States that behave in the same way.
“Are there not badly ordered States where the citizens are forbidden, under threat of death, to change the constitution?
“And yet the person who most skillfully flatters the people living under such a system—who indulges them, praises them, anticipates their desires, and satisfies their every whim—is considered a great statesman.
“Are such States not like the sick people I just described?”
“Yes,” he said. “The States are just as bad as the people. I certainly would not praise them.”
“But perhaps you admire the skill and boldness of those who act as political doctors and keep trying to reform such States.”
“Yes,” he said. “Although not all of them. Some have been deceived by the applause of the crowd into believing that they really are statesmen. Those people are not so admirable.”
“What do you mean?”
“You should have more sympathy for them.
“Suppose a man does not know how to measure, and a large group of people who also cannot measure tell him that he is four cubits tall. Can he help believing them?”
“No,” he admitted.
“Then don't be angry with them.
“They are almost like actors in a comedy, constantly trying to introduce little reforms.
“They believe that by passing new laws they can eliminate fraud in contracts and all the other forms of wrongdoing we mentioned.
“They do not understand that they are actually trying to cut off the heads of a hydra.”
“Yes,” he said. “That is exactly what they are doing.”
“I think the true legislator will not waste his time making laws of this kind, whether concerning ordinary laws or the constitution.
“In a badly ordered State, such laws are useless.
“In a well-ordered State, there will be little difficulty in creating whatever minor regulations are needed, and many of them will naturally grow out of the principles we have already established.”
“Then what remains for us to legislate about?” he asked.
“Nothing for us,” I replied.
“But Apollo, the god at Delphi, must still determine the greatest, most important, and most sacred matters.”
“What matters are those?”
“The establishment of temples and sacrifices, and the entire worship of gods, demigods, and heroes.
“Also the proper treatment of the dead, and the rituals required when someone wishes to appease the spirits of those who have gone below.
“These are matters we do not understand ourselves. As founders of a city, we would be foolish to trust them to anyone except the god who has always been our ancestral authority.
“He sits at the center of the earth, at its navel, and interprets divine matters for all mankind.”
“You are right,” Adeimantus said. “We will do as you suggest.”
Then Glaucon suddenly interrupted.
“But where, Socrates, is justice in all this?
“You have built the city. Now light a lamp and search through it.
“Bring your brother, Polemarchus, and the rest of our friends. Let us discover where justice and injustice are hiding, what makes them different, and which one a person who wants to be happy should possess, whether the gods and other people see it or not.”
“Ridiculous!” Glaucon exclaimed.
“Did you not promise that you yourself would search? You said it would be an act of impiety for you not to help justice when she was in trouble.”
“I do not deny saying that,” I replied.
“And since you remind me of my promise, I will keep it.
“But you must help me.”
“We will,” he said.
“Then I hope to find the answer in this way.
“I will begin by assuming that our State, if properly organized, is perfect.”
“Certainly.”
“And if it is perfect, it must be wise, courageous, temperate, and just.”
“That is obvious.”
“Then whatever of these qualities we discover in the State, the one we do not yet find must be what remains.”
“Exactly.”
“Suppose there were four things and we were looking for one of them.
“If we already knew the other three, then the fourth would automatically be the one left.
“Wouldn't that be the easiest way to discover it?”
“Certainly.”
“And the same method should work here, since there are four virtues.”
“Clearly.”
“First, wisdom appears in our State.
“And there is something interesting about it.”
“What is that?”
“We call the State wise because it is good at making decisions.”
“True.”
“And good decision-making must come from knowledge, not ignorance.”
“Of course.”
“But there are many different kinds of knowledge in a State.
“There is the knowledge of carpentry.
“Would that make a city wise?”
“No. It would only make the city skilled at carpentry.”
“Exactly.
“Nor would knowledge of working with bronze make a city wise.”
“No.”
“Nor knowledge of farming make it wise. That would make it an agricultural city.”
“True.”
