The Money Problem and How to Fix It
The United States was enjoying extraordinary prosperity in 1906. Population was growing rapidly, factories were busy, trade was expanding, and people were pouring money into land and mining ventures, especially in the West.
But this prosperity created a serious problem: money was becoming harder to obtain in New York.
Money was not disappearing. It was simply being used everywhere else.
Chicago was a good example. Normally, money flowed back into Chicago from the surrounding countryside during January, February, and March. But in 1906, the opposite happened. Banks in the interior were sending about $12 million a month away from Chicago.
The reason was not simply speculation in land and mines.
Factories, merchants, railroads, and other businesses throughout the West and South were absorbing enormous amounts of capital. Business was expanding so rapidly that ordinary commercial activity was using money that would normally have returned to the major financial centers.
As a result, speculation in grain, food products, and stocks had actually become less important in the West than it had been for years.
The figures from Chicago's banks made the situation clear.
Between January 29 and April 6, 1906, their loans increased by more than $8.6 million, while deposits fell by nearly $6.8 million. Their cash resources fell by more than $14.6 million.
In other words, the banks were lending out more money while receiving less money from depositors.
That explained why New York was short of money.
The West simply had very little money to send east.
And this was happening even though the country had more money in circulation than ever before.
The same trend appeared over a longer period. Compared with March 1905, the Chicago banks had lost nearly $8.7 million in deposits and almost $8 million in cash, while their loans had increased by about $1.6 million.
Chicago was not an isolated case. Banks throughout the West, Northwest, and Southwest were experiencing the same pressure.
For more than a year, those regions had been experiencing a tremendous expansion of trade, land and mining speculation, and new industrial enterprises.
The Southwest was especially remarkable.
By the Southwest, I mean Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Kansas, and the Territories of Oklahoma, Indian Territory, New Mexico, and Arizona.
During the previous decade, this part of the country had developed at a pace rarely seen anywhere in the world.
The growth of banking was simply following the growth of business.
And this was healthy growth.
New banks were being established because people genuinely needed banking services. New settlements were appearing, trade was expanding, and capital was needed to finance development.
American energy and Western enterprise had overcome enormous obstacles.
They were pushing civilization into new territory and creating new markets.
During the five years ending in 1900, 101 new national and other banks were established in these nine states and territories.
That produced an increase of about $94.5 million in individual deposits and $150.3 million in total banking resources.
But the next five years were even more extraordinary.
Between 1900 and 1905, another 1,415 banks and banking institutions were established.
Their addition brought about $73.4 million in new capital and surplus, $383.75 million in individual deposits, and $670.35 million in total resources.
So, in just ten years, the number of banks in the region increased by 1,516.
Capital and surplus increased by about $137 million.
Individual deposits increased by $478 million.
Total banking resources increased by more than $820 million.
This enormous expansion of banking both reflected and encouraged the expansion of the country itself.
Banks needed growing businesses, and growing businesses needed banks.
Each strengthened the other.
And there was no reason to believe the process would stop anytime soon.
The population was still increasing rapidly, and much of the West and Southwest remained sparsely settled.
The expansion of banking was therefore a tremendous benefit.
It also reduced the amount of money that had to be drained from distant regions into New York simply to finance the movement of crops.
The South was experiencing a similar transformation.
Banking and commerce were expanding together.
The South had never been so active or prosperous.
Its agricultural resources were enormous, but agriculture was only part of the opportunity. Manufacturing and mining also had tremendous potential.
As its population increased, the region would need more workers, including immigrants from Europe.
The South, therefore, appeared to have a very promising future.
But all this prosperity came with a price.
The enormous expansion of business, the land boom, the mining boom, and the general increase in economic activity were spreading across the entire country.
And the effect on the money market was completely predictable.
More business required more money.
The largest demand came from real estate.
The real estate boom was concentrated largely in vacant land and building lots, although improved properties were also being bought speculatively and new buildings were going up at a rapid pace.
A tremendous amount of money was being tied up in real estate.
The statistics were striking.
In May alone, twenty-nine of the largest American cities issued permits for 13,712 new buildings.
The estimated cost was more than $55 million.
In May 1905, those same cities had issued permits for only 12,036 buildings costing about $50.8 million.
That was an increase of roughly 8 percent.
And similar increases had appeared during every preceding month of 1906.
The greatest increases were outside the Atlantic states.
Portland's building permits were up 309 percent.
Tacoma's were up 111 percent.
