Wall Street During the Civil War
Wall Street stepped in to help the government when the country was in its greatest hour of danger. At the beginning of the war, the Treasury did not even have enough money to pay the interest on the national debt. The government was in a desperate financial position.
Secretary of the Treasury S. P. Chase sent instructions to Mr. Cisco, the Sub-Treasurer in New York.
“Do everything you can to raise the money we need,” Chase told him. “The nation’s credit must be protected.”
Cisco immediately went to the leading bankers, financiers, and operators on Wall Street.
“The Treasury is nearly empty,” he explained. “Within a few days, the government must pay interest on its outstanding obligations. If we cannot raise the money, government securities may be dishonored.”
The men understood the seriousness of the situation at once.
“If the government’s credit collapses,” one of them said, “the consequences could be disastrous.”
The danger went far beyond a temporary financial problem. If the government could not meet its obligations, confidence in every form of American security could be shaken. The value of property and investments could fall sharply, and the entire financial system might be thrown into chaos.
The outlook was extremely bleak.
The country was divided against itself. The survival of the Union itself was uncertain. European governments and financiers were watching the crisis closely. Many of them were anything but friendly toward the United States and were waiting for an opportunity to see the divided nation fail.
It seemed as though everything was working against the Union.
At such a critical moment, Wall Street did not stand aside.
The leading men of the Street gathered together and decided that they had to help the government escape its financial crisis.
Of course, they did not do it for free.
They charged the government twelve percent interest on the loan.
But considering the enormous risk involved, the rate was not unreasonable. At that moment, it was extremely difficult for the government to borrow money at any rate.
European lenders regarded lending to the United States as an extraordinarily dangerous proposition. The risk seemed almost comparable to what Americans today might think of buying worthless Confederate currency or the old Georgia bonds.
London’s Lombard Street was therefore in no mood to lend money to the United States.
Even the Rothschilds, among the most powerful financial interests in Europe, refused to advance money to the government.
Money was expensive, and the government had to pay whatever rate the market demanded.
There was even a strange situation in which private property was considered safer collateral than the government’s promise to pay.
The reasoning was simple, if not exactly patriotic.
“The country may survive even if its present government does not.”
But the government did survive.
The American system of government, which I believe is the best the world has yet seen, endured the crisis and preserved the nation’s independence.
A great deal of credit for that survival belongs to the men of Wall Street who acted quickly and raised the money needed to keep the government financially alive when the rebellion was still in its early stages.
Had they failed, the defeat at Bull Run might have become a decisive disaster for the Union.
The country might have fallen into complete disorder, perhaps leaving no alternative but a dictatorship to restore some kind of stability.
The loan arranged during this crisis led to the issue of twelve-percent Treasury notes.
Afterward, the government was able to borrow at lower rates.
Then came the eleven-percent notes, followed by the 10¾-percent issue, and eventually the famous 7-30 Treasury notes.
The 7-30s became extremely popular. They were successfully sold throughout the country and eventually replaced at maturity by the 5-20 bonds.
Jay Cooke saw the opportunity immediately.
Using the same basic idea, he later introduced his famous 7-30 Northern Pacific Railroad bonds.
Cooke seemed to have discovered a formula for selling 7-30 bonds to the public.
Clergymen bought them.
Sunday-school teachers bought them.
Prominent citizens and public benefactors bought them.
Then the crash came.
The Northern Pacific project became the chief cause of Cooke’s financial ruin, and countless other investors were dragged down with him into the same speculative disaster.
Yet even this tragedy was not entirely harmful.
The Northern Pacific was certainly one of the major and immediate causes of the panic of 1873, which I shall discuss more fully later.
But the railroad itself performed an enormous service for the country.
It helped open the Far West and develop its natural resources. It became one of the great arteries of the western railroad system, bringing new energy and lasting economic life to the vast regions beyond the Rocky Mountains.
Looking back over my twenty-eight years in Wall Street, I have repeatedly seen the same pattern.
Events that first appeared to be terrible disasters were often followed by benefits that partly balanced the damage.
The same thing happened after the panic of 1857.
It happened again after the financial upheaval of 1873.
And although I can only rely on historical records when discussing the earlier years of Wall Street, the same pattern appears to have followed the panic of 1837.
So the old saying that history repeats itself has certainly proved true on Wall Street.
As I reflect on all this, many other important thoughts come rushing into my mind.
The most striking thing is the extraordinary progress Wall Street made during the twenty-eight years I have been describing.
But Wall Street was only part of a much larger transformation.
Almost every aspect of life had advanced at an astonishing speed during the same period.
What interests me most is the role Wall Street men played in this enormous development.
The more I study the subject, the larger it becomes.
I feel rather like the Irishman who climbed to the top of a mountain. After recovering from his surprise at the view, he exclaimed:
“I never realized the world was so large!”
I feel much the same way.
“I never realized Wall Street was so large.”
Nor did I understand how far-reaching Wall Street's activities were until I began writing about them.
The closer I look, the more extensive—and, in many respects, the more constructive—the Street appears to be.
I only hope I can make this point clear to some of my clerical friends and others who have formed their opinions about Wall Street from rumors and unreliable stories.
Many of these people mean well.
But unfortunately, their enthusiasm has sometimes led them to spread misleading ideas about a world they have never really understood.
If we try to measure the progress of civilization fairly, I believe we can say that humanity made more material progress during the thirty years under discussion—especially in everything connected with a higher standard of civilization and the greatest good for the greatest number—than it had made during all the centuries since Herodotus, the so-called father of history, first began recording the real and imaginary stories of mankind.
Wall Street played a surprisingly large role in this transformation.
If its contribution were examined in full, it would require a book much larger than the one I have time to write.
For now, I can only touch on the most important subjects and major events in Wall Street’s long and sometimes dramatic history.
I can also briefly describe the lives of some of the remarkable people who became famous through speculation and the financial affairs of the nation.
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