“So is there some kind of knowledge in our new State that does not concern only one particular task, but understands what is best for the whole State and how it should deal with itself and with other States?”
“There certainly is.”
“And who possesses that knowledge?”
“The guardians,” he replied. “The perfect guardians we were just describing.”
“And what do we call a city that possesses this knowledge?”
“Wise and good at making decisions.”
“And will there be more true guardians in our city, or more smiths?”
“Far more smiths.”
“Then the guardians will be the smallest of all the groups distinguished by their particular kind of knowledge.”
“By far the smallest.”
“So the entire State becomes wise because of this smallest ruling class, and because the knowledge belonging to that class is the kind of knowledge that truly deserves to be called wisdom.
“And nature itself has arranged for the class possessing this wisdom to be the smallest.”
“That is completely true.”
“Then we have discovered the nature and place of one of the four virtues.”
“And very satisfactorily,” he said.
“Next, there is no great difficulty in seeing what courage is and which part of the State makes the State courageous.”
“How so?”
“When someone calls a State courageous or cowardly, he is obviously thinking about the part of the State that fights and goes to war.”
“No one would think of anything else.”
“The rest of the citizens may be courageous or cowardly as individuals, but their courage or cowardice does not determine whether the whole State is courageous.”
“Certainly not.”
“The State is courageous because of the part that preserves, under every circumstance, the correct belief about what should and should not be feared.
“And that is the belief our laws have implanted through education.”
“I would like you to explain that again. I don't think I fully understand.”
“I mean that courage is a kind of preservation.”
“Preservation of what?”
“The belief about what should be feared.
“Our laws teach people what things are truly dangerous and what things are not.
“And by ‘under every circumstance,’ I mean that a person preserves this belief whether he is experiencing pleasure or pain, fear or desire.”
“Can you give me an example?”
“Certainly.
“You know how dyers prepare wool when they want to produce a true sea-purple color.
“They first select the purest white wool and carefully prepare it. Only then can the purple dye take hold properly.
“Once the wool has been prepared and dyed in this way, the color becomes permanent. Washing cannot remove it.
“But if the wool has not been properly prepared, the purple looks faded and ridiculous.”
“Yes, I know.”
“Then you understand what we were trying to accomplish when we selected our soldiers and educated them through music and physical training.
“We were preparing their minds to receive the laws as deeply as possible.
“We wanted their beliefs about danger and everything else to become permanent.
“Pleasure should not be able to wash them away. Nor should sorrow, fear, or desire.
“These are powerful forces. Pleasure, especially, can wash away beliefs more effectively than any chemical used by a dyer.
“The power to preserve the true belief, created by law and education, about what is genuinely dangerous and what is not—that is what I call courage.”
“I agree,” he said.
“Then I suppose you are excluding the courage of an uneducated animal or slave.
“That kind of courage should have another name.”
“Certainly.”
“Then we can say that courage is what I have described.”
“Yes.”
“And if we add ‘of a citizen,’ we will be very close to the truth.
“Later, if you wish, we can examine courage in greater detail.
“But for now we are looking for justice, and we have said enough about courage.”
“You are right.”
“Two virtues remain.
“Temperance comes first, and then justice, which is the goal of our search.”
“Very true.”
“Can we discover justice without examining temperance?”
“I don't see how,” Glaucon replied. “And I don't want justice to appear while temperance disappears. So please consider temperance first.”
“Certainly. I would not refuse your request.”
“Then go ahead.”
“As far as I can see, temperance has more to do with harmony than wisdom or courage.”
“How so?”
“Temperance is the proper ordering and control of pleasures and desires.
“This is what people mean when they speak of a person being ‘master of himself.’”
“That makes sense.”
“Although the expression is rather strange.
“If someone is master of himself, then the master and the servant are the same person.”
“True.”
“I think the expression means that within the human soul there is a better part and a worse part.
“When the better part controls the worse, we say that the person is master of himself. That is praise.
“But when bad education or bad company allows the better, smaller part to be overwhelmed by the larger and worse part, we condemn the person and say that he is a slave to himself and has no self-control.”