Seattle's were up 30 percent.
The San Francisco earthquake and fire naturally contributed to the extraordinary growth in Portland and Tacoma.
But other cities were also experiencing enormous increases.
Omaha was up 75 percent.
St. Paul was up 49 percent.
Duluth was up 110 percent.
Louisville was up 50 percent.
New Orleans was up 47 percent.
Chicago was up 39 percent.
These numbers may look dry, but they tell an important story.
Every new building required money.
Every land purchase required money.
And the land boom was tying up huge amounts of capital.
Mining speculation was doing the same thing.
During 1905, speculation in gold and silver mines began to develop into a full-scale boom in Nevada.
The old mining districts were active again.
New mining districts were being developed in other states.
The copper country around Lake Michigan was also filled with speculation.
Mining properties were changing hands rapidly, while actual mining operations were expanding.
Thousands of speculators were effectively acting as their own bankers, carrying large amounts of cash in their pockets.
Money that normally flowed back into the major financial centers was therefore scattered across the country and actively employed.
The United States was experiencing a level of prosperity and industrial activity far beyond normal conditions.
That explained why New York was short of money.
But there was an important distinction.
Although money was scarce in New York, there was no justification for the extreme interest rates that sometimes appeared on the Stock Exchange.
Those rates were excessive, damaging, and dangerous.
Every banker, bank officer, and member of the Stock Exchange should therefore work to prevent such violent swings in the money market.
The question was how.
The Chamber of Commerce had created a committee to study currency reform.
Whether that committee would actually solve the problem remained uncertain.
Its questionnaire to bankers and other experts suggested that it was not considering any fundamental change in the monetary system.
It appeared unlikely to challenge the use of United States legal-tender notes or government bonds as the foundation of national bank currency.
But both systems had serious weaknesses.
The greenback had originally been created as a wartime emergency measure.
It was supposed to be temporary.
Instead, the government had allowed it to become a permanent part of the monetary system.
In effect, the United States government had remained in the banking business through a currency system created for war.
The foundation of national bank currency was also questionable.
Paper money should not ultimately be backed by more paper.
Even United States bonds, however safe they might be, were still promises of payment rather than actual cash.
A sound currency system should instead be based on assets that could quickly be converted into cash and ultimately redeemed in gold.
Government bonds were simply evidence that the government owed money.
Eventually those debts would be paid off.
The sooner the monetary system stopped depending on them, the better.
The committee probably understood the danger of making a sudden change.
The existing system was deeply established.
Trying to replace it too quickly might create an even worse crisis.
For that reason, the committee seemed inclined to expand national bank currency on the existing foundation.
It also favored branch banking and allowing large banks to rediscount loans for smaller banks.
But there was one reform that deserved much stronger support:
the abolition of the Sub-Treasury system.
The Sub-Treasuries were essentially government banks.
But unlike ordinary banks, they locked up the money they received until the Treasury later spent it.
That removed money from circulation precisely when the financial system needed it most.
The damage became especially serious during periods of monetary stress.
Recently, government receipts had been far greater than government spending.
That meant enormous amounts of money were being pulled into the Treasury and kept there.
The result was an even greater shortage of money in New York.
On the Stock Exchange, call-loan rates had repeatedly swung between 15 and 30 percent.
On one extraordinary occasion, the rate reached 125 percent.
That was not a normal money market.
It was an extreme distortion.
Such violent fluctuations were especially dangerous because New York was the financial center of the United States.
The New York Stock Exchange was effectively the country's financial barometer.
If New York experienced wild swings in interest rates, the consequences could spread far beyond Wall Street.
New York could not hope to become the world's leading financial center while allowing such violent fluctuations to continue.
Europe provided a useful comparison.
In London, Paris, Berlin, and other major European financial centers, interest rates moved within a much narrower range.
They generally stayed between 3 and 5 percent, with only occasional movements a few points above or below that range.
Nothing resembling New York's violent 15, 30, or 125 percent rates was normal there.
So why should such things be possible in New York?
One immediate reform would be to change the way the government handled surplus money.
Congress should require the Treasury to deposit government funds above its normal working balance of $50 million in national banks.
The banks could pay the government 2 percent interest on those deposits.
That would keep excess government money in circulation instead of locking it inside the Sub-Treasuries.
Bank notes should also be treated more like ordinary bank deposits.
They were simply another form of bank obligation, payable on demand.