“That is reasonable.”
“Now look at our new State.
“You will find one of these two conditions there.
“We can properly call the State master of itself if ‘temperance’ and ‘self-control’ mean that the better part rules the worse.”
“Yes. I see that.”
“Notice also that complicated and excessive pleasures and desires are usually found among children, women, slaves, and the large mass of ordinary free citizens.”
“That is true.”
“While the simple and moderate desires guided by reason and sound judgment are found only among the few who are best educated and naturally best suited to rule.”
“Very true.”
“So these two groups exist in our State.
“The desires of the many are controlled by the wisdom and better desires of the few.”
“I understand.”
“Then if there is any city that can be called master of its own pleasures and desires, master of itself, our city deserves that description.”
“Certainly.”
“And for the same reason it can be called temperate.”
“Yes.”
“And if there is any State in which rulers and subjects agree about who should rule, then that too would be our State.”
“Undoubtedly.”
“And if the citizens agree about who should rule, where do we find temperance? Among the rulers or among the subjects?”
“In both, I would think.”
“Do you see now why we were right to think that temperance was a kind of harmony?”
“Why?”
“Because temperance is unlike wisdom and courage.
“Wisdom belongs to one particular part of the State and makes the State wise.
“Courage belongs to another part and makes the State courageous.
“But temperance extends throughout the whole State.
“It is like harmony in music, bringing together the high, middle, and low notes.
“In the same way, it creates agreement among the weaker and stronger classes, whether we are talking about wisdom, physical strength, numbers, wealth, or anything else.
“So temperance is the agreement between those naturally superior and those naturally inferior about who should rule, both in the State and in the individual.”
“I completely agree.”
“Then we have discovered three of the four virtues.
“The last quality that makes a State virtuous must be justice—if only we can discover what justice is.”
“That conclusion is obvious.”
“Then the time has come, Glaucon, for us to act like hunters.
“We must surround the place where justice is hiding and make sure she does not slip away.
“She must be somewhere around here.
“Keep watch.
“If you see her first, tell me.”
“I wish I could,” Glaucon said.
“But you should think of me as a follower with barely enough sight to see whatever you point out. That is about all I can do.”
“Then pray with me and follow.”
“I will. But you must lead.”
“There is no clear path,” I said. “The forest is dark and confusing.
“Still, we must move forward.”
“Let's go.”
Then suddenly I saw something.
“Look!” I cried. “I think I can see a trail.
“And I don't think our quarry will escape us.”
“Excellent news.”
“Actually, we have been remarkably foolish.”
“Why?”
“Because justice has been lying right in front of us from the very beginning, and we failed to recognize her.
“We are like people searching everywhere for something they are already holding.
“We looked far away instead of examining what was right before us.
“That is why we missed her.”
“What do you mean?”
“I mean that we have been talking about justice for a very long time without realizing that we were talking about her.”
“You are taking a very long time to get to the point.”
“Then tell me whether I am right.
“You remember the basic principle we established when we first created the State.
“Each person should perform one task—the task for which his nature is best suited.”
“Yes. We said that many times.”
“And we also said that justice means doing one's own work and not interfering in the work of others.
“We repeated that again and again.”
“Yes.”
“Then doing one's own work in the proper way can be called justice.
“Do you see how I reached that conclusion?”
“No. But I would like you to explain.”
“Because I believe that this is the only virtue remaining in the State once we remove temperance, courage, and wisdom.
“And it is also the condition that makes all three of those virtues possible.
“If we have discovered the other three, then justice must be the fourth and final virtue.”
“That follows naturally.”
“Suppose we ask which of these four qualities contributes most to the excellence of the State.
“Is it the agreement between rulers and subjects?
“Is it the preservation of the soldiers' correct belief about danger?
“Is it the wisdom and vigilance of the rulers?
“Or is it this other quality I am talking about—the quality found everywhere, among children and women, slaves and free people, craftsmen, rulers, and subjects alike?
“I mean the quality of every person doing his own work and not interfering in the work of others.
“Wouldn't it be difficult to decide which contributes most to the State's excellence?”
“Certainly.”
“Then the ability of every individual to perform his own work seems to compete with wisdom, temperance, and courage for the title of the State's greatest virtue.”
“Yes.”
“And the virtue that enters this competition is justice.”
“Exactly.”
“Let us look at the matter from another angle.
“Are the rulers of a State the people to whom we entrust the task of deciding legal disputes?”
“Certainly.”
“And what principle do they use in judging disputes?
“Isn't it that a person should neither take what belongs to someone else nor be deprived of what belongs to him?”
“Yes.”
“And that is a just principle?”
“Yes.”
“Then justice can also be understood as possessing and doing what properly belongs to a person.”
“Exactly.”
“Now suppose a carpenter begins doing the work of a shoemaker, and a shoemaker begins doing the work of a carpenter.
“Suppose they exchange tools and responsibilities, or one person tries to do both jobs.
“Would that cause serious harm to the State?”
“Probably not much.”
“But suppose a person whom nature intended to be a merchant becomes ambitious because of wealth, physical strength, followers, or some other advantage.
“Suppose he tries to force his way into the warrior class.
“Or suppose a warrior tries to become a legislator and guardian even though he lacks the nature required for that role.
“Suppose one person tries to be merchant, lawmaker, and warrior all at once.
“Then would you not agree that this interference and mixing of roles could destroy the State?”
“Certainly.”
“Then since there are three distinct classes, any one class interfering with another or changing into another is the greatest harm that can come to the State.
“And this can rightly be called wrongdoing.”
“Exactly.”
“And the greatest form of wrongdoing against one's own city is injustice.”
“Certainly.”
“Then this is what injustice is.
“And when the merchant, the auxiliary, and the guardian each perform their own work, that is justice.
“And it will make the city just.”
“I agree.”
“We should not be too confident yet.
“If this understanding of justice is confirmed in the individual as well as in the State, then there will be no doubt.
“If it is not, we must investigate again.
“Remember that we originally built the State on a larger scale because we thought justice would be easier to see there than in one individual.
“We created as good a State as we could, knowing that justice would be found in a good State.
“Now we can apply what we discovered to the individual.
“If the individual and the State agree, we can accept our theory.
“If they differ, we will return to the State and test the theory again.
“Perhaps the friction between the two will produce the spark that finally illuminates justice.”
“That is a proper method,” he said. “Let us do it.”
“Let me ask you this.
“When two things, one larger and one smaller, are given the same name, are they alike in the respect for which they share that name?”
“Yes.”
“Then a just individual, considered in terms of justice itself, should resemble a just State.”
“He should.”
“We decided that a State was just when its three classes each performed their own work.
“And we called it wise, courageous, and temperate because of the qualities found in those same classes.”
“True.”
“Then perhaps the individual also contains three corresponding principles in his soul.
“And we can describe him in the same terms because the same pattern exists within him.”
“Certainly.”
“Then we have reached what appears to be an easy question.
“Does the human soul really have these three principles?”
“Easy?” Glaucon replied. “Hardly.
“The old proverb says that what is truly good is difficult.”
“Very true.
“And I do not think our present method is sufficient to answer the question with complete accuracy.
“The proper method would take much longer.
“Still, perhaps we can reach an answer good enough for our present purpose.”
“I am satisfied with that,” he said.
“So am I.
“Then let us continue.”
“Don't give up,” he said.
“We must acknowledge,” I said, “that the same principles and qualities found in the State also exist in individuals.
“How else could they enter the State?
“Take spirit or passion.
“It would be absurd to imagine that the spirit we find in States does not come from the individuals who make up those States.
“We see it in the Thracians, Scythians, and other northern peoples.
“Similarly, the love of knowledge can be associated with our own part of the world, while the love of money can be associated with the Phoenicians and Egyptians.”
“Exactly,” he said.
“That is easy enough to understand.”
“Very easy.”