They should therefore be subject only to restrictions necessary to guarantee their safety, acceptability, and redemption in gold or, for as long as they remained outstanding, United States legal-tender notes.
The currency system also needed greater flexibility.
I would not destroy the value of government bonds as a foundation for bank notes.
But banks should perhaps be allowed to issue somewhat more notes against those bonds.
The amount could be higher than the bonds' face value, though never higher than their average market value.
More importantly, national banks should be allowed to issue a limited amount of currency against their general assets.
That currency could be protected by a common guarantee fund.
When money became plentiful and the extra currency was no longer needed, a graduated tax could encourage banks to withdraw it from circulation.
The exact limits would require careful judgment.
But both the amount of asset-backed currency and the tax should be kept moderate.
This would be much better than an emergency currency carrying a very high tax.
The experience of American banking suggested that the danger was manageable.
From 1864 through June 1905, national banks had paid about $96.2 million in taxes on their circulation.
During that entire period, failed banks had only $17.3 million of notes outstanding.
Since creditors of failed banks had recovered an average of 77.95 percent of their claims, the estimated loss on those notes would have been only about $3.8 million.
That experience suggested that a guarantee fund financed by existing circulation taxes could probably protect bank-note holders adequately.
I would also make asset-backed currency a first claim on the assets of the issuing bank.
Banks should be able to redeem their notes at designated redemption centers in major cities.
There would be no reason to send every note to Washington.
Local redemption would be faster and cheaper.
It would also make the currency more flexible.
When money was plentiful, banks could retire excess notes more easily.
When money became scarce, they could expand circulation again.
That natural expansion and contraction would help prevent excessive speculation during periods of abundant money.
Canada already had several central cities where bank notes could be redeemed.
We could adopt a similar system.
But I would not copy Canada's rule requiring banks to have at least $500,000 in capital before they could issue notes.
A large number of banks can provide safety just as effectively as a small number of giant institutions.
The Sub-Treasuries could also be turned into redemption centers for national bank notes.
That would make them useful instead of allowing them simply to drain money from circulation.
There was, however, one proposal that I strongly rejected.
Some people wanted to establish a giant Wall Street bank with $50 million or more in capital.
Its purpose would be to provide loans to Stock Exchange borrowers and regulate interest rates, much as the Bank of England did in Britain.
That was the wrong solution.
Such a bank would immediately create jealousy among other banks.
It would possess special privileges and would become a financial monopoly.
America did not need another Bank of the United States.
Nor did it need a "Bank of Banks."
The Bank of England and Bank of France were unique institutions because they had developed over centuries.
They had grown alongside their respective governments and economies.
Their authority came not simply from their size but from their history and established position.
America could not simply create an equivalent institution overnight.
But there was another possibility.
The New York Clearing House might be able to perform some of these functions.
If its member banks agreed, it could establish a committee to announce a minimum and maximum interest rate for call loans and discounts.
The rates would not initially have to be compulsory.
Even a recommendation from the Clearing House would carry enormous moral influence.
If Wall Street banks supported the system, they would probably follow it.
And if the members formally approved the rules, the Clearing House could eventually enforce them with penalties.
That could provide a practical solution to the problem of extreme interest rates on the Stock Exchange.
At the same time, Congress should make the national currency more flexible by allowing banks to issue currency against approved assets, subject to supervision by the Comptroller of the Currency.
Other countries had already used systems like this successfully.
America's greatest monetary weakness was its lack of elasticity.
Strictly speaking, no currency based on government bonds could ever be as flexible as one based directly on gold.
But under existing conditions, government bonds were nearly as secure as gold.
The real problem was the restrictions placed on bank notes.
The law of 1882 made it unnecessarily difficult to retire notes.
That restriction should be removed.
Banks should be able to reduce their currency when money was plentiful and increase it again when demand returned.
That would allow the currency supply to rise and fall naturally with economic conditions.
Our existing system also wasted enormous amounts of banking power.
There were about $544.8 million in national bank notes but only $337.1 million in United States legal-tender notes.
Once gold was excluded from consideration, it made little sense to require the larger amount of bank currency to be redeemed in the smaller amount of government currency.
The system had effectively tied up more than half a billion dollars of banking capital in a form that could not be used for other purposes.
The capital was safe, but it was trapped.
That was inefficient.
Bank reserves had also fallen sharply.
The reserve ratio to loans had dropped from more than 20 percent in 1898 to less than 15 percent.
The banking system therefore needed stronger reserves.