“But the difficult question comes next.
“Are these principles really three separate things?
“Do we learn with one part of ourselves, become angry with another, and desire physical pleasures with a third?
“Or does the whole soul participate in every action?”
“That is the difficult question.”
“Then we must determine whether these principles are the same or different.”
“How can we?”
“Consider this principle:
“The same thing cannot, in the same part of itself, at the same time, act or be acted upon in opposite ways.
“Whenever we find such a contradiction, we know that what appears to be one thing must actually contain different parts.”
“That seems right.”
“For example, can the same thing be at rest and moving at the same time in the same part?”
“Impossible.”
“Then consider a man who is standing still while moving his hands and head.
“Someone might say that the same man is both moving and standing still.
“But we would say that one part of him is moving while another is still.”
“Exactly.”
“Or consider a spinning top.
“Someone might argue that the whole top is both moving and at rest because its peg remains fixed in one place while the top spins.
“But we would not accept that description.
“We would distinguish between the axis and the outer circumference.
“The axis remains still, while the circumference moves around it.
“If the axis itself tilts to the right, left, forward, or backward, then the top is no longer stationary in any respect.”
“That is the correct way to describe it.”
“So none of these examples should make us think that the same thing can act or be acted upon in opposite ways at the same time, in the same part and with respect to the same thing.”
“Agreed.”
“To avoid getting trapped in endless technical objections, let us assume this principle is correct.
“If it later turns out to be wrong, then we can withdraw whatever conclusions depended upon it.”
“That seems sensible.”
“Now, would you agree that agreement and disagreement, desire and aversion, attraction and repulsion are opposites?”
“Yes.”
“And hunger and thirst, as well as our other desires, belong to the same general category.
“When someone desires something, his soul reaches toward it.
“When he wants something given to him, his mind indicates that desire by agreeing to it.”
“Certainly.”
“And unwillingness, dislike, and the absence of desire belong to the opposite category—repulsion and rejection.”
“Yes.”
“Let us consider a particular kind of desire: hunger and thirst.
“They are among the clearest examples.”
“Very well.”
“The object of hunger is food, and the object of thirst is drink.”
“Yes.”
“Now consider thirst.
“Is thirst simply the desire for drink?
“Not specifically hot or cold drink, not much or little, not good or bad drink, but simply drink?
“If someone is hot, his thirst may become a desire for cold drink.
“If he is cold, he may want warm drink.
“If he is extremely thirsty, he may want a great quantity.
“But thirst itself, considered simply, desires drink simply, just as hunger desires food.”
“Yes,” he said. “The simple desire is for the simple object, and the qualified desire is for the qualified object.”
“But someone might object.
“He might say, ‘No one desires drink simply. People desire good drink. No one desires food simply. People desire good food.
“And since everything people desire is good, thirst must really mean a desire for good drink.’
“That argument could certainly be made.”
“Nevertheless, I would distinguish between different kinds of relationships.
“Some relationships are simple.
“Others have qualities attached to both sides.”
“I don't understand.”
“You know that ‘greater’ is always relative to ‘less’?”
“Of course.”
“And ‘much greater’ is relative to ‘much less’?”
“Yes.”
“The greater that exists at one time is relative to the lesser that exists at that time.
“And the greater that will exist in the future is relative to the lesser that will exist in the future.”
“Certainly.”
“The same applies to more and less, double and half, heavier and lighter, faster and slower, hotter and colder, and all similar relationships.”
“Yes.”
“And the same principle applies to the sciences.
“Science in general is knowledge.
“But a particular science concerns a particular kind of knowledge.
“For example, architecture is a particular kind of knowledge concerned with building houses.”
“Certainly.”
“It has a special character because it has a particular object.”
“Yes.”
“And that is true of all the arts and sciences.”
“Exactly.”
“Then you can understand what I meant about relationships.
“When one side of a relationship is taken simply, the other is also simple.
“When one side is qualified, the other must be qualified as well.
“I do not mean that the two sides must have the same qualities.