The law requiring national bank notes to be redeemed in greenbacks had been created when greenbacks were far more plentiful than bank notes.
Now the situation had reversed.
The tail was wagging the dog.
The law no longer matched economic reality.
But there was an even larger reform that America needed.
We needed to connect our money market more closely with the rest of the world.
There should be a system that could provide gold immediately whenever America faced a shortage.
But there was no reason to physically ship the gold across the Atlantic.
Instead, we should establish an International Gold Transfer System, essentially an international clearing house for gold.
Under such a system, America could obtain gold from Europe instantly through cable transfers.
Europe could do the same from America when necessary.
The old system of physically shipping gold back and forth across the ocean was wasteful.
Gold in circulation was useful.
Gold sitting inside a ship crossing the Atlantic was doing nothing.
The practice was almost like a ridiculous dance.
Gold moved from America to Europe when exchange rates made it profitable.
Then, sometimes only days later, the same gold was shipped back when market conditions suddenly changed.
It was an expensive and inefficient system.
Modern communications had made international financial transactions almost instantaneous.
Yet bankers were still transporting heavy boxes and kegs of gold across the ocean as though nothing had changed.
The costs were enormous.
There were packing costs, transportation costs, freight charges, insurance, interest lost while the gold was in transit, and even physical loss caused by abrasion.
There were also commissions and the possibility of robbery, accidents, or shipwreck.
All of this was unnecessary.
The major banks of America and Europe could simply keep large gold deposits on both sides of the Atlantic.
They could then issue international clearing-house certificates and bills of exchange against those deposits.
The gold could remain safely where it was.
If necessary, the Bank of England in London and the United States Sub-Treasury in New York could serve as the actual custodians of the gold.
We already had clearing houses for ordinary bank checks.
New York had a clearing system for Stock Exchange transactions.
London had its own bank clearing house.
So why not extend the same principle internationally?
Why physically move gold when a telegraph could transfer the financial claim in minutes?
An international gold clearing system would make trade faster, cheaper, and safer.
There was simply no good reason to move gold unnecessarily when certificates representing deposited gold could accomplish the same thing.
The absurdity of the existing system became obvious when the same gold was sometimes shipped to Europe and then shipped back to America only a few days later.
A sudden change in exchange rates could make the return shipment profitable.
The whole process resembled a comic dance across the Atlantic.
Unfortunately, bankers were paying real money for it.
As world gold production increased, the wastefulness of this system would become even more obvious.
Modern financial systems should match the speed of the telegraph and telephone.
An international gold clearing house would do exactly that.
If such a system had existed earlier, the Treasury Secretary would not have needed to take the unusual step of making secured loans to certain banks to encourage them to import gold from Europe.
His plan had been designed to relieve the money market temporarily.
The banks would repay the government once the gold arrived.
Under the circumstances, his action was wise.
It was especially fortunate because the San Francisco disaster soon created an enormous additional demand for money.
His action may have prevented the situation from becoming much worse.
But it was still only a temporary solution.
It depended on extraordinary government action and raised serious questions about the limits of Treasury authority.
It should therefore not be treated as a permanent remedy.
Instead, it demonstrated the need for a permanent international gold-transfer system.
Europe would benefit from such a system just as much as America.
The Treasury Secretary had also acted wisely by increasing government deposits in national banks while government receipts were running far above expenditures.
That helped keep some of the government's money in circulation instead of allowing it all to disappear into the Sub-Treasuries.
But again, this was only a temporary fix.
As long as the Sub-Treasury system remained in place, Congress should give the Treasury authority to deposit customs and internal-revenue receipts in national banks during periods of monetary stress.
When government receipts exceeded expenditures and the Treasury had more than enough working capital, excess funds should be placed with the banks.
The banks could pay the government perhaps 2.5 or 3 percent interest on these deposits.
The amount should be limited to no more than 25 percent of the bank's paid-up and unimpaired capital.
The government should be able to demand the money back at any time.
These special deposits would not need separate collateral, but they should have first priority against the banks' assets.
Taken together, these reforms could transform the American monetary system.
They would make the supply of currency more flexible.
They would reduce violent swings in interest rates.
They would prevent government money from being unnecessarily locked away.
They would strengthen bank reserves.
They would make international transfers of gold faster and cheaper.
And they would give the entire financial system greater stability.
The goal should not simply be more money. The goal should be a monetary system capable of expanding when business needs it and contracting when excess money creates dangerous speculation.
That was the flexibility America desperately needed.
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