“The science of health is not itself healthy, and the science of disease is not itself diseased.
“I mean only that when ‘science’ is used in a specific sense, with a particular object, it becomes a particular science.
“And because its object is health and disease, we call it medicine rather than simply science.”
“I understand, and I agree.”
“Then thirst is one of these relative things.
“It is clearly related to something.”
“Yes. Thirst is related to drink.”
“And a particular kind of thirst is related to a particular kind of drink.
“But thirst by itself is not specifically great or small, good or bad, hot or cold.
“It simply desires drink.”
“Exactly.”
“Therefore, the soul of a thirsty person, insofar as he is thirsty, desires drink and nothing else.”
“That is obvious.”
“Then suppose something pulls the thirsty person away from drink.
“That something must be different from the thirsty principle that draws him toward drink.
“For the same part of the soul cannot at the same time act in opposite ways toward the same object.”
“Impossible.”
“Just as you cannot say that an archer's hands both push and pull the bow in the same way.
“One hand pushes while the other pulls.”
“Exactly.”
“Can a person be thirsty and yet refuse to drink?”
“Yes. It happens all the time.”
“Then what should we say is happening?
“Wouldn't we say that one part of the soul tells him to drink while another tells him not to drink?”
“Yes.”
“And the part that forbids him comes from reason, while the part that desires the drink comes from appetite and physical need.”
“Clearly.”
“Then we can reasonably say that these are two different principles.
“One is the principle with which a person reasons. We may call it the rational part of the soul.
“The other is the principle through which he desires, hungers, thirsts, and experiences other physical appetites. We may call it the irrational or appetitive part.
“It is the ally of bodily pleasures and satisfactions.”
“Yes,” he said. “Those two principles are clearly different.”
“Then we have established two principles in the soul.
“What about passion or spirit?
“Is it a third principle, or is it part of one of the two we have already identified?”
“I would be inclined to say it belongs to desire.”
“Yet there is a story I remember, and I believe it is true.
“Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was walking home from the Piraeus along the outside of the northern wall.
“He saw some dead bodies lying near the place of execution.
“He wanted to look at them, but at the same time he felt disgust and horror.
“For a while he struggled with himself and covered his eyes.
“But eventually his desire won.
“He forced his eyes open, ran toward the bodies, and said, ‘There you are, you miserable eyes. Take your fill of the beautiful sight.’”
“I have heard that story too.”
“The point is that anger or spirit sometimes fights against desire, as if the two were different things.”
“Yes. That must be the meaning.”
“And we can see many other examples.
“Sometimes a person's desires overpower his reason, and afterward he becomes angry with himself for giving in.
“In that struggle, which resembles a civil war within the soul, his spirit takes the side of reason.
“Have you ever observed spirit joining the desires against reason when reason has decided that the desires should not be obeyed?”
“No, I have not.”
“Consider another example.
“Suppose a noble man believes that he has wronged someone.
“The person he injured then makes him suffer hunger, cold, or some other physical pain.
“The noble man will not necessarily become angry.
“He may believe that the suffering is deserved, and therefore his spirit does not rise against it.”
“That is true.”
“But suppose he believes that someone has wronged him.
“Then his spirit boils with anger.
“He becomes determined to defend what he believes to be just.
“If hunger, cold, or physical pain comes upon him during the struggle, he becomes even more determined.
“His spirit will not surrender until he wins, dies, or hears the voice of the shepherd—reason—telling his dog to stop barking.”
“That is an excellent illustration,” he said.
“And in our State, as we said earlier, the auxiliaries are like watchdogs.
“They must listen to the rulers who act as their shepherds.”
“I can see exactly what you mean.”
“But there is another point I want you to consider.”
“What is it?”
“Earlier, spirit seemed to be a form of desire.
“Now it appears to be the opposite.
“In the conflict within the soul, spirit sides with reason.”
“Certainly.”
“So we must ask whether spirit is also different from reason.
“If it is merely a form of reason, then the soul has only two principles: reason and desire.
“But perhaps the soul, like our State, has three classes.
“Perhaps the individual has a third element—spirit—which, when properly educated, naturally serves as the ally of reason.”
“Yes,” he said. “There must be a third.”
“Especially because we have already shown that spirit is different from desire.
“If we can also show that it is different from reason, then three principles are clearly established.”
“That should be easy.
“Even small children show strong spirit almost from birth, long before they can reason.
“Some never seem to develop much reason at all, and most develop it only later.”
“Excellent,” I said.
“And you can see the same spirit in animals, which gives us another proof.
“We can also recall Homer's words:
‘He struck his breast and rebuked his soul.’
“Homer clearly treats the power that reasons about what is better and worse as different from the irrational anger that is being rebuked.”
“Exactly.”
“So after all our wandering, we have finally reached solid ground.
“We agree that the same principles found in the State are also found in the individual.
“And there are three of them.”
“Exactly.”
“Then must we not conclude that the individual is wise in the same way and because of the same quality that makes the State wise?”
“Certainly.”
“And the same quality that makes the State courageous makes the individual courageous.”
“Certainly.”
“And the individual will also be just in the same way that the State is just.”
“That follows.”
“Remember that the justice of the State consisted in each of its three classes performing its own work.”
“We certainly remember.”
“Then we must also remember that the individual is just when each part of his nature performs its own proper work.”
“Yes.”
“And shouldn't the rational part, being wise and responsible for the whole soul, rule?
“And shouldn't the spirited part obey reason and serve as its ally?”
“Certainly.”
“And, as we said, music and physical training will bring these two parts into harmony.
“They strengthen reason with noble ideas and lessons.
“At the same time, they calm, discipline, and civilize the wildness of spirit through harmony and rhythm.”
“Very true.”
“Once reason and spirit have been properly educated and have learned their proper functions, they will rule over the appetitive part.
“This is the largest part of the soul in most people and the part most eager for gain.
“They must keep watch over it so that, strengthened by physical pleasures, it does not grow beyond its proper limits.
“If it becomes too powerful, it may try to enslave the parts that were never meant to be its subjects.
“And then the whole life of the person is overturned.”
“That is certainly true.”
“Together, reason and spirit will be the best defenders of the whole soul and body against external attacks.
“One will give advice, while the other fights under its command and carries out its orders courageously.”
“True.”
“And we call a person courageous when his spirit preserves, through pleasure and pain, the commands of reason about what should and should not be feared.”
“That is right.”
“And we call a person wise when the small part of him that rules has knowledge of what is best for each of the three parts and for the whole soul.”
“Certainly.”
“And a person is temperate when all three parts live in friendly agreement.
“Reason rules.
“Spirit and desire obey.
“And none of them rebels against reason's authority.”
“Yes,” he said. “That is the true meaning of temperance, both in the State and in the individual.”
“And surely we have explained repeatedly what makes a person just.”
“That is certain.”
“Then is justice less clear in the individual?
“Is its nature different from what we discovered in the State?”
“No,” he replied. “I see no difference.”
“If there is still any doubt, a few ordinary examples should settle the matter.
“Wouldn't we expect the just State, or a person raised according to its principles, to be less likely than an unjust person to steal a deposit of gold or silver?”
“Certainly.”
“Would a just citizen ever commit sacrilege, theft, or betray his friends or his country?”
“Never.”
“Would he break an oath or violate an agreement?”
“Impossible.”
“Would he be less likely to commit adultery, dishonor his parents, or neglect his religious duties?”
“No one would be less likely.”
“And the reason is that each part of him is performing its proper work, whether ruling or being ruled.”
“Exactly.”
“Then are you satisfied that justice is the quality that produces such people and such States?”
“I am.”
“Then our dream has come true.
“At the beginning of our work, we suspected that some divine power must have led us toward the original form of justice.
“Now that suspicion has been confirmed.”
“Yes, certainly.”
“And the division of labor that required the carpenter, shoemaker, and other citizens to perform their own work rather than someone else's was a shadow of justice.
“That is why it was useful.”
“Clearly.”
“But true justice is what we have now described.
“It is not primarily concerned with the outward behavior of a person.
“It is concerned with what is inside him, because that is the person's true self.
“A just person does not allow the different elements within him to interfere with one another.
“He does not allow one part to perform the work of another.
“He puts his inner life in order.
“He becomes his own master and his own law.
“And he lives at peace with himself.
“When he brings together the three principles within him—like the high, low, and middle notes of a musical scale—he creates harmony among them.
“He is no longer divided into many conflicting parts.
“He becomes one person, temperate and completely balanced.
“Then, whenever he acts, whether in managing property, caring for his body, conducting political affairs, or dealing with private matters, he calls whatever preserves this inner harmony just and good.
“The knowledge that guides such action he calls wisdom.
“And whatever damages this harmony he calls unjust action, while the opinion that leads to such action he calls ignorance.”
“You have described the truth exactly, Socrates.”
“Then if we say that we have discovered the just person, the just State, and the nature of justice in both, we will not be lying.”
“Certainly not.”
“Then shall we say it?”
“Let us say it.”
“Now we must examine injustice.”
“Certainly.”
“Isn't injustice a kind of civil war among the three parts?
“Isn't it one part interfering with another, trying to rule when it has no right to rule?
“Isn't it like a rebellious subject rising against the true ruler to whom he naturally ought to submit?
“What else could such disorder be but injustice?
“And wouldn't it also produce lack of self-control, cowardice, ignorance, and every other form of vice?”
“Exactly.”
“Once we understand justice and injustice, we will also understand what it means to act justly or unjustly and what it means to be a just or unjust person.”
“What do you mean?”
“They are like health and disease.
“Justice and injustice are to the soul what health and disease are to the body.”
“How so?”
“Health produces health, while an unhealthy condition produces disease.”
“Yes.”
“Likewise, just actions produce justice, and unjust actions produce injustice.”
“That is certain.”
“Creating health means establishing the natural order and proper control among the parts of the body.
“Creating disease means disrupting that natural order.”
“True.”
“And creating justice means establishing the natural order and proper rule among the parts of the soul.
“Creating injustice means disturbing that natural order.”
“Exactly.”
“Then virtue is the health, beauty, and well-being of the soul.
“And vice is its disease, weakness, and deformity.”
“True.”
“And good practices produce virtue, while evil practices produce vice.”
“Certainly.”
“Yet our original question remains.
“Which is more beneficial: to be just and act justly and practice virtue, whether the gods and other people see us or not?
“Or to be unjust and act unjustly, provided we escape punishment and are never reformed?”
“In my judgment, Socrates, that question has now become ridiculous.
“We know that when the body is destroyed, life is no longer worth living, even if a person has plenty of food, drink, wealth, and power.
“So how could anyone claim that life is still worth living when the very essence of the soul has been corrupted?
“Could a person really consider such a life desirable simply because he is allowed to do whatever he wants, except become just and virtuous or escape from injustice and vice?”
“Yes,” I said. “The question is ridiculous, as you say.
“But we are now very close to seeing the truth clearly, so let us not give up.”
“Certainly not.”
“Come with me, then.
“Let us climb higher and look at the different forms of vice.”
“I am following you. Continue.”
“The argument seems to have reached a high point.
“From here, like a man standing on a tower, we can look down and see that virtue is one, while the forms of vice are many.
“And there are four particular forms worth examining.”
“What do you mean?”
“I mean that there appear to be as many different forms of the soul as there are different forms of government.”
“How many?”
“Five forms of the State, and five corresponding forms of the soul.”
“What are they?”
“The first is the State we have been describing.
“It can be called by two names: monarchy, when one distinguished person rules, or aristocracy, when several such people rule.”
“True.”
“But I regard these as one basic form of government.
“Whether one person or several rule, if the rulers have been educated in the way we have described, the fundamental laws of the State will remain intact.”
“That is true.”
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